



Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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Joint Control of Nuclear Forces Urged

PM0308161993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition pp 1-2

["Commentary" by Deputy Desk Editor Vyacheslav Kocherov: "Creatures Born To Fly Can Also Spread Across the Face of the Earth"]

[Text] A briefcase has been quietly spirited away, as they say. Not at Kazan Station [notorious for thefts], however, but from Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov's office. And not a briefcase full of clothes, but the one containing the nuclear button. As a result the levers of Strategic Forces command and control have passed to the complete and undivided possession of the Russian minister of defense. In the flurry of events of differing significance the incident of the complete "privatization" of the nuclear button has gone almost unnoticed by the public and has not given rise to any serious objections from the CIS member states.

Although previously adopted documents on this matter confirm that the CIS participants jointly formulate policy on nuclear issues and recognize to an equal extent the need for joint command of the Strategic Forces and the preservation of joint control over nuclear weapons and other types of mass-destruction weaponry, it is Russia, however, that retains the dominant place in the collective security system. The point is that those with access to the nuclear button—apart from the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces [JAF] and the presidents of all the states with nuclear weapons located on their territory—included the Russian defense minister, since the Strategic Rocket Forces commander in chief and the CIS JAF deputy commander in chief for this area of responsibility was, first and foremost, a deputy defense minister.

And there is an explanation for this. Seventy percent of mass destruction forces and weapons systems are located in Russia, which is responsible to the world community for them. Incidentally, Moscow, not Kiev, is the site of the defense ministry to which the tried and tested threads of control of a unified diabolical machine ready to spring instantaneously into action at the first signal from the nuclear button stretch from all corners of the former USSR. And the people with the best understanding of the machinery of these interconnections are the commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Defense Ministry located in the same building on the Arbat which used to house the USSR Defense Ministry.

Taking this factor into account, last year the presidents of the CIS states adopted a wise decision: Each commander in chief of a branch of the Armed Forces would have to perform the duties of CIS JAF deputy commander in chief for his own area of responsibility. If this decision had been implemented in practice, it would have been possible to save the unified air defense system from disintegration and we would not have the current Black Sea Fleet problem—a problem supremely stupid

in form and tragic in content—since the Navy commander in chief would still be the single and indivisible commander of all the fleets and flotillas. In brief, a unified organism of the most important armed forces systems would have been preserved despite the parade of sovereignties. As for access to the nuclear button, which had become more of a subject of political games by that time, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had real access to it on an equal basis, and only by agreement with them could the president of Russia make a decision to use the weapons.

Strange as it may seem, however, it was Russia which was the first to disagree with this approach to solving the collective security problem. Not even six months had passed after General Maksimov, commander in chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, had been appointed deputy commander in chief of the CIS JAF when, by presidential edict—without explanation and without consultation with the other heads of state—he was released from the post of rocket forces commander in chief and Russian deputy defense minister and, as a consequence, was no longer able to perform duties in the CIS JAF High Command since he no longer had the corresponding services, personnel, and command and control centers under his jurisdiction.

Many military experts believe that this was done with just one aim—that of removing the commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces from the CIS JAF High Command. We also have the Russian defense minister's opinion on this point: No kind of leadership of the Strategic Forces can be exercised by the CIS JAF High Command. Why not? Because, in Grachev's view, command and control of these forces on the territory of Russia and Belarus is already exercised by the Russian Defense Ministry. As for the nuclear forces of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, their state affiliation must be determined on a bilateral basis, but the possibility must be examined in the near future of unplugging the neighboring groupings from the system of centralized combat command and control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces.

How is this stance to be explained? Maybe the defense minister is motivated by his native peasant gumption, thinking that this way it will work out "cheaper" for us? But no, the 14 February 1992 Agreement Between the CIS Member States on the Status of the Strategic Forces stipulates that these forces must be maintained out of fixed contributions by all the signatory states. So now, it seems, Russia alone is taking the burden of their maintenance on its own shoulders?

Judging by General Grachev's stance, new upheavals await us in the near future, this time connected with the sharing out of the Strategic Forces, with all the ensuing consequences. The "expropriation" of the nuclear briefcase confirms yet again that Russia, regrettable as it may be, is looking more and more unreliable from day to day as a partner both for the so-called nearby foreign countries and for foreign states proper, since it is Russia that is violating the Treaty Between the USSR and the

United States on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Lisbon Protocol to which stipulates that "the nuclear arms of the former USSR will remain under the secure, strict, and reliable control of a single joint command."

In the opinion of a number of military experts, in response to Russia's unilateral actions with regard to the Strategic Forces, Belarus and Kazakhstan could declare their own status as nuclear states, despite the fact that Nursultan Nazarbayev is the most consistent advocate of integration in the military sphere. Incidentally, such attempts can already be observed on the part of Ukraine.

What is the way out of this situation? In the view of many officers whom I have spoken with both at the Defense Ministry and at CIS JAF headquarters, what should be done is to take the path of setting up a small staff (in the form of a Nuclear Planning Committee) for command and control [upravleniye] of nuclear forces, under the joint command of the CIS JAF and with the participation of representatives of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. And the leadership of this staff should be vested in the Strategic Rocket Forces commander in chief. That is to say, the best option is a return to the wise decision by all the presidents last year, concerning the dual subordination of the commanders in chiefs of branches of the armed forces. That is the view of the majority of sensible high-ranking military men in Russia.

As for the reaction of the defense ministers of the CIS states to the situation concerning the leadership of the Strategic Forces, we will presumably learn what it is next week, when there is to be a meeting of the council of defense ministers to examine the questions of the CIS JAF commander in chief and the commander of the Strategic Forces. It remains to be hoped that the defense ministers will find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem that has arisen.

Uzbek President Urges Expansion of Tajik Peace Talks

MK0308134793 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Vera Kuznetsova report: "Dushanbe Wants To Conquer Badakhshan. A Large War May Break Out There in September"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Tajik leadership, despite calls for a political settlement of the conflict heard from all sides both in Tajikistan itself and on the Tajik-Afghan border, is very reluctant to hold talks with forces that do not support them. The situation in Gornyy Badakhshan is getting more complicated every day. According to border guards, large forces will be amassed in Afghanistan opposite this area by September, and an outright war may break out.

The presidents of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan suggest that the Tajik leadership start talking with the opposition. Karimov believes that a national accord may be reached in Tajikistan by holding new elections. Representatives of various security services note, however, that the time for new democratic elections has long passed. At present, only horizontal talks between clans are possible in some areas of Tajikistan.

Nonetheless, the governments of Central Asian countries and Russia are hoping that the earlier announced quadrilateral meeting to resolve the conflict will take place. [Uzbek President] Islam Karimov, however, believes that this meeting should be expanded: It should be attended not only by Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, but also by Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and other countries that have influence on the warring factions in Afghanistan should also be invited. As for Afghanistan, only Rabbani said he wishes to attend the talks. Hikmatyar, who represents a different faction and whose military units are deployed right on the Tajik-Afghan border, has so far refused to enter into negotiations.

'Right-Wing' Baltic Youth Organization Formed

WS0308123993 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1835 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, August 2—Six Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian right-wing youth organisations united on Monday [2 August] and established the Baltic Organisation of Young Democrats (BODY).

"BODY is a bridge that co-ordinates political activities of the Baltic right-wing youth," the chairman of the new organisation, Ken-Marti Vaher, deputy head of the Estonian Res Publica youth association, told ETA.

BODY will organise joint activities, exchange information, publish an information bulletin and co-ordinate relations with the Baltic and other youth organisations, Vaher said.

BODY's headquarter will be in Tallinn as the organisation was initiated by Estonia's association Res Publica joining all the country's right-wing youth organisations.

Central Asian Trade Union Meeting Discusses Ties

LD3107134593 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 2300 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] The Kyrgyzstan Council of Trade Union Federation has received colleagues from a number of sovereign countries. Yesterday saw the end of a session of trade union coordinative council members from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Delegations from Ukraine, Moldova, as well as the leaders of FITUR, which is the legitimate successor to the All-Union Central Trade Unions Council, were present as guests.

This was the fourth meeting of leaders from the largest public movement, which stands for the protection of social rights. In three days of work at issue were problems encountered during the trade union centers' activities aimed at protecting the social and economic interests of the working people, and the implementation of documents passed at the meeting of the coordinative council in Tashkent, Almaty, and Baku on the restoration and establishment of interrepublican economic ties, which are the correct way of improving the economy and preventing the further decline of production. The stance of trade unions in determining the price for labor under the transition to market relations was discussed, as well as concerted actions by trade union centers with regard to improving and developing the legal and normative basis in the sphere of labor protection under new economic conditions.

The participants visited a number of the capital's industrial enterprises and trade union rest homes on Issyk-Kul lake. It was decided to continue the practice of holding such sittings in future.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 4 Aug

LD0408060593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0546
GMT 4 Aug 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 4 ITAR-TASS—National newspapers today continue commenting on the assassination of Russian Vice-Premier Viktor Polyanichko in the zone of the Osset-Ingush conflict in the Caucasus. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI says the leadership of North Ossetia held an emergency joint meeting of the parliament presidium and government to demand that the culprits be brought to account. North Ossetian parliament Chairman Akhsarbek Galazov said the act of terror pursued one goal—"To destabilise the situation in the zone under the state of emergency and stock confrontation between the multinational republic and Russia's peace-keeping forces".

The Ingush leadership said in a statement that the committed crime was backed by "powerful, well organised forces rejecting peaceful means of settling the Osset-Ingush conflict.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA publishes an article citing the Ingush Security Ministry's protest against an allegation that Ingushes were somehow party to the crime. Polyanichko's leadership of the temporary administration, albeit very brief, inspired hope that "impartial information provided by the head of the temporary administration from the zone under the state of emergency to the president and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation" was about to drastically change the situation for tens of thousands of Ingush refugees.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) carries on its front page an interview given by Viktor Polyanichko a day before he was killed in an ambush. Responding to a question about ways out of the dramatic situation in the zone of the Osset-Ingush conflict, Polyanichko said that he was a firm believer in the peaceful settlement and the force of people's diplomacy. He explained that the strength his own policy was in this reliance on the wisdom of nations and people's diplomacy. "I assure you that not a single shot will be fired in the conflict zone on my order and no innocent blood will be spilled. As long as I am here, there will be no war", Polyanichko said.

As concerns the pivotal problem of the conflict, Polyanichko said it was the relocation of refugees who are numbering about 100,000.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries a report about the situation on the Tajik border with Afghanistan. It says the Russian president's special envoy Anatoliy Adamishin met President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan during his visit to Ashgabat. It was noted during the conversation that the border of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan is stable and that political means must be used to settle the Tajik-Afghan conflict.

According to a Russian diplomat, Turkmenistan's position in this matter echoes that of Uzbekistan which has also stabilised its border with Afghanistan enabling it to carry on effective cross-border commercial activity. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA says the Russian president's envoy came to understand, as a result of his "Central Asian tour and discussion of the Tajik-Afghan problem with all regional leaders, that a 'Tajik-Tajik' conflict is central in the situation and needs to be resolved the soonest possible. Adamishin meant the lasting conflict between the present Tajik Government and the 60,000-strong opposition entrenched in neighbouring Afghanistan. [no closing quotation marks as received]

The political and economic situation in Kyrgyzstan is covered in an article published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, which says that the results of President Askar Akayev's rule are "lamentable" because he has failed to set the national economy back on track. "More than 100 major industrial enterprises are operating short working hours every day or a short working week", the newspaper reports. Every third industrial worker is redundant. Nearly 70 per cent of the republic's population live below the poverty line". [quotation marks as received]

PRAVDA makes a lot of allegations of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's worsening state of health. PRAVDA points out that the German newspaper DIE WELT published a comment saying that political opposition in Moscow was spreading rumours about bad health of the president of the Russian federation. PRAVDA cites DIE WELT as saying that opposition forces are using the rumours as a weapon in the struggle for power, in the course of which they are seeking to oust the president by any means.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Karasin Holds Briefing**Troops Not Involved in Gorno-Badakhshan**

LD0308130693 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1148 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondents Sergey Staroselskiy and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Aug—Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Department for Information and Press of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing today that Moscow is concerned about clashes between government forces and local formations in Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast.

The diplomat recalled that several posts protecting the Tajik-Afghan border are situated in this remote mountainous area of the autonomous oblast. The representative of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry expressed his opinion that the escalation of armed clashes in Gorno-Badakhshan would be "undesirable and counterproductive", especially in the context of current efforts to stabilize the situation on the border and to establish political dialogue inside the country in order to achieve national reconciliation there.

Karasin added that it is Moscow's opinion that Tajikistan's National Armed Forces could be used more effectively, in their direct line of duty, to protect—first and foremost—the country's frontiers. The director of the Department for Information and Press of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry also said that subunits of the Russian Federation 201st Division and Russian Federation border troops are not involved in any way in clashes in Gorno-Badakhshan. The attitude of local authorities toward them is fair.

Warns Against 'Hasty Actions' in Bosnia

LD0308130793 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1215 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondents Sergey Staroselskiy and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Aug—"The main thing now is not to allow the break-up of the Geneva talks process by inappropriate hasty actions," director of the news and press department of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Grigoriy Karasin said today at a briefing. This was his comment on the declared disposition of a number of states, including the United States, to employ methods of force in Bosnia.

The Foreign Ministry representative emphasized: "In Moscow we proceed from the fact that the only instance when resolutions of the UN Security Council do not exclude the use of aircraft is in the event of its having to do directly with the protection of the UN peacemaking forces, and this approach will be firmly adhered to."

Discusses Air Strikes in Bosnia

PM0408100593 Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian* 4 Aug 93 p 7

[Maksim Natin report: "Moscow's Reaction..."]

[Text] What is the Russian diplomatic service's position on the question of NATO air strikes in Bosnia? Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, requested that it be borne in mind that the Foreign Ministry's analysis of the situation in the former Yugoslavia is currently based not on its own information, but on press reports.

In his 31 July statement, Minister A. Kozyrev stressed that Russia is in favor of displaying "maximum restraint in resolving matters in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina."

"Moscow believes," Karasin pointed out, "that the use of military aviation to settle the problem is only justified if a direct threat arises to the lives of representatives of the UN peacekeeping forces."

Citizens in Khabarovsk Allege DPRK Loggers Steal Uranium

OW0308134393 Vladivostok *Radiostantsiya Tikhiiy Okean Maritime Network in Russian* 0715 GMT 3 Aug 93

[From the "Pacific Ocean" Program]

[Text] Inhabitants of Verkhnebureinskiy Rayon of Khabarovsk Krai maintain that North Korean loggers working in the area have opened concrete sealed uranium adits located near their settlements. This forgotten raw material was taken out in an unknown direction and has, in all probability, somehow been transported to the DPRK. Witnesses to these criminal acts by the North Korean citizens obviously prefer not to publicize their names. However, it is known that many Verkhnebureinskiy residents who were in the taiga saw the bustling Koreans near the open adits.

Did the official Korean representatives, leaders of the logging operations, know about this? So far, there are no answers to these questions.

PRC Hopes For 'Close Cooperation' in Space Exploration

LD0408105193 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1028 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Pavel Spirin]

[Text] Beijing August 4 TASS—"We hope for close cooperation with Russia in developing artificial Earth satellites," president of the Chinese Academy of Space Technologies, Professor Qi Faren told *ITAR-TASS* today.

Regrettably, only in the past few years Moscow and Beijing secured a real possibility of interaction in the field of the most advanced technologies, which were closed to outsiders until recently, he said.

However, the rich "space potential" accumulated by Russia and China inspires hopes for a prompt and successful beginning of joint work which would help realize the national space programmes of the two countries, Qi Faren said.

Specific guidelines for such cooperation will be identified in the course of talks between the leaders of the Chinese Academy of Space Technologies and a delegation from one of the leading Russian design bureaus which is due to arrive in the Chinese capital one of these days.

Japanese Diplomat Cites Goal of Improving Ties

LD0308142993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1337
GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vasily Golovnin]

[Text] Tokyo August 3 TASS—Kunihiko Saito, new first deputy foreign minister of Japan, said that the main diplomatic tasks of Tokyo at present are the preservation of close ties with the United States, the improvement of relations with Russia and the advancement of a dialogue on guaranteeing security in Asia.

Kunihiko Saito has taken now the highest post for a professional diplomat because usually a portfolio of a minister in this country is given to political figures from members of parliament.

In today's interview with a number of Japanese newspapers, Kunihiko Saito stressed that he did not worry about the coming to power in the country of a coalition cabinet to replace the one-party ruling of Liberal Democrats which lasted 38 years. The first deputy foreign minister noted that members of the new government coalition had already spoken for retaining the continuity in Japan's foreign policy.

According to Kunihiko Saito, the preparation for the visit of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Japan will begin in the second half of August.

Touching on the problems of Japanese diplomacy, the first deputy foreign minister said he would like the Japanese Government to express support for the permanent prolongation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible. According to the Japanese top diplomat, the delay with making such a decision has caused suspicions in some countries which should be immediately dispelled.

Kozyrev Outlines Priorities, Strategies in Tajikistan

PM0308202193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Aug 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev: "What Does Russia Want in Tajikistan?"]

[Text] While in Tajikistan at the height of the fratricidal clashes in that country in October of last year, and again on the Tajik-Afghan border this spring, I repeatedly asked myself those questions which are disturbing minds today. Why are kids from Ryazan and Smolensk defending the borders of another state, at times at the cost of their lives? Is Russia not being dragged into a situation of the Afghan type?

Answers to these crucial questions are provided by an analysis of Russia's national-state interests in Tajikistan.

The first and most important among these interests is solidarity with the multiethnic people of that country, which is connected with Russia by age-old links of history, culture, and traditions. This includes ensuring the safety and lawful rights of the 200,000-strong Russian community. We cannot abandon these people in any circumstances. Russia and Tajikistan are linked by a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid, signed 25 May 1993 in Moscow by Russian President B.N. Yeltsin and E. Rakhmonov, chairman of the Republic of Tajikistan Supreme Soviet.

Second—a shield against the spread of regional and clannish Islamic extremism in Central Asia. There is an abundance of inflammable tensions around Tajikistan. Next door the same forces are tearing Afghanistan to pieces. On the other side is the Fergana Valley. The volatile mixture of problems accumulated in the era of "Soviet enlightenment" has already exploded once in Osh. The zone of total instability and violence cannot be allowed to spread from Tajikistan's southern border to its other borders, right the way to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, threatening the entire Central Asian part of the CIS with a population of around 50 million people.

Third—safeguarding security in West and South Asia. In essence, what is developing on the Tajik border is a confrontation with those same forces of political extremism which are today operating not only in Afghanistan, but also in Iran and Pakistan. These forces are recklessly driving waves of instability northward, whipping up religious extremism, conflicts, and international terrorism far and wide. Incidentally, this must be remembered when deciding questions of military-technical or nuclear cooperation with countries of the region. Once again let me stress: The strictest possible observance of the regulations for the nonproliferation of nuclear and missile weapons and the corresponding know-how is our—Russia's—vital interest, and not someone else's (the United States and West Europe are much further from this conflict zone). The region is becoming increasingly susceptible to infiltration by the

arms trade and the drugs business, which are already energetically exploiting the chaos and instability in Afghanistan to their advantage.

All this threatens not only Russia but the world community as a whole, which should move from its temporizing stance toward actively supporting our efforts to stabilize the situation in this region of Asia and to sharing the burden of expenditure on peacekeeping forces. Talking to Western politicians, I have frequently had occasion to speak about a tragic paradox which is capable of resulting in major miscalculations. In the period of confrontation Afghanistan was in the spotlight of world politics as the beachhead for restraining Soviet communist expansion. But today, when global confrontation has been replaced by partnership, it proves impossible to keep "knocking on the door" of big politics until we attract attention and summon the forces needed for a settlement in that country engulfed by internecine strife.

The spectrum of our interests in Tajikistan has nothing in common with neoimperialist ambitions or, conversely, with an underestimation of Russia's special role and responsibility. Unfortunately, the opposition is trying to push us toward these extremes. At the same time the Supreme Soviet leaves the executive's requests for the allocation of additional contingents of border guards and peacekeeping forces or for ratification of the Treaty on Collective Security unanswered for months on end, and then gives its consent to them with great enthusiasm, as a rule after the latest casualties on the border. What is the value in this context of fine speeches in defense of the Russian-speaking population and threats which are as provocative as they are empty to all and sundry in the former union republics!

Nor can there be any suggestion whatever that we are supporting a "procommunist regime" in Tajikistan. Today there is a legitimate government in Dushanbe, formed by constitutional means and called on to guarantee state unity and stability. At the same time it is obvious that the swiftest possible progress to national consensus in the Republic of Tajikistan would accord with the interests of Tajikistan itself and our own interests in that region. The way toward this lies through dialogue between the national-ethnic communities and the country's regions, its leading political forces—both the ruling forces and the opposition forces (naturally, on the condition that the latter renounce the armed struggle) and religious authorities. It is also necessary to create firm legal and material-financial guarantees for the return of refugees. The first steps on this difficult road—albeit the only correct road toward consensus—are being made, but agreement must be reached now, immediately.

A one-track policy based on vengeance or ideological intolerance would lead only to more senseless loss of life. Russia will not compensate for a lack of political will for reconciliation in Tajikistan with the blood of its soldiers, as happened in Afghanistan. But the experience of Afghanistan also shows us something else. Hopes that, if

the Russians leave, peace and harmony will come virtually automatically are totally groundless. The main casualty would be the civilian population, and the aim of the warring sides—power—would turn out to be just as hard for them to achieve as in neighboring Afghanistan.

The key to peace in Tajikistan lies within the country, and, in view of the aforementioned external factors, diplomatic means of influencing the situation are extremely limited. All the same, the Russian president's foreign policy seeks to make use of all the country's possibilities in order to resolve the range of long-term, interconnected problems.

First. We are mobilizing our CIS partners which are directly affected by the crisis—Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan—to adopt effective measures to strengthen the defense capability of Tajikistan, including participation by their armed contingents in protecting the border. Russia cannot and will not be alone in defending the interests of the Central Asian members of the CIS.

Coordinated measures on Tajikistan have been worked out at all recent CIS meetings. In October of last year, on the initiative of the Russian president and with the participation of his personal representative, a meeting of leaders of Kazakhstan and the Central Asian states was held whose decisions helped to pull Tajikistan out of chaos and form a lawful government in the country. Another top-level meeting between Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian states, which is intended to open up a new phase of coordination in the Tajik sphere and in the Central Asian sphere as a whole, is scheduled in the next few days in Moscow.

Second, together with the members of the CIS, Western partners, and healthy forces in the Muslim world we are working persistently with Tajikistan's other neighbors with the aim of halting their direct or indirect support to the armed opposition, and then promoting the normalization of the situation. We advocate the creation of a new type of "club of friends of regional stability," which the Central Asian states, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan could join. The initiative of Kabul and Dushanbe to hold a meeting of representatives of Tajikistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan to normalize the situation and settle the refugee problem deserves to be supported.

Third, we advocate stepping up the peacekeeping role of the United Nations and the CSCE in Tajikistan. The United Nations is already giving useful assistance in the settlement of the refugee problem. The Security Council could adopt a decision on placing international observers on the border and giving financial support to the peacekeeping forces involving the participation of Russia and the Central Asian members of the CIS, and so on.

The CSCE, to which the Republic of Tajikistan belongs, could also make an important contribution to settling the Tajik conflict. I consider it a strategic success of Russian diplomacy that 18 months ago we secured

acceptance for the Central Asian republics of the former USSR into the common European process, with the ensuing commitments relating to the protection of human rights, the rights of ethnic minorities, and the development of democratic institutions. Now we have the right to present our partners in the West and in the East with the question of joint action in order to make sure that the principles of the Helsinki Act are gradually ratified in Central Asia too.

I cannot avoid making separate mention of the Russian servicemen in Tajikistan, who are heroically discharging their duty. It is not just high time to adopt measures relating to their combat equipment, reinforcement, and social protection—these are overdue. I also hope that that it is only bureaucratic and not political reasons that explain the hair-splitting of our financial organs in failing to allocate sufficient money to equip Russian diplomatic and consular missions both in Tajikistan and in other “hot” regions of the CIS.

The priorities of Russian policy in the Tajik sphere are as follows: to avert a new round of civil war in Tajikistan, to ensure the security of that country's multiethnic population, to lead it onto the path of democratization and national conciliation, and to protect the vast region of the CIS against an explosion of violence and extremism. I am sure that the people in Russia who are guided by not opportunistic reasons in the internal political struggle but by the long-term interests of the state will understand and support the president's policy on this.

Situation on Border Viewed

LD0308222693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1425 GMT 3 Aug 93

[“Tested by Tajikistan” program]

[Excerpts] [Unidentified narrator] This picturesque landscape opens up when you take a bird's eye view of the border. How Tajikistan's natural beauty contrasts with its political reality! After all, this place, the River Pyanj, is now one of the most troubled areas on the map of the CIS. This is where the second act, entitled Border, of the Tajik drama is being played out. This is where Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek soldiers are defending the southern borders of the commonwealth.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified interviewer] Should Russian border guards remain here or should they withdraw from here?

[Unidentified soldier] I think they should go.

[Unidentified elderly man] Of course I want to live here. I have no intention of leaving; it hasn't entered my head. [end recording]

[Narrator] These lads don't like posing for the cameras. They are no longer in a position to talk about what has happened. They don't even want to. All the same we met

some of them. They are Tajiks who are standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Russians.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified interviewer, addressing recruits in dormitory] How long did the fighting last?

[Unidentified recruit] From 0400 until 1500 the following night. Although I say it finished at 1500, we ourselves were involved until the following morning.

[Interviewer] When did reinforcements reach you?

[Recruit] Toward evening—and the following morning. To start with, we were frightened, of course. This is the first time we have been involved in such fighting. Then we saw the bodies of our friends. Of course we were frightened. I knew some of them. [Words indistinct] I knew them. Then we got over it. We organized the fighting against those mojahedin.

[Interviewer] Where do you come from?

[Recruit] Leninabad in Tajikistan.

[Interviewer] But Russians and representatives of other nationalities, as well as Tajiks, also fought together with you.

[Recruit] Yes. Russians, Tatars, and Uzbeks—from Uzbekistan— fought with us. All nations and ethnic groups have been with us at the outpost, living with us like brothers. [end recording]

[Narrator] Superficially, the capital of Tajikistan appears peaceful. Enterprises and institutions are working. Public transport is running. Fairs are being held on the city streets. But there, on the border, war is being waged. Many Russian citizens ask why the conflict in distant Tajikistan is of such concern to Russia, which does not even have a common border with Tajikistan? Why are Russian soldiers—rather than Uzbek, Kirghiz, or Kazakh ones—shouldering the main burden of guarding the southern borders of the Commonwealth? We hear various answers to this question. Usually they take the following form. In spite of the disintegration of the USSR, Russia, as a great power, continues to have geopolitical interests in the Central Asian countries. Finally, there are 300,000 Russian-speaking inhabitants of Tajikistan, whose lives would be jeopardized if an orgy of bloodletting broke out in that country. If Tajikistan falls into the hands of Islamic extremists, there would be the direct threat of fundamentalism spreading to other states of Central Asia. History has ordained that Tajikistan and Russia should be bound together by threads which cannot be severed overnight. One of these threads is the southern border of the CIS, which runs for 1,400 km.

But who is resisting the present Dushanbe government on the far side of the Pyanj?

[Begin recording of Anatoliy Chechulin, commander of Russian border guards in Tajikistan] The leaders of various antigovernment forces, based in the Islamic

State of Afghanistan and united under the aegis of the Islamic Revival Party which has set up the so-called Tajik government in exile, have concentrated forces and sharply stepped up their efforts to overthrow the present leadership of Tajikistan. In doing so, they have chosen to stage armed provocations across the state border, committed by substantial groupings of both Tajik fighters and Afghan mercenaries. To this end they have set up, trained, and armed—with assistance from some other states—certain groupings in border regions of Afghanistan. Border patrols of Russia's border forces stationed on the Tajik-Afghan section of the border have been subjected to shelling and attack over 100 times during the last three months alone. That is why this section of the border has become a combat barrier guarded by Russian border guards, men of Russia's 201st Motorized Rifle Division, and servicemen of Tajikistan's Defense Ministry, State Committee for National Security, and Ministry of Internal Affairs, a battalion of border guards from Kazakhstan, and, I think, a battalion of border guards from Kyrgyzstan who arrived the other day. I know how powerful this barrier is. At the same time I realize that it is difficult to hear each other amidst the din of gunfire. Therefore, clearly, the path of political solutions and interstate commitments and the search for accord is a shorter way of achieving peace in this region. [end recording]

[Narrator] Here is the border itself. Here, at the 10th outpost, it is relatively peaceful. The situation is worse at the 11th outpost, which we reached aboard an infantry fighting vehicle. The first attack on the Russian border guards occurred here at the 11th outpost, on 29 May. Several people were killed and about 10 injured. That was when the politicians and generals who are responsible for the security of our borders were forced to face up to the fact that these incidents could escalate into a large-scale conflict.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified man] Wonderful! How good this is!

[Unidentified interviewer] Hello, what's your name.

[Man] I am (Aleksandr Matroshin).

[Interviewer] Have you been on the border long?

[Man] Yes, I have been here 18 months already. Soon it will be two years.

[Interviewer] How long have you spent at this outpost?

[Man] I have been at this outpost since the beginning of summer.

[Interviewer] Have you been involved in any fighting?

[Man] In all of it, except the first shelling. The first incident was the only one I missed. I arrived after that.

[Interviewer] How often is there shelling here.

[Male voice in background] Every day.

[Man] Almost every day.

[Interviewer] Can you show us where the shelling comes from?

[Man] They shell...

[Interviewer interrupts] Tell us please.

[Man, pointing backwards] They shell from that side. [end recording]

[Narrator] Immediately after the attack on the outpost, it was decided to reinforce the Russian border outposts with men from the 201st motorized rifle division stationed in Tajikistan. Reinforcements from other parts of the republic and from Russia were sent to help the border guards. The amount of combat equipment available was doubled. Apart from conscripts, volunteers came to serve on the border under contract.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified interviewer] How long have you been stationed here?

[Tank commander] Four months. I'm into my fifth month.

[Interviewer] So you've come here on contract. Where were you living?

[Tank commander] I come from Smolensk.

[Interviewer] Smolensk.

[Tank commander] Yes, I have come here on contract. An army recruitment center told me that contracts to serve in Tajikistan were being offered.

[Interviewer] During the four months you've been here have you regretted the choice you made?

[Tank commander] No. I've no regrets.

[Interviewer] If it's not a secret, how much are you being paid?

[Tank commander] We're not paid much. This month we received 90 [currency not specified] each. So, it's not much.

[Interviewer] Have there been attacks on this outpost or shellings during the last four months?

[Tank commander] This outpost has not been attacked. But the 11th and 12th have been destroyed. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording of Abdumalik Abdullojonov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan] The fact is that our opponents on the other side are concerned that they are not in their country—that is, in Tajikistan—and they keep seeing themselves on the throne in Tajikistan where they want to set up an Islamic state. Of course I think they won't succeed in this because the people that live in Tajikistan, all the peoples that live in Tajikistan are against it.

[Unidentified interviewer] Do the forces opposed to you have any influence in this country, or do they mostly operate from abroad, using money given to them by Saudi Arabia and other Islamic states?

[Abdullojonov] Of course they did not stay here, but if the people had supported them, they would have certainly stayed. Since the people do not support them now, and never did, and I don't think they will ever support them, they all dispersed with the advent of the new government and leadership of the republic. They all left the republic.

[Interviewer] In your opinion, how effective is the peace-making role currently played by Russia and the Russian military deployed on the territory of Tajikistan and on the Tajik-Afghan border?

[Abdullojonov] How effective? Well, you know it is hard to overestimate the role of the Russian peacemaking forces, because if it had not been for the Russian peacemaking troops, the opposition would have broken through the border long ago. Thanks to Russia's peacemaking forces, thanks to the decision of the Russian Government, to the president and parliament of Russia they are unable to break through this border today. [end recording] [passage omitted: presenter discusses the pros and cons of withdrawing Russian troops from Tajikistan; people in Dushanbe street interviews say that they are not interested in Islamic fundamentalism and that the Russian troops should stay]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified interviewer] A group of parliamentarians headed by Yevgeniy Kozhokin, chairman of the Subcommittee for International Security and Intelligence under the Russian Supreme Soviet, has visited the border.

Haven't you got an impression that we are being deliberately drawn into a new Afghan war?

[Yevgeniy Kozhokin, chairman of the Subcommittee for International Security and Intelligence under the Russian Supreme Soviet] I do not think that anyone can draw us into anything unless we ourselves get involved. And it seems to me that this border, the Tajik-Afghan border, is a very special place, because it happens to be a Russian border at the same time. We simply have no other border in the south, no other border that needs defending. We are already in Tajikistan, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division is deployed there; there are masses of people in Tajikistan who are closely linked with Russia, and also a considerable proportion of Tajikistan's citizens does not want the Russians to go away from there.

[Leonid Petukhov, deputy chairman of the Committee for Internationalist Soldiers in the CIS] The opinion one currently hears in the media, that it would be better to withdraw from there, seems short-sighted to me. The reason why it is short-sighted is, first of all, that we have no guarantees that the events that we, participants of the war in Afghanistan, saw there will not sweep Tajikistan

tomorrow, and will they go no further than Tajikistan or will they expand? Then there is another consideration that we must bear in mind, that besides being a channel for drug trafficking, which was mentioned by Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich [Kozhokin does not mention this in the program], this is also a channel for supplying arms. And it will also be a channel for supplying fighters who are being trained by various instructors in Afghanistan, so there will be wide opportunities for terrorism. Also, we should not forget that in Tajikistan there are over 300,000 Russophones, as we call them now—which in fact means Slavs and other Russian-speaking nationalities—and these 300,000 should also be taken into consideration. So, if we withdraw from the area, we would be simply betraying those people.

[Interviewer] Well, obviously, the problem will be tackled along these lines.

[Kozhokin] On the other hand, it is quite clear that we won't be able to resolve it by purely military means. A clear-cut strategy, comprising political, economic, social, and, I would even say, sociocultural measures should be worked out. We must finally learn to understand our closest neighbors, who include Tajiks and Uzbeks. And it seems to me that a great intellectual effort should be made in order to see how Russia should live in this new world and what kind of policies Russia should pursue in Central Asia. If we fail to understand this and to work out this strategy, then we may end up with a defeat. [passage omitted]

Official To Meet Georgian, Abkhaz Envoys in Sukhumi

LD0308150493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1342 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchegoleva]

[Text] Sochi August 3 TASS—Head of the Russian team of the United Commission on Abkhazian Settlement and head of the Russian State Committee for Emergency Situations Sergey Shoygu left Sochi for Sukhumi today.

He will meet personal envoy of the Georgian state head Alexander Kavsadze and the leadership of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic to discuss on the organization of work of the state committee' operative group in Sukhumi and the introduction in the conflict zone of international peacemaking forces.

Deputy Reports 'Genocide' of Russians in Crimea

LD0308214493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] A correspondent from Moscow has reported that Yevgeniy Pudovkin, a Russian people's deputy, who chairs the Commission on the Status of Sevastopol, presented a fantastic sensation for Moscow and foreign correspondents on his return from the Crimea. He stated that the Ukrainian side has been taking unilateral actions

which are leading to the genocide of the Russian population in the Crimea and Sevastopol, and that the authorities are supposedly being replaced by representatives from western Ukraine. Moreover, a special plan has been [words indistinct]—by 100 percent for next year, and that the Security Service jeers at people when it finds out that it is dealing with Russians.

Perhaps it is not worth paying attention to these ravings, the Moscow correspondent emphasized, but Pudovkin is essentially expressing the view of the majority of his colleagues in parliament.

Bank Chairman Explains Why Notes Sent to Uzbekistan

PM0308114593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 3

[Undated statement by Central Bank Chairman V. Gerashchenko, published under headline "From the Russian Federation Central Bank"]

[Text] In connection with the urgent message from the Russian Federation finance minister to Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin and Russian Federation Prime Minister V.S. Chernomyrdin dated 31 July 1993, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation announces that the sale of Bank of Russia 1993-issue bank notes to the Republic of Uzbekistan Central Bank was carried out within the framework of interstate agreements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan dated 19 March 1993, the decisions of the government Commission on Questions of Credit Policy dated 20 May 1993, and Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No. 5291-1 dated 29 June 1993.

The aforementioned money will be used by Republic of Uzbekistan citizens traveling to Russia on business and personal trips following the withdrawal from circulation on Russian Federation territory of all bank notes issued before 1993.

In meeting this request from the Republic of Uzbekistan Central Bank, the Bank of Russia is also proceeding on the basis that the Republic of Uzbekistan's top leadership has expressed its readiness to use Russian Federation currency as legal tender on its territory and to pursue a coordinated financial and credit policy.

[Signed] V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation

Estonia's Russians Hurt by Media's 'One-Sided' Views

PM0308111793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 93 First Edition p 8

[Article by Narva City Soviet People's Deputies A. Gamazin and V. Yemelyanov: "Not All Russians in Estonia Have Been Deprived of Citizens' Rights"]

[Text] Narva—There has been a need for a long time now to draw the Russian mass media's attention to factual inaccuracies in reports from Estonia. We will not be contesting the assessments of correspondents here. We will merely adduce clarifications and corrections which substantially, in our view, alter the content of the articles.

Having made the decision to hold a referendum on creating an autonomous formation, the Narva City Soviet could not urge the population "to follow the constitutional road," as some correspondents report. A referendum to grant the status of autonomous national-territorial formations to one or two cities is at variance with the republic law "On the Bases of Local Self-Government" and the actual Constitution of Estonia. In terms of its state system Estonia is a single state whose administrative-territorial divisions are laid down by law.

It is surprising to see superficial judgments of the following type: "Around 95 percent of the population of the city of Narva is made up of non-Estonians. But they will not have a single representative of their own on the future city soviet." The inhabitants of Russia are undoubtedly unaware that in Narva (electorate 60,000) there are now over 9,000 adult citizens of Estonia; however, only around 3,000 are ethnic Estonians [sentence as published]. It is only possible to identify "non-Estonians" with "noncitizens" deliberately. Even the mayor of Narva, a native of Belarus, almost all his advisers, and the leaders of city departments and many Narva enterprises have long since obtained citizenship of Estonia. So there are people to elect to the city soviet.

"The children of non-Estonians will be able to study in their native language only as far as the ninth grade," correspondents go on to write—again, very inaccurately. First, this only involves schools financed by the state. Second, it is planned to enact this statute by the year 2005, that is to say, a whole generation of schoolchildren away. Third (and this is perhaps the most important consideration), no one is preventing the Narva municipality, which owns the schools, from gearing itself up over the next 11 years to finance instruction in Russian in the 10th and 11th grades.

This is the third year now that we have had our own higher education operating in Narva. As of 1 September a branch of the Leningrad State University Law Faculty is to open in the city. It is also worth noting that the president of Estonia has sent the law on schools and high schools back to parliament, thus it has not even been adopted yet.

And one more opinion which merely gives the appearance of correctness. All non-Estonians, we read in IZVESTIYA, having become aliens overnight, are now forced to apply for permission to continue living in Narva. The fact has already been stated that this does not apply to all. The fact that it was not "overnight" bears special comment. When, in February 1992, Estonia restored legal force to the 1938 Law "On Citizenship,"

the overwhelming majority of former citizens of the USSR did indeed not receive Estonian "nationality" automatically. But since then, over what is now 18 months, 35,000 of us inhabitants of Estonia have become citizens of Russia.

It is no secret that the campaign to take Russian citizenship in Narva has been artificially blown up and has even been encouraged in the city soviet. Now that a relatively strict law regulating the status of foreign citizens has been adopted, thousands of Estonian Russians have become the hostages of unscrupulous politicians.

What, then, is the way out of the trap legislatively set by parliamentary national radicals but sprung by the Narva activists of the Union of Russian Citizens? Staging a revolt, blocking the roads, suspending the laws? That means war. Proclaiming autonomous cities and rayons off our own bat? But what is to be done about Tallinn, where two-thirds of all Russians in Estonia live, and the 10 other settlements and towns where Russians predominate?

As a result of strong public pressure both inside and outside the republic Estonian President Meri sent the Law "On Aliens" back to parliament. On 8 July the State Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority almost all (19 out of 20) the CSCE recommendations on the draft law: In particular, the existing right to reside, right to work, and right to social welfare are guaranteed to those who hold an Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic permanent residence permit, that is to say who were settled here prior to 1 July 1990. The concepts "citizen of a foreign state" and "person without citizenship" have been separated. This opens up very broad scope for "aliens" to acquire full political rights (for example, after 6-7 years current stateless persons will not require knowledge of the state language to obtain Estonian citizenship).

Unfortunately, those who have had the bit of local power between their teeth in Narva and Sillamae since the eighties are put out by such a subtle legal option. This fall the former party-soviet nomenklatura will not get into the local city assemblies because they lack citizenship. The only way for them to hold on to power is to make those two cities autonomous or, more accurately, sovereign.

How will events go on to develop? We would like to read more objective information in Moscow publications. Superficial and one-sided articles from Russia principally affect us—the Russians in Estonia.

Country To Stand Up For Ethnic Russians

MK0308120093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 4

[Sergey Tsekhmistrenko report: "Russian-Estonian Relations. Russia Insists That Citizenship be Granted to All Who Wish it"]

[Text] Russia is ready to stand up resolutely for the interests of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. This conclusion can be drawn from last weekend's visit to Tallinn by a delegation of Russian experts led by Abdulakh Mikitayev, chairman of the Russian president's commission on citizenship. In talks with Estonian President Lennart Meri and Foreign Ministry head Trivimi Velliste, the Russian representatives implied in no uncertain terms that Russia would continue to insist on the Estonian side's fulfillment of the 1991 treaty on the bases of interstate relations that provides for the granting of citizenship on the basis of free will expressed by permanent residents.

According to observers' accounts, the Estonian side was unprepared for the Russian delegation's conducting dialogue in such a tough form, almost without any "diplomatic quibbles." During the latest visit, Abdulakh Mikitayev repeatedly stated that the treaty on the foundations of interstate relations of Russia and Estonia could serve as a legislative basis for the solving the citizenship issue. The Russian side unswervingly observes its provisions, having already granted Russian citizenship to all Estonians who wished it. Estonia, he thought, is supposed to take a similar step in regard to the republic's Russian-speaking residents.

To all appearances, the arguments of Moscow that, as Boris Yeltsin stressed in his statement of 24 June, is not going to remain in the position of a "passive observer" would be noted by Tallinn to a certain extent. Your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent has come to learn from competent sources in the Estonian capital that despite the assertion by Estonian officials about the immutability of the position on "Russian-speaking" aliens, the republic's State Assembly has started work on a draft law providing for a somewhat less rigid procedure of granting them citizenship.

In its attempts to wrench concessions from Estonia, Russia is banking on mediation from Sweden, traditionally regarded as "Estonia's protector." During the Russian-Swedish consultations between both foreign policy agencies that ended on 30 July, the Russian side noted the "useful role" played by Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt in defusing the interethnic tensions in Estonia in the wake of the adoption there of the notorious law "On Aliens." Russia's relations with the Baltic states are expected to occupy higher than last place on the agenda of Andrey Kozyrev's impending visit to Stockholm.

Yeltsin Pardons Ex-Deputy Commander Parfenov

LD0308173193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1700 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Zharkov]

[Text] Moscow August 3 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree today to pardon ex-deputy commander of the Riga Omon [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] police unit Sergey Parfenov, taking into account the long term of his imprisonment and the

application of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Parfenov shall be freed from further imprisonment, the presidential press service reports.

Ex-Riga Omon Deputy Commander Parfenov was arrested in Surgut, the Tyumen Region, in October, 1991, by the Latvian special team. On December 14, 1992, the Riga District Court sentenced him to four years of imprisonment (Article 161-1 Part 2 of the Latvian Criminal Code) "for his subordinates' attack at the Latvian Interior Ministry" and activities "aiming to overthrow the constitutional government of the Latvian Republic".

On July 31 he was passed over by the Latvian police to staffers of the Pskov interior department.

Before the pardon decree, Parfenov's wife Olga with four children planned to leave for Tyumen, where the local authorities offered them a three-room apartment. The Tyumen Omon unit reported, Parfenov, who was transferred to the area from Riga, fully preserves the post of deputy unit commander.

USAID Announces Program for Officers in Baltics

*WS0308130493 Tallinn BNS in English 1833 GMT
2 Aug 93*

[Text] TALLINN, Aug 02, BNS—The U.S. Agency for International Development announced an extensive program to help solve the problems of housing and retraining Russian officers withdrawn from the Baltic countries.

The United States plans to help finance the construction of 460 housing units for Russian officers and the retraining courses to help them reintegrate with civilian life, said the U.S. Embassy in Tallinn. The program costs 6 million U.S. dollars.

The aid program targets 460 officers demobilized in the Baltic states after April 1, 1993, who lack housing in Russia. The housing units will have a floor space of 60-70 square meters.

The program should last until July 31 next year. Ground-breaking is expected to begin later this month. The housing will be built in Nizhni-Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Volgograd and in the Lipetsk and Tula regions.

The Americans plan to use local labor and materials. The aid program is one of several agreements signed during the U.S.-Russian summit in Vancouver in April.

Author of Law on Religion Rejects U.S. Criticism

*PM0408101793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in
Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Vyacheslav Polosin, people's deputy and chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for

Freedom of Conscience and Links With Public, Religious, and Charitable Organizations: "What's the Fuss About, Overseas Messiahs?"]

[Text] The Russian Supreme Soviet's amendments to the law "On Freedom of Religion" have prompted a storm of indignation from Protestant communities, fundamentalist missionaries, and certain Russian publications. As the author of the amendments, I believe that it is the first legislative act in Russia adopted with a view to preserving our homeland's spiritual values.

Matters have even reached the point of diplomatic representations. On 21 July the U.S. ambassador to Russia handed Sergey Filatov an appeal from U.S. congressmen to President Yeltsin regarding these amendments. The congressmen believe they "severely restrict the right of American and other non-Russian religious organizations to engage in religious activities."

After setting out their position, the congressmen address B.N. Yeltsin with the bluntness of a cowboy: "We ask you to take all necessary measures to ensure that this updated legislative act does not enter into force."

You get the impression that the U.S. congressmen see Russia as a new North American state [shtat] where they have more of a right of legislative initiative than, say, the Russian Orthodox Church, which together with Russia's Muslims supports the amendments.

It is appropriate to recall in this connection a report from London on Mayak radio 30 March this year regarding U.S. evangelists' plans to destroy Orthodoxy, Islam, and other traditional Russian creeds in Russia by sending 200,000 missionaries over to us (as against 11,000 Orthodox and 5,000 Muslims). Now that the Russian Supreme Soviet has for the first time adopted a law in support of the cause of reviving the traditional Russian way of life and our people's culture and spirituality, U.S. congressmen are demonstrating by their protests their annoyance that the legions of missionaries prepared for the invasion of Russia will be unable to carry out their plan.

The British Foreign Office has also made an official statement hinting at CSCE sanctions against Russia unless we abandon Orthodoxy. The U.S. State Department has refrained from issuing official statements, it is true, but has organized powerful pressure on the Russian president. God grant him the spiritual strength to endure this pressure from the angry missionaries.

The Bible tells how Esau, the first-born son, was to receive his birthright, but gave it up in his brother's favor for the sake of lentil pottage, which he loved. So let us Russians decide what we value more: American pottage at the price of abandoning our Orthodox spirituality, or a great Russia, where Orthodox and Muslim equally serve a single state?

If we regard ourselves as citizens of a "banana republic," as inhabitants of a spiritual and cultural desert, then by

all means let aliens decide our fate for us and determine our world outlook and conscience. But we ourselves can teach a great deal to the American people, who are young in historical terms: The Russian state has existed for 1,100 years, there have been 1,000 years of Christian culture in Russia, and Islam and Buddhism have developed for many centuries—but there have been only a little over 200 years of U.S. statehood!

Just think: Congressmen are hinting at worsening relations with Russia and at the curtailment of humanitarian aid if the president of Russia, with its 150 million people, fails to fulfill the demands of a few religious-political fundamentalists!

Do the congressmen themselves know of the strict regulation of beliefs in their own country? A U.S. Treasury Department instruction (form 10-23) instructs believers to disclose information not only about their income, but also about their dogma, particular features of the religion, the number of members of the organization, clergy, and their family and other ties. A believers' organization can be deprived of religious status for refusing to fill out the form prescribed by the department, after which it is easy to stifle it with taxes by placing it on the same footing as a commercial structure.

Maybe in the Americans' view this practice does not run counter to freedom of personal choice, maybe the special services will not "keep on the hook" parishioners who have naively filled out the form, as happened in our country under communism—ultimately that is the U.S. own internal affair. But the same cannot be said of attempting to lecture others when your own practice is like that!

We have just abandoned this. In our country the unforgettable Council for Religious Affairs also forced people to fill out forms and write reports, it was just that the state religion was different. However, even during its heyday in the times of Stalin and Khrushchev our Council for Religious Affairs never even dreamed of demanding the amount of information required by the U.S. Treasury Department!

Incidentally, anyone who is knowledgeable about religion knows that the most eminent, authoritative theologians of Protestantism, including Karl Barth, have long said that the missionary movement is now dead and there is no country on earth that has not heard of Christ. The missionary movement in the 20th century, in their opinion, is an instrument in the hands of governments for introducing their own ideology and policy into other countries. Only Protestant fundamentalists retain an inclination toward missionary work, and they have no prestige whatever in the theological world, are notable for their extremely simplistic interpretation of scripture, and have strong support in the U.S. upper echelons of power.

True, freedom of conscience, freedom to personally choose your convictions and way of life, is freedom from

political, economic, and spiritual compulsion. We Russians should realize what the true Russia is like, and then, as the Bible says, the truth will make us free.

Somalis Picket UN Building; Refugee Policy Questioned

LD0308125193 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By correspondent M. Sarbaa; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] In February this year, Russia adopted a law on refugees. This document places certain obligations on the Russian Federation with respect to these people. Refugees from Somalia have started picketing the building of the UN representation in Moscow. Some of them are students and graduates of higher education establishments in their home countries who are left without the means to exist as a result of war. Others have fled war and gone to wherever they can, having taken their most valuable belongings and children with them, and arrived in Russia via a third transit country.

Through the efforts of the propagandists, the USSR was once seen as paradise on earth. According to estimates by international experts, there are currently more than 19 million refugees in the world, the majority of whom settle in poorly developed countries. Now even Russia can be included among them.

Despite everything, in February parliament adopted a law on refugees. It envisages providing assistance, food, and accommodation at state level. Russia has also declared its concern for them on an international level, by joining the UN convention. This probably ought to symbolize yet another breakthrough in democracy, but the help mechanism has not yet been developed, nor has the money for this program been allocated.

Foreign refugees know of this and for some reason they don't even think of asking the appropriate bodies in their home countries.

INA Reports Planned Russian-Iraqi Economic Accord

LD0308205693 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 3 Aug 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Iraq and Russia are preparing to sign an agreement on economic and trade cooperation, the Iraqi agency INA has just reported. A Russian delegation arrived in Baghdad yesterday headed by Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Labov.

Polish Perceptions of Gas Supply Deal Viewed

PM0408083193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Leonid Kornilov report: "Yamal Gas Will Go West Via Poland"]

[Text] Warsaw—The contract initialed in Warsaw to build a 670km gas transit pipeline across Polish territory, through which Yamal gas will flow to Western Europe, has been described by Vice Premier H. Goryszewski as an extremely major contract that will act as a "locomotive" powering an upsurge in the Polish economy.

An total of 67 billion cubic meters of natural gas will be conveyed through the pipes every year. Poland gets the right to purchase 14 billion cubic meters of it. The country's requirements for this type of fuel will thus be satisfied for several decades. Poland currently consumes about 10 billion cubic meters, and more than half of this volume comes here via old pipes from Russia. Talks have been going on for many months. It is well known that several years ago the Soviet Union proposed this construction project to Poland, but the agreement to realize it was not reached, and at the time a gas transit pipeline was built through Czechoslovakia. The current second Russian-Polish attempt was successful and promises to be beneficial to both sides.

The Polish section of the gas pipeline will be constructed by Polish firms using Polish materials. This will be extremely lucrative for them—after all, the cost of laying this section is estimated at \$3.2 billion. The Polish oil extraction and gas company and Russia's "Gazprom" will share ownership of the gas pipeline on an equal basis.

In a move to head off the possible mistrust of local inhabitants, Warsaw television reported that any kind of "punitive" action, say, or any attempt to "turn off the tap" by the Russian side is basically impossible, because then the gas would be unable to get through to the West. GAZETA WYBORCZA notes that at the same time the contract does not cancel out talks on purchasing gas from fields in the North Sea, which would eliminate Poland's complete dependence on a single foreign supplier—Russia. Deputy Industry and Trade Minister K. Adamczyk believes that, initially, the North Sea gas will arrive in Poland via the German gas pipeline network, because the construction of a special gas main would cost the Poles another \$3 billion.

Parliamentarians Visit Western Group of Forces

MK0308112693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Polotskiy, RIAN own correspondent in Berlin, special to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, under "Army" rubric: "Charges Against Western Army

Group Are Groundless,' Believes Sergey Stepashin, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security"]

[Text] "In spite of the often nonobjective criticism and the difficult conditions of withdrawing Russian troops to the motherland," Stepashin noted during a meeting with newsmen in Wuensdorf after a one-week visit to eastern Germany, "the Western Army Group is successfully carrying out its tasks." According to the committee chairman, "it is time to put an end to attempts to play a military card in the political struggle," while statements about corruption within the Western Army Group must be regarded as malicious lies.

Sergey Stepashin and his colleagues from the committee studied two main questions here—the accommodation of units and detachments withdrawn and the implementation of related bilateral treaties with Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states (former USSR republics). In particular, an opinion was expressed that in view of changes in the situation that had occurred in the past period, the time has come to adjust these agreements concluded by the Soviet Union. The problem of accommodation, as is known, has become rather complicated following the decision by the Russian and German leaders to reduce by a whole four months the term for the pullout of our troops from the FRG. The implications were also in the focus of the deputies' attention. The pace adopted, as is common with us, is unique: Over two years more than 80 percent of personnel and military hardware has been withdrawn while the construction of military campuses has proceeded at a rate several times slower.

We often try to compare ourselves with the Americans. Thus, they take 10 years to pull out just one division. This year alone nearly 70 percent of officers and NCO's will return to their "homes." In addition to the housing problem and its financing with the 7.8 billion marks allocated by the Germans plus 550 million as a bonus for the four-month "acceleration," Stepashin quoted among the tasks of his mission visits to a number of garrisons to brief army servicemen on the Supreme Soviet's legislative activity in the military sphere; the problem of a "worthy sendoff" to our troops upon completion of the withdrawal next year (some people in Germany are planning to mark this occasion without the Russians, after they have left); and questions of possible organization of joint ventures with the Western Army Group's facilities and properties left in Germany.

According to the parliamentarians, the Group's command has accumulated some positive experience in acquiring apartments for their officers with their own hard currency and off-budget funds earned by the Western Army Group itself. True, Stepashin qualified that in principle, under the law, the state guarantees free housing to those who have completed their military service terms, but reality is such that the "group of troops today is not only feeding itself but has actually remitted 9 million marks for apartment construction projects." He stressed that in a new, expanded military

budget social spending would account for 90 percent—as compared with 72 percent at present—and will go mainly for raising salaries and housing construction projects. At the same time spending on military R&D programs will be substantially cut. Another positive thing is the WAG's experience in training army servicemen, jointly with the German side, in new professions. More than 13,000 officers have taken such courses here.

The deputies paid attention to increased instances of robberies and assaults on military servicemen and installations of the Western Army Group. Stepashin stressed that "around the garrisons there is a whole mass of gangs—Moldovan, Ukrainian, Chechen, and so forth." German police actually mollicoddle the detainees, almost immediately setting them free. Stepashin believes that it is urgent to coordinate the requisite additional measures between the Russian Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs with their counterparts from the relevant organizations in the FRG in order to sustain the efforts of the Western Army Group itself in ensuring the security of Russian citizens.

Finnish Light Aircraft Crosses Russian Air Border

PM0308140793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 3

[Marat Zubko report: "Finnish Airman Violated Russia's Air Border"]

[Text] Helsinki—Helsinki press and television have reported the strange flight of a Finnish light aircraft which crossed Russia's air border four times.

The pilot of this aircraft took off from the airfield in the city of Joensuu in southeast Finland and set course for Helsinki. However, after some time he changed direction and flew south toward the city of Imatra, and there he suddenly crossed Russia's air border.

Having circled for some time above the wide open Russian spaces, the aircraft returned to the Finnish side, again in the vicinity of Imatra. But then, for some reason, the pilot felt the need to enter Russian airspace yet again.

The Finnish border services, which noted these maneuvers by the Finnish aircraft, claim that, in all, it spent about 30 minutes in the air over our territory, that it flew on to Vyborg, and it crossed the border (on the Finnish side) for the fourth and last time at its southernmost point, near the Gulf of Finland coast. This was near the settlement of Vaalimaa.

The reason for this strange flight has not yet been announced. The press merely claims that, having landed near Helsinki, the pilot was detained by the authorities and is being interrogated. The border services in southeast Finland believe that the pilot did not have permission to cross the air border with Russia.

And how did our border troops react to all these flights over Russia's air border? Unfortunately, nothing is known about this.

Agreement Reached on Deferment of Debt to Commercial Banks

LD0308184493 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By correspondent R. Safronov, including recording of remarks by A. Vavilov, first deputy finance minister, from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Representatives of the Russian Federation completed negotiations with the London Club at the end of July. The London Club is made up of commercial banks and a joint banking consultative committee. The Russian delegation to the talks was headed by First Deputy Finance Minister Andrey Vavilov. At a news conference today he said:

[Vavilov] Our entire debt currently stands at over \$70 billion, including to the Paris and London clubs.

[Safronov] This year we are supposed to pay out \$3.5 billion. As a result of the talks, interest payments will be \$500 million. Agreement was reached that the former USSR's debts to commercial banks will be given a lengthy deferment. The conditions for this will be sorted out at future meetings between representatives of Russia and the banking consultative committee. These meetings are expected to be held on a regular basis.

IMF Consultations Held on Debt

LD0308120393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1052 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington, August 3 (TASS)—After Russia's conclusion of an agreement with commercial banks or the London Club on the restructuring of its debt for 1993, consultations began in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the preparation to write off part of the external debt that Russia inherited from the USSR and to use part of the credit of IMF for the purpose (a detailed agreement on restructuring Russia's debt was signed with official creditors, the Paris Club, in April 1993). According to experts of IMF, the foreign debt of the former USSR is estimated at 80 billion dollars, ITAR-TASS learned from circles close to IMF leadership.

A reserve credit will be granted to Russia before the end of this year. 2,800 million dollars out of the credit will be used to redeem former Soviet debts on the secondary market. If there is consent of IMF, the World Bank will participate in the programme on debts of the former USSR. It will also grant to Russia a credit of 1,200 million dollars to redeem debts on the secondary market.

Konstantin Kagalovskiy, executive director of the Russian Federation in IMF, refused to confirm or deny this information.

Political Issues

Spokesman Says Yeltsin's Health 'Normal'

MK0308102093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 2

[Unattributed DPA-NG report under "President" rubric: "Boris Yeltsin Is Well, Kremlin Says"]

[Text] A Russian presidential press service spokesman in conversation with the German DPA news agency has denied reports about Boris Yeltsin's serious illness, saying that "his state of health is normal."

As is known, on 31 July PRAVDA and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA published a report suggesting that circles within the Democratic Russia movement had discussed the possibility of changes in the country's leadership in connection with the allegedly deteriorating health of the Russian head of state. Both papers, without referring to any sources, wrote that Democratic Russia is trying to prevent the creation of a state medical commission to check Yeltsin's health.

This subject has been a target of much political speculation in the past few years. This time the talk about the president's state of health must have been caused by the fact that since the middle of last month Boris Yeltsin has not been seen in public for more than a few minutes at a time.

Yeltsin Says Health 'Excellent'

LD0408061193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0606 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Yarushin]

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin talked to journalists on Wednesday morning [4 August] before flying to the city of Orel (Eagle) in central Russia to attend the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Orel-Kursk battle, in the course of which a crushing blow was dealt to Nazi invaders in the second world war.

Yeltsin said "the constitutional process is progressing at a good pace, as regions, territories and republics within the Russian Federation begin active discussions of the constitution". The president said it is "quite realistic to expect the resumption of the work of the Constitutional Assembly in September".

Yeltsin told journalists that he was calling a meeting of the heads of republics within the Russian Federation and the chairmen of eight regional associations for August 13-14 in Petrozavodsk to settle contradictions pointed out in the course of discussions of the draft constitution.

Responding to a question about the date of his planned meeting with President Leonid Kravchuk to negotiate

the Black Sea Fleet problems, Yeltsin confirmed that the meeting would take place in August, but declined to specify the date.

Asked about the state of his health, Boris Yeltsin rejected allegations in the media that he was feeling unwell. He said "the state of my health is excellent, I work intensively, the programme is very tense".

Yeltsin's Health, Bodyguard Viewed

PM0408093593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Aleksy Fedorov report: "It Is Uneasy in the Kremlin"]

[Text] "Despite the victory of democracy, today we know possibly less about what is going on behind the Kremlin walls than we did before 1991," my colleague, an American journalist, thinks.

And he is right. Now, in the era of glasnost, we know almost nothing about the powers that be. Meanwhile, Western diplomats and journalists are alarmed. "What has happened to B. Yeltsin? He has not appeared in public since 12 July. The rare television news pictures show us an irritated person with a sickly, puffy face, moving around uncertainly. According to the testimonies of people who have seen the president at close quarters, his speech has become incoherent."

This is the metamorphosis that has recently happened to the man who used to play tennis and who liked to bathe in cold water. It is curious that these changes started when the Kremlin administration changed. Talk is going around which is equally difficult to confirm or refute, to the effect that Russia is now essentially being run by three men—S. Filatov, who heads the president's apparatus; Barsukov, chief of the Bodyguard Main Directorate; and A. Korzhakov, the chief of B. Yeltsin's personal protection squad. Removing the obstacles in their way, they managed to get rid of Yu. Skokov and V. Barannikov who had direct access to the president and gave him objective, frequently impartial information, and tried to make sure the Yeltsin adopted truly considered decisions.

The fact that the president is being controlled can be seen in the example of the dismissal of V. Barannikov, who was removed one-and-a-half hours after he informed B. Yeltsin of facts concerning the corruption of certain individuals in the closest entourage of the head of state, and their ties with foreign special services. It is characteristic that the president's announcement of the edict dismissing V. Barannikov from the post of minister of security was of a hasty and downright slapdash nature. It was as though someone, worried about exposure, wanted to get rid of the dangerous minister in a flash, and was afraid that the president might reconsider and leave him in his post.

And another detail. At the same time as V. Barannikov was dismissed, the powerful antiterrorist subunit "Vym-pel" was, by a directive of the president, urgently transferred from the Ministry of Security to the Bodyguard Main Directorate, that is, to the personal authority of M. Barsukov. The Bodyguard Main Directorate already has its own functioning counterintelligence, telephone bugging service, and its own subunit for the organization of external surveillance, that is, shadowing. The Bodyguard Main Directorate duplicates the Ministry of Security in its structure, and goes significantly beyond it in equipment; unlike the Bodyguard Main Directorate, the Ministry of Security is under the control of the Supreme Soviet and the Russian Prosecutor's Office.

Thanks to the efforts of its chief and the support of the president, the Bodyguard Main Directorate has been turned into a huge power—the personal guard of B. Yeltsin. Today it has in its ranks around 18,000 well-trained, highly-paid employees, accountable to no one except M. Barsukov and B. Yeltsin. According to one of the workers, the Bodyguard Main Directorate is active and uses without restriction the whole range of operational methods of collecting information on people whom S. Filatov, M. Barsukov, and A. Korzhakov consider to be members of the opposition, but who in fact are their own personal opponents or people they find inconvenient. These are, above all: A. Rutskoy, R. Khasbulatov, V. Zorkin, V. Stepankov, Yu. Skokov, and now V. Barannikov, and certain deputies and leaders of political parties.

Maybe the deputies and the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office would do well to conduct a thorough verification of the activity of the Bodyguard Main Directorate? And at the same time to wonder why the employees of the Bodyguard Main Directorate are protecting the notorious, failed "General Dima [Yakubovskiy]"?

A clarification of the activity of the Yeltsin-Barsukov guard is also necessary because in a situation when the president is not in perfect health, and does not always assess a situation ideally, this guard could turn into a self-contained force, not so much protecting the Kremlin household as isolating the head of state from reality. It would be undesirable for the Bodyguard Main Directorate to develop, without relying on the law-abiding Ministry of Security, into a all-pervasive subunit [totalnoye podrazdeleniye] engaged in shadowing people with dissenting views. That is a stone's throw away from political repressions.

Yeltsin Allegedly Obeys 'Democratic Russia' Orders

PM0408115593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 93
p 1

["Observer's Commentary" by Aleksandr Ilin: "Party Says: 'It Must Be Done!' President Answers: 'Aye, Aye'"]

[Text] Readers have no doubt noticed that the name of M. Shneyder, representative of "Democratic Russia" who signed the rejoinder to PRAVDA, is not known to the public at large. L. Ponomarev, G. Starovoytova, G. Yakunin, V. Bokser, I. Zaslavskiy, A. Shabad, S. Yushenkov, and others are far better known. As indeed are the more substantial politicians standing behind them who may not formally belong to the movement's leading structures.

This may be why "Democratic Russia's" "refutation" is couched in the usual sharp but fairly streamlined expressions which do not reveal the essence of the decisions and appeals of the democrats in the past few weeks and days. It seems worth recalling them, having noted that this time the reports have not been obtained from an anonymous source, but from ITAR-TASS reports and articles carried by publications close to the members of "Democratic Russia."

This is possibly the most overt and clear-cut presentation by "Democratic Russia" of its rights to influence both the president and his policy. ITAR-TASS, 23 July this year: "The 'Democratic Russia' Movement Coordination Council believes that a 'pre-putsch' situation has developed in the country in connection with which it has sent a telegram to President Yeltsin, calling on him to urgently return to Moscow from his vacation." Look at the reports carried on that day and subsequent days by IZVESTIYA and other extremely democratic publications—they categorically make it clear to the president that the continuation of his quiet vacation in the present circumstances is verging on criminal inaction.

And, as you recall, Yeltsin did interrupt his vacation; the party spoke, and the president answered: Aye, aye!

And another telling quotation from the same ITAR-TASS report: "The 'Democratic Russia' Movement Coordination Council has condemned the All-Russia Economic Conference being prepared and has called upon the Russian Federation president 'to adopt a decision dismissing members of the Russian Federation Government who are conducting an antimarket policy.'" Subsequent events have shown that the boycott of the economic conference by the government occurred in strict accordance with the same formula—"the party spoke..." As for the dismissal of members of the Cabinet of Ministers, for the time being the matter has apparently been restricted to the minister of security, but who knows what the democratic chefs are cooking up...

We could supplement these comments by quoting from the demands made by G. Popov, leader of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, which were also unquestioningly carried out by the president, and the recommendations made by Burbulis' "Strategiya" Center which set the central task of the democratic forces as "the molding of new political leaders..." But you cannot fit everything in a short article.

Finally, I can say one thing: B. Yeltsin feels uncomfortable in the seething environment of democratic

intriguers. It seems that, although it was he himself who led them into the political arena not so long ago, now he is being reminded: It is you, not we, who has old debts to settle.

But thanks are due for M. Shneyder's explanation: Since "Democratic Russia" supports the Constitution and order, we can breathe more easily. At least for a while.

'Renewal' Official on Yeltsin's Power Base

MK0408130693 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 32, 8 Aug 93 (signed to press 3 Aug 93) p A2

[Unattributed report under the "Quotation" rubric]

[Text] "...the main trouble with Yeltsin is that he has proven incapable of becoming president of Russia, remaining, as he was, president of Democratic Russia...."

Despite the chill in the president's relations with Democratic Russia just after Gaydar's dismissal, Boris Yeltsin is still under the sway of the movement that swept him into power. This is the view of Aleksandr Vladislavlev, cochairman of the Renewal union. He noted in an interview with a MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent that the reason for this attachment is perhaps the fact that "we, in particular the Civic Union, have simply failed to create forces the president could lean on." Democratic Russia, however, thinks differently. Its recent statements and calls to the president sound increasingly like ultimatums. Thinking that Boris Yeltsin inexcusably let slip the initiative in the wake of the April referendum, the Democratic Russia men demand from him "swift and resolute" actions. Today they are still able to sway, and do sway, the president (mostly via their leaders who have joined presidential structures.) They are hardly capable at this stage of becoming a reliable power base for him in political battles. The pendulum of public affection has swung from radical-democrats toward moderate reformers who promise "capitalism with a socialist face." If no one comes along to hold back the pendulum at this point, it would either shoot further toward the order and discipline of the communist times, or veer toward a "special road."

Boris Yeltsin seems to have made a mistake gambling on the creation of a "president's" party at one time. While the idea remained unfulfilled, it acted as a powerful brake on the establishment of a powerful centrist block. As a result, with elections near at hand, Boris Yeltsin can only realistically count on support from the Russia's Choice coalition, whose core consists in those same Democratic Russia members. In the meantime, Aleksandr Rutskoy is coming to play the role of the "principle centrist" ever more vigorously.

Cabinet Leaders' Activities, Statements Reported

PM0308141793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed feature: "Executive Branch Monitoring"]

[Text] Meetings, Trips, Conferences

Just a few days remain until the enlarged session of the Russian Council of Ministers-Government. That is why Russian Government Head Viktor Chernomyrdin is holding conferences with Cabinet members, at which matters pertaining to the final phase of the preparations for the enlarged Council of Ministers are being decided.

Russian Federation Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin held a working conference on 2 August, attended by Cabinet members and experts, in connection with the murder of Viktor Polyanichko, head of the interim administration in the state of emergency zone in the region of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. According to sources close to the government, the conference considered proposals to stabilize the situation in the conflict zone.

First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko attended the opening of the Congress of Young Compatriots at the Academy of the National Economy.

First Vice Premier Oleg Lobov attended the Russian premier's conference.

First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets devoted the morning to a reception dealing with personal matters and then took part in the opening of the Second International Conference on Late-20th Century State-of-the-Art Technologies, "Nano-2."

Vice Premier Sergey Shakhrai arrived in Vladikavkaz with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in connection with the death of Viktor Polyanichko, head of the interim administration in the state of emergency zone on the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and Vladikavkaz Garrison Chief Anatoliy Koretskiy. They died 1 August in the village of Tarskoye in North Ossetia's Prigorodnyy Rayon, where a state of emergency is in force. Viktor Polyanichko was the fifth head of the interim administration in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. As Russian vice premier he was appointed head of the administration in the state of emergency zone 28 June 1993. A valedictory ceremony was held for Viktor Polyanichko at the Vladikavkaz Garrison Officers' Mess in the afternoon on 2 August.

Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha answered questions from Russian and foreign journalists at a press conference in Moscow devoted to the state of affairs in the agro-industrial complex and the progress made with the harvest.

Vice Premier Yuriy Yarov's visit to the Far North is drawing to a close. He visited the port of Nakhodka, through which freight is mainly shipped to the eastern sector of the Arctic. According to him the reduction in

goods traffic to the Kuril Islands is the result of confusion with supplies to remote regions of Russia. Supplies for the Kurils will be organized, the vice premier believes, and the population of the islands will not be left to get on with their troubles over the winter.

Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays is on vacation through 7 August.

Results of One Tour of Duty

While in St. Petersburg, First Vice Premier Oleg Lobov announced at a press conference at City Hall that the construction of a St. Petersburg-Moscow superhighway will be backed by the state. The highway will be commissioned in 1999. This ambitious construction project has been launched by the "Vysokoskorostnyye Magistrali" Joint-Stock Company.

Statements

The Russian Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations is to formulate a unified plan for regulating exports in the near future, Sergey Glazyev, Russian minister for foreign economic relations, said during a visit to the "Norilskiy Nikel" Concern. According to the minister, the first steps toward this have already been taken—this year Russia has largely been able to prevent a whole number of suppliers of Russian nonferrous metals from trading on the foreign market in a disorganized manner.

The Russian minister for foreign economic relations is touring a number of regions of Russia's North and Far East.

More on Grigoryants, Yushenkov Press Briefing

PM0308115393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Vyacheslav Kocherov report: "So Much Conjecture, So Few Facts"]

[Text] The press continues to focus its attention on the situation prevailing around Viktor Barannikov's unexpected dismissal. A press conference held yesterday and pointedly entitled "Barannikov's Resignation—the End or the Beginning of Security" confirmed this once again.

In a short opening speech, Sergey Grigoryants, a known KGB opponent, informed those present of the crisis which has allegedly erupted in the Security Ministry. We learned that the ministry pits itself against society and the state, that it is inclined, as before, toward criminal working methods and, as if that were not enough, it foists its own depraved interests on us. Nor did the speaker try to hide his personal feelings from journalists, prompting him to conclude that ministry staffers are not quite normal. Admittedly, not all of them. "I am talking about strong, influential, hard-line people with an inexhaustible supply of manic ideas"—this was Grigoryants' summary.

Yushenkov said: We demanded repeatedly that the president dismiss Barannikov, including when B. Yeltsin was on vacation. We did this because he [Barannikov] wanted to institute criminal proceedings against certain deputies, Yakunin, for instance. And because he tried to have Mikhail Poltoranin searched. And because the ministry is failing to deal with corruption—it panders to the kindling of nationalist and fascist ideas.

Yushenkov also announced that it is a waste of time instituting criminal proceedings against Shumeyko and Poltoranin, and Barannikov lacks a political view of the problems. Which only left the government. And we learned the "there are also quite a lot of corrupt elements in the government itself..."

Admittedly, there was no success in finding out the one thing we really wanted to know—the facts.

'Democratic Russia' Refutes Report on Planned Coup

PM0408102393 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Undated letter to the editorial office from Mikhail Shneider, executive secretary of the "Democratic Russia" Movement Coordination Council: "Who Writes the Scripts for Coups"]

[Text] On 31 July, issue No. 146 of your newspaper frontpaged an article by G. Ovcharenko entitled "Is an Attack Being Prepared?" Citing a certain anonymous warning, it reports that "Democratic Russia" is apparently planning a "change of government leadership by means of a coup in the next few days."

This report is not simply a misrepresentation, it is a deliberate lie from beginning to end.

First of all, for over six months, since the beginning of the movement's third congress, we have not had a Political Council, or any organ like it. Second, the "Democratic Russia" Coordination Council meets on Thursdays and in the past few months has not conducted any extraordinary sittings. Third, our movement has not, at any stage of its history, ever adopted decisions either verbally or in written form, that directly or indirectly called people to violent or anticonstitutional actions, and it has never participated in such actions.

Such a falsehood could have been ignored, since certain mass media have recently been publishing such reports almost every day, but the deceit that was contained in the rumor your newspaper published, which is simply unprecedented in its impudence, gives the impression that certain political forces standing behind the author's back in the present very acute crisis needed to urgently launch such material which could detonate a sharp destabilization in society. From our point of view it is no coincidence that such fabrications were snatched up last week by R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and Russian Federation

Vice President A.V. Rutskoy. Their recent actions and statements increasingly testify to the existence in certain circles of a carefully planned script for a state coup, which is possibly already being played out.

'Shadow' Forces Use Democratic Russia as Front

PM0308144593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition pp 1,2

[Parliamentary Observer Aleksey Vorobyev "Weekly Review": "'Democratic Russia' Is Nothing More Than a Cover"]

[Text] In recent days the leaders of radical democracy have stated increasingly plainly their claims to be the saviors of the fatherland. The character of their actions and statements has given some observers grounds for talking about the formation of a new, third center of power, after the first two which took up residence in the Kremlin and the White House long ago.

What actually happened was the dismissal of the security minister, long awaited by the radicals but carried out by the president so clumsily and crudely that many of his supporters, including Viktor Sheynis, for example, publicly called this action not Boris Nikolayevich's first mistake and not his last either. Most probably, the head of the executive was once more simply forced into making an error and furthermore the leaders of "Democratic Russia" did not even have any qualms about claiming the credit for this themselves. They went to the president several times, they said, and waited in the reception room until they got what they wanted!

The radicals' other "achievements" over the past week were less showy but also have serious consequences. The edicts on the procedure for coordinating the text of the constitution and additional measures on privatization which were hastily presented for signature are splintering the already weakened foundation of Russian legality and, far more importantly, are destroying the constructive cooperation which has barely emerged between parliament and the government. Cooperation which could save the country's economy and stabilize Russian society.

It would seem that here, too, the "Democratic Russia" people were successful: The leaders of the government did not go to the economic conference, allegedly obeying the will of L. Ponomarev and company. Well after that how can you not be infected by megalomania?

We would venture to claim that "Democratic Russia" and in particular its subsidiaries have never been victorious at any nationwide elections or referendums in Russia. Even if only because such events have never been organized in our country along formal party lines. But if you carry out an unofficial tally of votes, deputies' seats, and other indicators of the "people's support," first you have to subtract from those figures all the votes and seats gathered by various figures and movements ranging from Mikhail Chelnokov to Artem Tarasov, from Vitaliy

Korotich to Aleksandr Rutskoy, from the Democratic Party of Russia to "Communists for Democracy."

If you add up today how many public movements, social groups, and individual politicians have distanced themselves from "Democratic Russia," you can say with confidence that this party has no more or less mass support. Just as it has no right to call itself victorious or ruling.

From the viewpoint of electoral procedures, the claims of these "victors" to dictate their will to the head of the executive are highly dubious. The president himself cannot fail to understand that. The leaders of "Democratic Russia" have even less right to claim the role of B. Yeltsin's think tank. Just take a look at the gallery of personalities there—and immediately memory will suggest that their path into politics has not been marked by any intellectual achievements and that they are not qualified to be anything more than ordinary workers in the apparatus of executive power.

Any president in any country would simply have booted such people out of his waiting room long ago given these abilities and ambitions of theirs and the fact that they have repeatedly suggested such bad decisions. And their whole political career would have ended there.

But in our country they are not only still in the office but also venture to demand from the president, as the "Democratic Russia" coordinating council did the other day, resolute and rapid steps for the introduction of some sort of constitutional act so as to hold early elections to parliament on its basis. Where do they get such appetites from?

Last week's events attributed to "Democratic Russia" are too serious and simply do not match this organization's political influence and authority. Thus there are reasons to claim that the "Democratic Russia" people have been chosen merely as a cover for the activity of a far more powerful and influential center of power which has formed secretly deep within structures around the Kremlin. This center clearly does not want to be thrust into the spotlight for the time being and is thus forced (temporarily) to channel its decisions through intermediaries.

The "Democratic Russia" people have been entrusted merely to suggest ideas for cadre reshuffles and to intimidate society, thereby maintaining the necessary tension. It is also possible to explain some of the president's at first glance highly impulsive and illogical actions, the true motives for which are different from those that are offered to citizens, as a concession to the radicals. Even more significant is that by having set "Democratic Russia" up, it is possible to quickly radicalize and polarize the confrontation in society along the axis of "democrats versus communists," which also significantly increases the shadow power structure's chances of holding onto the levers of political control.

This plan of operating under a cover is so successful and highly promising that those who are actually behind the decisions being made in the Kremlin simply could not pass it by. I think that this is the reason for their strange behavior and the deliberately sensational nature of some of the past week's events as well as the megalomania of the radicals.

The question is surely only this: Did the president freely agree to play this game? And how do its organizers see the political fate of B. Yeltsin himself and of "Democratic Russia"?

Democratic Committee Condemns Khasbulatov

PM0308152593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Statement by the Social Committee of Democratic Organizations of Russia: "Parliament Cannot Do Without Telling Lies. The Social Committee of Democratic Organizations Considers R. Khasbulatov's 30 July Speech on Russian Television To Be the Latest Political Provocation"]

[Text] R. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, gave an address on Russian Television 30 July 1993. This address was another link in the chain of political provocations organized in recent months by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium and the opposition grouped around it with the aim of destabilizing the political situation. The previous link in this chain was the action of the Central Bank of Russia, which is accountable to the Supreme Soviet, to withdraw from circulation banknotes issued in 1961-1992, for whose consequences some people are trying to blame the Russian Federation president and government, a fact which Comrade Khasbulatov demonstrated once again in his lengthy television speech.

In terms of lies, the television speech made by the chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet could easily have competed with speeches by the depressingly well-known leaders of totalitarian states, although in this case Khasbulatov is only the diligent pupil of the aforementioned masters of brainwashing the population.

You only have to look at Khasbulatov's claim that only one "insidious" organization—"Democratic Russia"—did not sign the Declaration on Economic Accord. The Social Committee of Democratic Organizations of Russia [SCDOR], which was created 15 February 1993 as a democratic alternative to the Supreme Soviet's "roundtable," and which now includes 93 parties, movements, trade unions, creative unions, and other public organizations, states that the organizations in it have not signed the aforementioned declaration.

What he said about "Democratic Russia" as the ruling party sounded equally absurd. Far from believing that "Democratic Russia" has never made mistakes, SCDOR stresses that Khasbulatov's words do not correspond to

reality. There is not a single member of this movement in the present Russian Federation Government, and even Finance Minister B. Fedorov has never been a member of the movement; nor was he nominated for this post by "Democratic Russia." His claims that "Democratic Russia" gives orders to B. Yeltsin and V. Chernomyrdin, and that it was actually on the orders of "Democratic Russia" that V. Chernomyrdin did not participate in the All-Russia Economic Conference are lies. This is a direct attempt to discredit the president and chairman of the Russian Government and humiliate them. Such accusations are insulting not just to "Democratic Russia," but also to all democratic forces.

What Khasbulatov said about his own and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's commitment to the ideals of the market economy was equally untrue. The pseudo-market formulas hide an attempt to return to a touched-up administrative edict system. Khasbulatov's attack on B. Fedorov, the most consistent supporter of market reforms who in is in fact trying to stop hyperinflation, confirms this. The Supreme Soviet's generosity to the Army, expressed in an increase in military expenditure by a factor of 1.6, will prove to be a heavy burden on all Russians. In the first place, this "generosity" will affect workers in the budget-financed sectors and pensioners, because it can only be ensured by increasing the amount of money printed. That is what the real concern of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and its chairman in respect of Russia's economy looks like. SCDOR protests resolutely in connection with R. Khasbulatov's 30 July 1993 speech on Russian Television.

Yeltsin Edict on Coordination of Draft Constitution

PM0308123793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 6

[Russian Federation presidential edict No. 1079 of 24 July 1993: "On the Procedure for Coordinating the Russian Federation Draft Constitution"]

[Text] Proceeding from the need to ensure democratic guarantees for the constitutional process in the Russian Federation,

guided by a desire for civic peace and harmony,

and taking note of the approval of the unified Russian Federation draft constitution by the Constitutional Conference comprising representatives of Russian Federation federal organs of state power, including Russian Federation people's deputies, representatives of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, the Russian Federation Supreme Court, the Russian Federation Supreme Court of Arbitration, organs of state power in Russian Federation components, organs of local self-government, political parties, trade union, youth, and other social organizations, mass movements, religious faiths, commodity producers, and entrepreneurs, I decree that:

1. It shall be deemed necessary to coordinate the Russian Federation draft constitution prepared and approved by the Constitutional Conference with legislative (representative) organs of state power and heads of the executive authorities (republic presidents) in Russian Federation components.

2. The Constitutional Conference participants shall be instructed to participate in explaining the provisions of the Russian Federation draft constitution, and in the discussion of it by organs of state power in Russian Federation components.

3. The chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government and the leader of the Russian Federation President's Administration shall:

coordinate the schedule for working trips by members of the Russian Federation Government and leading officials of the Russian Federation President's Administration with the schedule for the discussion of the Russian Federation draft constitution by organs of state power in Russian Federation components with a view to ensuring their participation in explaining the provisions of the draft constitution and in coordinating it;

on the basis of the results of the discussion (coordination) of the Russian Federation draft constitution by organs of state power in Russian Federation components, make proposals on the date for holding a plenary session of the Constitutional Conference.

4. The working commission for finalizing the Russian Federation draft constitution shall generalize the positions of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, legislative (representative) organs of state power in Russian Federation components, the presidents and governments of Russian Federation republics, and the heads of executive authorities in krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg on the Russian Federation draft constitution, along with their recommendations on the procedure for adopting the new Russian Federation constitution, and make corresponding proposals.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 24 July 1993

No. 1079

Decree on Processing of Foreign Travel Passports

PM0308140193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 5

[Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decree No. 685 of 20 July 1993: "On Additional Measures To Ensure the Procedure for Russian Federation Citizens To Leave the Russian Federation"]

[Text] In connection with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree of 11 June 1993 "On the Procedure for the Processing of Russian Federation Citizens'

Exit Documents," the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decrees that:

1. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall be permitted to process up to 1 June 1994 foreign passports for trips for official or business purposes in accordance with the temporary regulations for the issue and processing of foreign passports for Russian Federation citizens stipulated by Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decree No. 73 of 28 January 1993 "On Measures To Safeguard the Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation To Freely Travel Beyond Its Borders and Return Unhindered, and On Improving the Procedure for Secondments Abroad."

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, shall determine before 1 August 1993:

the organizations in Moscow City and Oblast entitled to apply to the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Service for general citizens' foreign passports for official or business trips;

the organizations entitled to apply for general citizens' foreign passports for official or business trips to representative offices of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Russian Federation territory, and the procedure for cooperation between these offices and internal affairs and state security organs in connection with the processing of such passports.

2. Before 1 June 1994 the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs shall:

in accordance with the regulations stipulated in Clause 1 of this decree, reregister general citizens' foreign passports (for the period until their expiry) issued prior to 1 January 1993 by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its representative offices on Russian Federation territory, and prior to 1 March 1993 by the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs and its local organs;

stamp these passports with the authorization "Permitted to leave until..." for the period up to 1 June 1994 on the basis of existing agreements with federal organs of state security.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers

Official Views Foreign Policy, Diplomacy

PM0308144993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 30 Jul 93 p 7

[Article by Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department Section Chief Vyacheslav Ivanovich Yelagin: "Official Visit at Oblast Level"]

[Text] Russia's foreign policy does not only aim to develop good-neighborly and mutually advantageous relations with former Soviet republics and foreign states. Now another and no less serious problem is being posed to Russian diplomacy: that of guaranteeing the unity of all the components of the Russian Federation. This task is becoming an ever greater part of the remit of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the creation of the Department for Ties with Federation Components, Parliament, and Public and Political Organizations, it is acquiring a qualitatively new significance.

In essence, we are talking about the effective exploitation of the unique opportunities afforded Russia by its regions' entry into the wider international arena. Incidentally, in accordance with the Federation Treaty, Russian Federation republics, krais, and oblasts can maintain relations with foreign partners without having to seek special instructions about this from Moscow. The draft Constitution, which is at the discussion stage, also proceeds from the fact that federal bodies are coordinating foreign relations together with republics within the Russian Federation. The provisions in question are entirely in keeping with contemporary trends in the development of the rule-of-law state.

The widening cooperation of the Russian Federation's components has put the Foreign Ministry in a difficult position and given rise to a mass of complex problems which hitherto have been unknown to Russian diplomacy. As Russia becomes regenerated, it is simply obliged to take into consideration the special features not only of regions but of entire peoples who populate our country. On the other hand, it is important not to allow parts of the federation to have separate foreign policies. In short a balance of mutual interests is necessary to firmly guarantee the country's unity in the areas of foreign policy and foreign economic activity.

Many Russian Federation components have gained some experience in this area in their capacity as autonomous partners. They have taken part in the signing of dozens of different agreements and protocols in the economic and cultural spheres. A number of federation components have founded their own missions abroad: The Republic of Sakha has done so in Japan as has Tatarstan in North Rhine-Westphalia (FRG).

The majority of components, when resolving foreign policy issues, cooperate closely with federal bodies. The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) has best succeeded in this respect. The draft international agreements which it works up are, as a rule, appraised by experts at the Russian Foreign Ministry. Sakha has to this end concluded a protocol with the Russian foreign policy department on bilateral cooperation. The Republic of Bashkortostan, the Karelian Republic, the Komi Republic, the Republic of Adygea, the Altay Republic, Krasnodar Krai, and Rostov Oblast are beginning to turn with increasing frequency to the Foreign Ministry for recommendations. By acting in this way, these regions are

carrying out the Russian president's directive "On Guaranteeing a Unified Political Line for the Russian Federation in International Affairs."

The Russian Foreign Ministry is for its part ready to provide not just theoretical but practical assistance to all federation components which have an interest in it. Some 20 Russian Federation Foreign Ministry missions offices are to be opened shortly in Russia. Meetings between representatives of Russian Federation components take place in Moscow on a regular basis under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

Certain leaders of federation components give Russian parliamentary and executive structures prior notification of their foreign trips. Tatarstan President M. Shaymiyev considered it necessary to meet with the Russian President B. Yeltsin before his trip to Turkey, came to an agreement with him about his visit's format, and consulted with Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev. As a result the negotiations in Ankara went off very successfully. They had concrete results and increased both Tatarstan and Russia's standing. Although this was not a state visit, President M. Shaymiyev was received in Turkey at the highest level.

Karelia's leaders act in a similar manner when they go on trips to neighboring Finland.

Of course, the trailblazing Russian regions' appearance on the world stage is turning out to be problematic. In the first place, a lack of experience in conducting international affairs and the lack of skilled cadres are having an effect. I dare say that it is for this reason that discussions about the danger of Russian foreign policy fragmenting into Tatar, Yakut, and Siberian foreign policies are less and less a rarity now. It is most likely that the main reason for such relations is the complex internal political situation. When it becomes stabilized in Russia, it is unlikely that 89 regional foreign policies will appear. After all in accordance with the Russian Constitution, the regions have not been given the right to resolve questions of war and peace and of defense and security, to conclude interstate agreements, nor to act as full-fledged subjects of international law. On the other hand, their participation is not only admissible but extremely desirable when working out a common foreign policy strategy for Russia.

How, for example, can we discuss questions of providing for refugees from the Caucasian region without taking into consideration the southern Russian oblasts' opinions? Is it possible to speak of strengthening ties all round with the Adygean diaspora without the Republic of Adygea taking part? Or to attempt to resolve the problem of building nuclear storage facilities without the agreement of the local administrations of the regions on whose territory these facilities will be located?

True, experience shows us that it is foreign economic activities and consular questions which basically concern

the Russian Federation's components. Therefore, Krasnodar Kray will hardly become tempted to conduct its own foreign policy autonomously. But the region does possess its own international ties—economic, cultural, and humanitarian ones. This is why President of Cyprus Vasiliou signed an agreement on developing Krasnodar Kray during his visit to Russia. Both the presidents of Russia and Cyprus took this project under their wings and became the honorary chairmen of a joint commission.

The Russian Federation's republics, krays, and oblasts have the right to demand that the "metropolis" broaden their powers with regard to contacts between people, cross-border contacts, and settling conflicts in those regions of other countries which adjoin it. Of course, arguments, differences of opinion may arise at first. But they completely surmountable if the sides do not attempt to go outside the law.

One more thing. Active diplomacy on the part of the federation's components presupposes that the obligations under the deals and agreements which have been concluded are carried out in a timely manner. Appeals to center for financial support for this or that failed contract may only undermine the idea itself of constructive sovereignization.

In order to be fair, I should point out that you still come across incidents of individual Russian regions approaching the resolution of foreign policy problems in an improvised manner. They run the risk of fragmenting Russian foreign policy. Certain federation components (evidently out of ignorance rather than deliberately) are trying to assume the role of subjects of international law and are including questions in the texts of bilateral items which fall within the competence of federal bodies. During their trips abroad, the republic leaders attempt ensure that they are received, without fail, at the states' power structures, at times eschewing protocol. This kind of diplomacy perplexes our foreign colleagues.

Unfortunately, there is cause for even more serious disquiet. The actions of Chechnya's leadership are a wretched little example of "rogue" diplomacy in Russia. This republic's leadership, by its rash and completely unrealistic foreign policy moves, is violating generally accepted international legal standards and diplomatic canons. The harm this "sovereignization" does is clear. Public opinion both in this country and abroad has reflected this on more than one occasion. For example, the mutual recognition of Chechnya and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is, from the point of view of international law, completely unfounded. The act itself is counterproductive, as what we are talking about here is a formation on the territory of Cyprus which nobody has recognized, and the direct violation of the U.N decision on the indivisibility and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Such impromptu action weakens Russian unity and creates chaos in international relations.

Only a coordinated policy of all Russian Federation components can stop the effects of uncivilized diplomacy in the international arena. It will allow our "federal" system to transmute in the interests of the state as a whole.

Foreign Intelligence Reorganization Viewed

PM0408103993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 4 Aug 93 p7

[Article by Nikolay Semenenko: "Fewer Residents"]

[Text] Reorganization is in full swing in the Russian foreign intelligence service, separated from the once omnipotent KGB—new traditions and a new concept of intelligence activity are being formed.

An independent structure subordinated directly to the Russian president is being created on the basis of the former USSR KGB First Main Directorate. There has been a reduction in the number of staffers working in the central apparatus (up to 30 percent) and abroad (they have been halved). Several dozen foreign residences have been closed. In the period since August 1991 five of the seven leaders of the foreign intelligence service have been replaced. Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, the well known politician and public figure who headed the service, is convinced that the intelligence service must be made to work not for some political structure or for specific statesmen but "to ensure the interests of society."

A little while ago the most secret of the secret services opened its doors once tightly sealed to the outside world. Contacts between the press and its leaders have become regular, and a large amount of work relating to the foreign intelligence service's work is performed by its bureau for liaison with the public and the mass media headed by Yuriy Kobaladze, a cadre intelligence officer and journalist by education and work experience.

Contacts are being set up on problems of mutual interest not only with the special services of foreign states but also with researchers and writers. This has been confirmed by an unprecedented project: Agreement has been reached with the U.S. Crown publishing company, which is part of the giant Random House publishing concern, on the publication of a series of books which will be written on the basis of materials from the secret archives of the foreign intelligence service. The proposed subjects include the work of the former KGB in the United States, including work on "nuclear matters," the behind the scenes story of the Caribbean crisis, the Berlin crisis, and the Trotsky case. According to Yuriy Kobaladze, there can be no case of any publishing activity which could harm either Russia or the intelligence service itself (for instance, the uncovering of agents). New elements in the life of the Russian foreign intelligence service should include the fact that in accordance with the law "on foreign intelligence"

adopted in July last year the activity of the foreign intelligence service has been placed under the control of legislative power.

Despite the difficulties which are being experienced right now by our society and all its structures, the intelligence service has retained its efficiency and is successfully fulfilling the tasks which have been set it, acting strictly within the framework of the Russian laws and the Constitution. That is the conclusion of the first check in the history of Russian intelligence, carried out in the foreign intelligence service by the Russian Supreme Soviet provisional commission consisting of 12 deputies from different factions and also experts from the relevant parliamentary committees, the ministries of security and foreign affairs, and a number of other departments.

An anonymous sociological poll of officers in the central apparatus and foreign residences has made it possible to ascertain and sense the feelings and thoughts by which rank and file foreign intelligence staffers are living and working. The overwhelming majority spoke of the desire to continue service in the foreign intelligence service since they consider it "necessary to the state" or "interesting." A certain proportion, however, has decided to work elsewhere. Here the main reasons included dissatisfaction with their material position.

As a whole according to Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Trubnikov, first deputy chief of the foreign intelligence service, the intelligence operatives' wages are on a level with those of servicemen. It is true that they have several allowances, in particular for knowing foreign languages (and a knowledge of two or three languages is the norm for an intelligence operative) and also for working under the tough conditions of secrecy. As Vyacheslav Trubnikov noted, the parliamentarians helped the foreign intelligence service leadership to amend its efforts to elaborate a new juridical and legal basis. There was a review of the enormous number of internal departmental orders, indications, instructions, and other administrative documents inherited from the KGB. Right now the main juridical documents by which the intelligence lives and will continue to live have already been elaborated and received the necessary approval. In particular in April of this year the Russian president approved the statute on foreign intelligence. In addition statutes on various subdivisions of the service have been prepared and approved.

As a form of activity intelligence is a far more ancient profession than that which we now like to call the "oldest" profession. And it is hardly possible for any modern state to do without information acquired by the intelligence services. That is why intelligence has been, is, and will be as long as states exist with their economic, political, and other interests. In whose hands this specific instrument is and who uses it and how is another matter.

The intelligence operative is a profession recognized throughout the civilized world. That is why the question

arises of observing elementary "rules of the game" in mutual relations between special services. And here, General Trubnikov believes, "there is enough scope for dialogue" about some kind of agreements which could rule out acts of provocation at the troglodyte level. The main principle in determining these "rules of the game" should be respect for the honor and dignity of the intelligence operative and the members of his family.

In civilized society there should be no place for deliberate moral and psychological pressure on the intelligence operative and those close to him. "We have examples of a quite tough attitude toward our workers. Sometimes this affects the honor and dignity of a man and often influences the climate in his family, and sometimes even his children are drawn into the recruiting game surrounding the operative. We should probably talk about this together and a decision should be made about the framework to which counterintelligence and intelligence should stick," Vyacheslav Trubnikov said.

"We have moved away from confrontation and are developing contacts with the special services of other states," General Trubnikov noted. "The spheres of collaboration concern the conservation of general human values and here, it seems to me, we are making the most successful headway." For the first time in Russia the provision that the intelligence service's activity should not harm the health of man or the environment is recorded in legislation—in the law "on foreign intelligence."

Among the main avenues of the Russian foreign intelligence service's collaboration with foreign states' intelligence services one can name the struggle against international terrorism, the narcotics business, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a number of fields of mutual interest.

Questions of the Russian intelligence service's activity with regard to the republics of the former USSR often arise. This problem, as we know, is regulated by the Almaty agreement signed within the framework of the CIS according to which the sides have undertaken not to perform operational and recruitment work against each other. But that does not mean that the foreign intelligence service is not acquiring information about the situation in nearby foreign parts. Of course the situation is being monitored. It is not operational but conventional methods which are used, including the gathering of information from open sources—reports in the mass media and materials from scientific conferences.

And finally, the question of traitors in the foreign intelligence service. Some of its former staffers deserted to the opposite camp during the period of existence of the Soviet Union allegedly for political motives and are therefore responsible to a state which no longer exists. But the former attitude has been retained in the foreign intelligence service toward deserters. It is believed there that these people betrayed above all the service in which

they worked, they gave away not only state secrets but also the secrets of the intelligence service. In addition intelligence operatives are convinced that the overwhelming majority of betrayals were done by their former colleagues not for political but for purely mercenary reasons. In accordance with the law on intelligence divulging the fact that one belongs to that intelligence service and to the apparatus of its assistants is a punishable offense. Therefore the foreign intelligence service in conjunction with the relevant specialists will obviously soon elaborate a "legal formula" for the question of how to treat traitors of past years like Oleg Gordiyevskiy and his ilk.

Economic Issues

Bank Official Khandruyev on 'Ailing' Ruble

PM0308140893 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Jul 93 p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Khandruyev, deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, by Aleksandr Golovenko; date, place not given: "At the Bedside of the Ailing Ruble"]

[Text] Our bankers have the reputation of being secretive people, not keen on interviews. They prefer to keep their secrets safely under lock and key, as the saying goes. That is understandable, in general. But we cannot ever remember any of the Central Bank's leaders answering SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers' questions, although some representatives of commercial publications have been able to penetrate the iron railings around that fine, palatial old building at 12, Neglinnaya Street. Yet the readers of a people's newspaper, most of whom have been ruined by crazy prices, would like to know how the Bank of Russia sees its own role in that destruction of the national economic complex that is cynically called by the euphemism "reform." Why this prejudice against the people's newspaper? That was how I began my conversation with Aleksandr Andreyevich Khandruyev, deputy chairman of the Central Bank, who is, incidentally, a very sociable and hospitable man.

"There is no prejudice," my interviewee replied. "The Central Bank of Russia tries to steer clear of political sympathies and antipathies, being guided solely by the tasks it is charged with. Therefore any journalist executing his readers' will, in accordance with the 'Law on the Press,' has the right to obtain the necessary information on our institution's work."

[Golovenko] About two years ago an article entitled "Humiliation of the Ruble" appeared in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. It put forward the idea that our national currency was being deliberately compromised, and hence: If the dollar is running the show in Moscow and nationwide, then it is clear what kind of impresario is calling the tune...

[Khandruyev] I am always irritated and offended when our ruble is described as "wooden." True, the ruble is suffering humiliation today, but let us look unemotionally at how this came about. Not everyone knows, I suppose, that the ruble's stability is determined by the relationship between the money supply and the commodity supply. If more rubles are issued than there are goods to cover them, then they begin to be devalued.

And it must be said frankly that the Soviet Union and Russia, back in the mid-seventies, began to experience a state budget deficit. The USSR Gosbank [State Bank] became an organ financing socioeconomic programs adopted over its head, leading to excessive quantities of money being put into circulation.

Today, as a result of processes primarily associated with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, economic links between republics have been destroyed everywhere. Everyone knows that the USSR economy was created as an integrated national economic mechanism. Tens of thousands of enterprises were scattered across different national compartments, which undoubtedly undermined the stability of the money supply. The decline in production which began to be observed in our country back in the early eighties, following the imposition of "shock therapy," became an out-and-out recession. This was naturally another blow to the ruble.

[Golovenko] I do not want to bring you under critical fire from certain newspapers, but I thought that you yourself were highly critical of the macroeconomic experiments of Gaydar and his team, which brought the majority of Russia's population to the brink of poverty.

[Khandruyev] It is not a question of macroeconomic theory, whereby they were trying to halt the production recession by means of financial and credit levers alone. In strategic terms, it must be said, this is in line with the changes that are being made in other countries. The range of means for the transition to a market economy is the same. It is another matter that in our country they totally failed to take account of the Russian people's unique economic, historical, cultural, and psychological characteristics.

I think the simplest illustration is this: The USSR's economy was profoundly monopolistic, based on the state sector. We knew, and said repeatedly, that in these conditions price liberalization would not produce equilibrium on the market, but would lead to a "war of labels," to price piracy. And that is what happened. It was simply impossible to stop the economic train plunging toward derailment solely by means of financial and credit levers, price liberalization, and a deficit-free budget. Still less to divert "our locomotive" onto an entirely different track. And how was the question actually put, sometimes? Let it all collapse, and out of the wreckage and the ruins we will build what we want. We have always objected to this bravado approach.

[Golovenko] But it seems, Aleksandr Andreyevich, that such macroeconomic formulas were evolved for underdeveloped Third World countries, whereas the USSR was a mighty industrial power. And the ideas of the "Chicago school" do not appear to have been successful anywhere. Moreover, in our country the "Chicago boys" wanted to make an instantaneous leap from socialism to capitalism, and nobody had any experience of that at all. So is it not pure adventurism to do what Gaydar preached—"close your eyes and leap into the unknown"?

[Khandruyev] Today people talk about a degree of success for monetarist theory in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, but what do they omit to mention? Again, those countries' unique characteristics. The main thing is that they were, on the whole, prepared for the transition to a new type of economy. Take Poland. Some 80 percent of its agriculture was in private hands, while in trade the private sector was active. The Poles began the transition to the market immediately when Solidarity came to power. They underwent a state of emergency period in the economy and the liberalization of prices on some goods, and it was not until 1989 that they started carrying out the "shock therapy," the so-called "Balcerowicz plan." This was accompanied, in the initial stage, by a fairly sharp fall in production, high inflation, and a fall in living standards. Now they seem to have the economic situation under control, it seems there is no inflation and the zloty has stabilized. But at what cost? The government had to resign and many enterprises are threatening to go on strike.

[Golovenko] But let us not conceal the fact that, according to experts' assessments, production and consumption have fallen by one-third in Poland. The Poles, the general mass of working people, are living less well. The abundant goods in the store windows are not for them. So it transpires that our own reformers also want the great leap toward capitalism for the benefit of a special group of very rich people, who, moreover, made their fortunes by criminal means.

[Khandruyev] I would only add that China, which was and remains socialist, has also embarked on the path of reforms. But what kind? A path of gradual, phased transformations. The result: The people are fed, shod, and clothed.

[Golovenko] That is, I think, a useful contribution to enlightenment. But let us return to our poor old ruble. Our readers do not understand why it is valued at one-tenth of an American cent. They cannot grasp how come the value of the national currency is determined not by the state, but by some kind of interbank exchange. Many people think that this is being done in the interests of the West and of America, so that they can buy up our natural resources for peanuts. One dollar buys 1,000 rubles [R]. Inconceivable!...

[Khandruyev] Not everything can be explained unequivocally here. You know that for many decades our ruble

was a closed, nonconvertible currency. It must be admitted honestly that the exchange rate was artificially overstated. After the liberalization of the currency regime we set a commercial rate: R1.6 to the dollar. The official rate remained 58 kopeks to the dollar. That is to say, the ruble was devalued virtually to one-third of its former level. At the same time currency auctions began to be held. At these, rubles and dollars were sold for the purchase of certain types of goods: computers, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, cheap cosmetics, and so forth. This was the so-called computer rate.

At first, people gave R20 per dollar at the auctions, then R40, and so it went on... In the middle of last year we agreed with the IMF to tie the official ruble rate to the rate on the currency exchange. I think that was a mistake. Nonetheless, after this linkage, the dynamics of the balance between our currency and the U.S. currency began to be determined by supply and demand on the exchange.

[Golovenko] I just hope SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's readers can fathom the ins and outs of these devious agreements and deals. But it seems that those who detected in the falling ruble rate the will of Uncle Sam and the Western financial big shots were right. There is a view that the present relative stabilization was specially timed by them to coincide with President B. Yeltsin's trip to the G-7 meeting.

[Khandruyev] I do not think there is any connection. It is most likely the result of the moderate to tough financial and credit policy that the Central Bank began to pursue since roughly last year.

Prior to that, we were operating more like a fire brigade.

Remember the economic situation in the country when Viktor Vladimirovich Gerashchenko became head of the bank. An acute crisis in the cash supply and in enterprises' solvency: Their mutual debts were in excess of R3 trillion! Forged "letters of advice," checks, and so forth were circulating. Production was on the brink of total stoppage, collapse.

In these conditions the bank leadership managed to persuade the president, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and the government to introduce offsetting of mutual debts between state enterprises.

Whereupon certain of the mass media rounded on the bank chairman: He was supposedly striking a blow against the reforms.

By offsetting debts, we managed to extinguish R2 trillion in mutual nonpayments. And that set the pulse of hundreds of enterprises beating with redoubled energy and made it possible to save them from collapse and their people from unemployment.

It is also said that we rescue unprofitable enterprises from bankruptcy. It is not we who decide whom to finance, but the government.

[Golovenko] I think you have always been a tactful man, Aleksandr Andreyevich. But many economists think that bankruptcy for certain enterprises was what the mafia nouveaux riches wanted, having gotten hold of huge sums of money which they do not know how to launder. Insolvent enterprises, under the bankruptcy law, could come under the hammer. But you and Comrade Gerashchenko well and truly foiled their game. So they decided to vent their spite on you through certain newspapers.

Sometimes you are accused of excessive license with the printing press, whose capacity you are constantly increasing.

[Khandruyev] When people say that a wicked uncle sits at the Central Bank giving the order, at whim, to increase the issuing of money, this should be seen as stupid. If a decision is made to increase a wage, a pension, or a grant, what are we supposed to do? Right: We have to issue as many bank notes as are needed to fulfill this task. So that the worker, student, or pensioner can go to the cash desk and receive all that is due to him under the law or edict.

I therefore believe that before making a political decision on paying additional income or increasing wages, the government and the presidential team should always think a thousand times about what they can really allow themselves to do. Populism is by its very nature the most dangerous form of antipopular policy.

[Golovenko] Now it is clear why, in Stalin's day, they preferred to lower prices rather than increasing wages. However, experts claim that the inflation spiral is on its way up. In the twenties, they say, a box of matches cost a million. Will it come to that for us?

[Khandruyev] It all depends on what economic policy the government pursues. We think there are ways of curbing inflation. For instance, reducing budget expenditure and increasing revenue. Look what has happened: They have destroyed the traditional taxation system, without creating a new one. The collection mechanism is extremely inefficient. The main taxpayers are state enterprises and ordinary citizens. Those commercial structures that are making billions skillfully avoid taxes. Whose idea was it to permit free trade without considering the question of cash registers, taxes, and licenses? These are customary throughout the free world. Vast sums are slipping through the state's pocket.

I can also see other ways of combating inflation, which readers will understand. They include, of course, halting the downturn in production, boosting it instead, and increasing investments. Foreign economic activity is a special category. It must be acknowledged that our country was in too much of a hurry to liberalize it. As a result natural resources are exported from Russia basically without any control.

[Golovenko] One very delicate question that concerns readers is this: Why did the Central Bank set about withdrawing—in haste, at that—the Soviet money depicting V.I. Lenin? Is it a political decision? The

distinguishing mark of the dollar on bank notes of various denominations is the portraits of U.S. presidents.

[Khandruyev] I would not attach political overtones to our action. I share the feelings of those who are distressed by the new Russian symbols. But Russia has become a sovereign state, and must have a uniform currency. I wish to state quite authoritatively that the Central Bank's actions, which have caused such a storm, were justified exclusively by the interests of protecting the country's citizens. Recently, the nearby foreign countries had dumped R500 billion on us—twice the sum that we intended to withdraw and had been withdrawing little by little since last year. Ten percent remained to be withdrawn...

[Golovenko] But do you not think that the introduction of a purely Russian currency will lead, shall we say, to even greater alienation of the former union republics?

[Khandruyev] You know, world experience indicates that it is by no means essential for a common currency to circulate in relations between countries. Look how the countries of Western Europe are integrating. The German and French economies are very closely interwoven, yet each state has its own currency. For us, the main thing today is to restore the wrecked economic ties. And that requires political will.

[Golovenko] At the beginning of the so-called "perestroika" the overseers and architects trumpeted the convertibility of the ruble...

[Khandruyev] At that time V. Gerashchenko, as chairman of the USSR Gosbank, and I said that the battle for convertibility could not be a political campaign. A series of special conditions and prerequisites are needed. But the most surprising thing is that, having forgotten the slogan, we are now far closer to convertibility than we think. After all, at any exchange center you can exchange a certain quantity of rubles for dollars or marks. And vice versa.

[Golovenko] But the ratio!...

[Khandruyev] True, it is very weak. However, Russia has a vast national wealth and an industrious people. Given a wise state policy aimed at restoring our economic potential, we will be able to overcome the difficulties and create all the prerequisites for our currency to take a worthy place in the ranks of world currencies. Russia is a country that deserves to have its ruble speak out proudly.

Over 700 Billion Rubles in Old Notes Exchanged

LD0308132893 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English 1311 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Viktor Petrenko]

[Text] Moscow August 3 TASS—According to the information of the Central Bank of Russia, over 720 billion

roubles out of just over one thousand million roubles, to be withdrawn from circulation, were exchanged for new banknotes by early August. The turmoil caused by the exchange of banknotes of the 1961-1992 issues has subsided.

Institutions of the savings bank exchanged 332 billion roubles and opened over 100,000 deposit accounts on which 13 billion roubles were put, said Alla Abramova, director of the economic agency of the savings bank. Fifty-six billion roubles were exchanged in Moscow, over 20 billion roubles in the Moscow region and about 13 billion roubles in St. Petersburg. Abramova believes it will take a week or a little longer to complete the exchange.

Some economists say the exchange of banknotes undertaken by the Central Bank was quite justifiable. The bank has tried in this way to put in order the country's monetary system. The non-cash rouble zone was split in June 1992 as the national economy of the former Union disintegrated. The countries having their own currency kept a considerable rouble supply (it is estimated to amount to nearly 1,700 billion roubles in countries of the former USSR). This caused a considerable flow of roubles to Russia and could not but affect the stability of its monetary system. Countries that remained in the rouble zone conducted an independent monetary policy. Negotiations about the settlement of disputed questions did not go further than generalised statements and declarations.

In order to invigorate Russia's monetary system, it was necessary to withdraw some kinds of banknotes from circulations. There were 26 modifications of banknotes in circulation. Experts believe that, normally, their number should not be more than 6-8. In addition, money of the 1992 issue were not sufficiently protected and were meant to be in circulation for 6-8 months at most. There were many forged banknotes. According to the Central Bank, up to 20 per cent of forged banknotes contained in the total supply were withdrawn from circulation in the recent months.

Older banknotes were certainly being withdrawn even before July 26 when the exchange was announced. 1,800 billion roubles were withdrawn from circulation by that date, including 500 billion roubles from former Union republics. Banknotes of the 1993 issue made up 88 per cent in money circulation by July.

Economist Shmelev Interviewed on Reforms

PM0308105193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with Economist Nikolay Shmelev by A. Yevgenyev under the "Point of View" rubric; place and date not given: "No Matter Who Comes to Power, the Country Can No Longer Return to the Past. Economist Nikolay Shmelev Analyzes the Results of 18 Months of Reforms"]

[Text] [Yevgenyev] Nikolay Petrovich, I recently discovered to my great amazement that a growing number of people, far removed from big-time politics, feel a sense of nostalgia for the pre-perestroika times—well-ordered, calm, and rational by today's standards.

[Shmelev] But the country was sliding toward the abyss. It consumed its gold reserves, wasted the petrodollars, and was getting deeper and deeper into the whirlpool of external debt. Store shelves were emptying even in Moscow and the state was becoming a gigantic central distributor. Professionals were warning the authorities: We are on the brink of national disaster, do something. The response took the form of petty bureaucratic intrigues, nothing substantial. Actually, a lot has been written about all this.... By the time Gaydar came in, he could no longer afford the luxury of marking time. Action had to be taken. Ultimately, he achieved the main goal: Reforms in Russia became irreversible and this, in my view, is an indisputable fact.

[Yevgenyev] Pathological symptoms can also be irreversible.

[Shmelev] Ambiguity still exists. I do think, however, that the correct vector of movement has been chosen. It is a different matter that mistakes, even serious ones, were not successfully avoided.

[Yevgenyev] What, in your opinion, could be put down to the reformers' credit?

[Shmelev] First, thanks to the liberalization of prices, money is once again functioning in Russia, which had almost reverted to the universal barter of the Stone Age. It is bad and weak money for the time being, but it is already this money, rather than the notorious barter, that is turning the wheels of the Russian economy.

Second, for all that, we have overcome our ideological legacy and have rehabilitated private enterprise and private initiative. In any event, they are no longer punishable.

People's mentality is changing amazingly quickly. The passive, servile, and parasitical mentality and the habit of relying only on the supreme authority are receding into the past. The market is forcing people to look at life from a different angle and is promoting the perception that they should rely only on their own efforts. There have been especially encouraging changes in the philosophy of the corps of directors—the most influential, and simultaneously the most restrained, not to say conservative, stratum of society. It was skeptical even about Gorbachev, and the initial steps by the team of reformers were greeted with a wry smirk: Give the guys a chance to work out their enthusiasm. But now, having acquired a taste for autonomy and having been forced to accept the proposed rules of the game, it is beginning to realize: Certain positive changes have really occurred in the world around it and the new realities can no longer be ignored. Regardless of whether you like them or not.

But I would not extend the list of achievements any further.

[Yevgenyev] And what about the other cup of the scales?

[Shmelev] You may recall that the reforms began with the liberalization of prices. Let me emphasize: This was absolutely necessary and inevitable at that moment in time. But the liberalization of prices took the form of such a steep turn that people ended up being robbed virtually overnight. The government failed to honor its own promise about compensations. Now this question has surfaced again. But I assume that it has not been seriously thought out. To compensate bank deposits by means of cash would mean blowing up the entire financial system. Some different ways should be sought. Maybe an attempt should be made to try and reimburse depositors using property—land, housing, shares in enterprises being privatized. But not money. I am disappointed that the government, which actually created the crisis situation, is doing nothing to resolve it sensibly.

It looks as if the cabinet has miscalculated in failing to release all prices at once. If you are to grasp the nettle, do it boldly. Having taken energy sources out of the equation, we have given ourselves a headache for many years to come. They will carry on fueling inflation for a long time yet.

The reformers have also encountered failure in the industrial-financial sphere. The enterprises' reaction to the shortage of funds was easy to misjudge, and several bankruptcies had to be rushed through back in May-June last year, even though that was done purely to teach the others a lesson. In order to make the economic managers realize: The hothouse conditions had come to an end, the market is not like a game of billiards, with money changing hands everywhere but never ending up in the state's pocket. But the reformers' nerves proved to be weaker than the directors'. The nonpayments crisis was eased by means of an additional injection of credits and reciprocal settlements. A new wave of nonpayments is swelling at present, and I still cannot figure out whether the government is ready for it.

It is hard to describe the currency strategy as considered, either. In the conditions of high inflation it is literally forcing exporters to leave their currency earnings in banks abroad. Admittedly, the cabinet has been doing something recently to remedy the mistakes and restore faith in the state.

Science and higher education are in real difficulties. And yet fundamental research and the education system are almost the sole indisputable capital accumulated throughout the Soviet period of our history. But after a couple more years of this policy we will have nothing with which to enter the 21st century.

[Yevgenyev] So far you have not said a single word about the slump in production.

[Shmelev] This is a special question. Unfortunately, the slump in production has become a convenient political slogan. But the issue is not as primitively simple as it is sometimes presented in political debates. Yes, compared with 1990, Russia has lost one-third of its industrial output volume. But 10 percent of this is due to the collapse of CEMA and a further 15 percent is the consequence of the USSR's disintegration. Consequently, the reforms actually account for 7-8 percent. This amount includes conversion in the defense sectors, where so far there has been more destruction than construction. I think that 7-8 percent is a price worth paying for fundamental transformations in the economy. This is a bargain-basement price, as the saying goes. How will events develop in the future? The slump will persist in some sectors. But this is not all that dreadful—we simply need to get rid of part of the industrial potential which operates exclusively for its own sake. But there are sectors where, I would like to hope, we have hit rock bottom—the consumer sector, the services sphere, housing construction. If stabilization is getting under way there, it can be expected that we have started climbing out of the ditch in which we had ended up.

[Yevgenyev] But there is something preventing us from actively developing small and medium businesses. Especially in industry. After all, this is not just a direct promotion of the market, it also means new jobs.

[Shmelev] I agree with you on this point. Thank God, private operators are no longer put behind bars for political reasons. But opening a private repairs workshop or brick factory is still as difficult as it was 60 years ago. The registration principle operates throughout the world in such cases, but we operate the permissive principle. Struggles for the right to give permissions were waged by the bolsheviks in the past, then by the democrats, and now by those who style themselves centrists. This is the foundation of the monstrous pyramid of corruption which a normal person cannot and never will be able to circumvent. Surely by now this must be obvious to everyone. The second point—taxes. They are so high that they render pointless any entrepreneurial activity, apart from trade. Any private operator will tell you that, unless you cheat the state, you will be deprived of 90 percent of your profits.

[Yevgenyev] Taxes are also stifling big industry. In your view, is there an opportunity to "trim" them nowadays?

[Shmelev] Yes, but not in the way parliament's chairman proposed on one occasion. Cut taxes by one-half, he said, and everything will be fine. Until this "fine" state is achieved we still have to somehow maintain the budget. It will take at least six months and maybe even a year before the lowering of taxes produces its effect—higher volumes of output and expansion of the tax base. But wages in budget-funded sectors will have to be paid. Each month. If we managed to obtain major credits from the West.... But the amounts we have received so far are just crumbs as far as Russia is concerned. They will not solve our problems.

[Yevgenyev] It seems to me that, in the process of coaxing dollars and marks out of the West, we have altogether forgotten that many countries also owe money to Russia. If they do not pay us, why not factor their debts?

[Shmelev] This is indeed a paradox; a look at Russia's foreign economic balance would show that it is not at all a debtor but one of the world's largest creditors. We owe \$95 billion, and we are owed \$145 billion. But it is not all that simple to exchange one for the other. We need some sort of broad international action, something at the Marshall Plan level. This would be of real help to Russia. I know that Aven intended to tackle our debts. But nothing has been said so far about any success.

[Yevgenyev] Therefore, we are left facing our own problems. Huge inflation and an unprecedented deficit of 22 trillion rubles in the eventually finalized budget.

[Shmelev] As regards the budget deficit, that was only to be expected. The president, the government, and parliament made so many promises that the cash to honor them could have been acquired only from the printing presses. It is also good that we have given up technical credits for CIS countries.

Nonetheless, I do not perceive the main source of inflation as lying here, or in the flight of capital abroad, or even in what some people consider to be excessive allowances for pensioners. This source, in my view, lies in the continued provision of finance, subsidies, and preferential credits for loss-making enterprises. It is time for us all to realize: By supporting potential bankrupts, we are inevitably bankrupting the state.

[Yevgenyev] This is true in theory. But what would be the effect of refusing to provide the countryside with something? Next fall we will end up with empty granaries.

[Shmelev] Back in the past I worked on the country's grain balance and discovered the following: Some 20-25 percent of kolkhozes and sovkhoses supply about 80 percent of the commodity output of agricultural production. This one-quarter creates the insurance fund for the country's survival. It is quite happy with the normal grain price fixed at the exchanges. The hopeless ones must be told: We will support you for another year, and from then you are on your own. Amalgamate, disband, transform yourselves, gear yourselves anew, sow and plant whatever you like, and sell your produce to whoever you like and on whatever terms you like—it is all up to you. But do not count on the state: It can no longer come to your rescue.

[Yevgenyev] And who will determine whether you are hopeless or not? For example, which pits in Vorkuta should be closed down and which should continue to receive subsidies?

[Shmelev] There is a viewpoint that the market itself will sort everything out and will work out the selection. There

can be no argument: It will sort it out, it will work it out. The question is: What price will have to be paid for this. If everyone were to be cast into the river and we were to observe from the bank the swimming abilities of potential survivors, I estimate that 30-35 percent of enterprises would sink. Yavlinskiy cites an even higher figure—80 percent. Experiments like this are risky and not very productive. In all likelihood, we will still not manage without administrative intervention.

[Yevgenyev] In other words, entrust everything to functionaries again and create yet another criminogenic niche.

[Shmelev] There is nothing else to be done, this is a case when we have to choose the lesser of two evils. And the lesser evil is to agree, while still on the river bank, who will be saved and whose future lies exclusively in his own hands. This, incidentally, is the only way to pursue a policy of priorities rather than meting the same treatment to everyone.

[Yevgenyev] The government is still being blamed for lacking a clear-cut program.

[Shmelev] I have no faith in any programs. The situation forces us to act according to circumstances, following the dictates of common sense. There is a set of tasks, and their conditions dictate the technology of solutions. Like a tightrope walker, we have to traverse a difficult path with high inflation on one side and mass unemployment on the other. There is no alternative. There is no magician with a white rabbit in his pocket. Yavlinskiy may join, Gaydar may come back, Volskiy may be brought in, some finer points may change, but we will still have to walk this thin and dangerous tightrope, striving at all costs to maintain our equilibrium and avoid jerky movements.

Program for Tackling Economic Crisis Drafted

PM0308155993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Ministerial Plan to 'Save the Economy' May Put An End to Reforms"]

[Excerpt] As the IZVESTIYA editorial office has found out from well informed sources, the commission formed by a directive of the Russian Government 20 July of this year has elaborated a draft program of urgent measures to bring Russia out of the economic crisis for the period up to 1995.

In addition to commission members, the chiefs of leading departments of the Russian Ministry of the Economy also took part in preparing the program.

As the introductory part of the draft says, the commission has integrated in the program proposals from a group of authors, and first and foremost, no doubt, the Declaration of National Economic Accord—the final document of the "roundtable"—a forum of social and

political forces of Russia convened by the parliament and the government and comprising representatives of business circles, labor collectives, trade unions, and political parties and movements, as well as representatives of science and state power.

Furthermore, in the opinion of the elaborators of the program, it uses proposals made by the Russian Ministry of the Economy Academy of Economics (V. Senchagov), the Russian Ministry of Finances (B. Fedorov), the Union of Russian Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (A. Volskiy), the Economic Society (G. Popov), and a number of other sociopolitical organizations and associations.

Such a broad representation of people involved in this document, given the fundamental differences in approach and in the assessment of the strategy of Russia's economic development, inevitably makes you wonder whether wishful thinking is engaged in here, as is frequently the case. The doubts are intensified when you familiarize yourself with the content of the draft program. However, it is not the degree of participation in its elaboration by various "representatives of business circles, labor collectives, trade unions, and political parties and movements, as well as representatives of science and state power" that is of interest today. The main thing is something else. The program, which was conceived of as a set of urgent measures to get out of the crisis, in actual fact envisages a full-scale reorientation of the present economic policy. Furthermore, it is not out of the question that it will become the subject of a discussion at one of the next few sittings of the Russian Government. [passage omitted]

Zaveryukha Optimistic About Harvest Prospects

PM0308122193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "We Will Believe It When We See It"]

[Text] A period of stability has dawned for agricultural production in Russia. This was claimed at a press conference yesterday by Government Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Zaveryukha. He cited numerous facts and figures testifying to an end to the slump in the production of milk, meat, and eggs.

The vice premier stressed that an unprecedented area of grain crops has been grown this year in many regions, which will allow for some 120-125 million tonnes of grain to be threshed.

Aleksandr Zaveryukha reassured the inhabitants of major industrial centers: The harvest promises to be good, and there is every opportunity for storing sufficient potatoes and vegetables.

Harvest Forecast 'Too Optimistic'

PM0408100993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Valeriy Konovalov report under general headline: "Russia Will Harvest 110-112 Million Tonnes of Grain. But Harvest Under Threat in Belarus"]

[Text] More than 20 million tonnes of grain have already been threshed in Russia. Yields are considerably higher than last year. And, despite the fact that no agreement on purchase prices has been reached between peasant organizations and the government, grain is nonetheless being sold to federal and regional stocks—the state has already bought 2,215,000 tonnes of grain.

The prices at which the new harvest is being bought are considerably higher than stock exchange prices and are nearing world prices. For instance, the most widespread type of wheat—class III wheat, for which a price of 60 rubles [R] per kilo had been set—was being bought for R70 in August because of indexation. But not everybody is happy about these prices. In certain areas, judging by everything, people intend to haggle to the bitter end to get a price which will compensate farms for their costs on fuel and other resources.

Thus, in the neighboring regions of the Kuban and the Stavropol area, where the harvest is just as good, grain sales to the state have varied greatly. More than 650,000 tonnes of grain—43.6 percent of the contract total—have already been sold in the Kuban. Whereas Stavropol has delivered just 60,000 tonnes—or 7.5 percent of the contract. Grain sales to the state have been most active of all in Kalmykia, which has already delivered 86.8 percent of its contract.

The harvest is already exceeding recent forecasts. New forecasts are being made. Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha has even predicted that more than 120 million tonnes of grain will be harvested. Admittedly, specialists believe that this forecast is too optimistic. And, in any case, not all regions are finding things going as successfully as they have been in the south of Russia and in Orenburg and Omsk Oblasts. In a number of Siberian oblasts, Irkutsk Oblast in particular, drought has done a great deal of damage to the harvest—up to 40 percent. But, even so, a harvest of 110-112 million tonnes—which would be very large for recent years—is now considered entirely realistic. Last year the gross grain harvest, granary weight, was 106.8 million tonnes.

Deputy Minister 'Pleased' With Winter Feed Prospects

PM0308155393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed telephone interview with First Deputy Agriculture Minister V.N. Shcherbak under the "Telephone Call" rubric; place and date not given]

[Text] [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] In your view, Vladimir Nikolayevich, how is the general picture, traditionally known as preparation for the winter, shaping up?

[Shcherbak] We are pleased with the harvest and the stockbreeders are pleased, too: There will be more mixed feed which means that there is an opportunity to increase livestock productivity. There is good potential for procuring coarse and succulent feed everywhere. We expect that the supply of feed to stockbreeding will be somewhat better than last year.

Finances and prices are the biggest headache. You cannot go on raising the cost price of produce endlessly. At the moment price movements do not favor agriculture. Here is one example: One liter of gasoline used to be equal to one kilogram of grain in cost price. Now it is equivalent to two.

Farmers Complain to Ministry Over Prices, Supply Problems

PM0408081993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Sounding the Alarm"]

[Text] At a Russian Ministry of Agriculture telephone conference representatives of different regions spoke about virtually one and the same thing:

the absence of the credit resources promised to the countryside by government organs and the price disparity between agricultural producers and the suppliers of equipment, construction materials, and fuel. Let us cite just one opinion—that of Zh. Altynbayev, chief of the oblast agriculture department (Chelyabinsk):

"The preparation of stockraising premises for winter is proving difficult. Many farms do not have the funds to pay for lumber, glass, and bricks."

Supreme Soviet

Khasbulatov Seeks Tighter Control Over Executive Authority

LD0308141993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1204 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Yuriy Likhopek and Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Orel, 3 Aug (TASS)—The parliament is intending to "reinforce its constitutional control of the activities on the executive authority," stated Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov speaking here today at a meeting with representatives of the executive and the representative authorities, and of the public of Orel and Orel oblast. According to

him, executive power, unwilling to put up with this, has forced the current constitutional confrontation on the Supreme Soviet.

Emphasizing the urgent necessity of introducing market relations into the country, the head of parliament pointed out at the same time, that there is no country where economic reforms implemented along the lines similar to those practiced now in Russia, would have succeeded. He believes that the state should secure interests of its citizens to a certain degree, and should do this, inter alia, via democratic institutions including soviets. He particularly stressed the perilous nature of boosting the rate of privatization, and stated that "attempts to adopt the American or Latin-American way" are leading nowhere. At the same time he expressed the belief that the government and the president do not understand it.

Responding to possible criticisms of soviets, Ruslan Khasbulatov said that if unworthy people work in representative bodies, voters have the right to recall them. Such a possibility by no means signifies, however, that the system of soviets is faulty as a whole, Ruslan Khasbulatov said.

Touching upon the economic situation, the head of parliament drew attention to shortcomings in the budgetary sphere. "Under pressure from the government we were forced to toughen the taxation system," he said. Meanwhile, budgetary deficiencies could have been made up by other means. According to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, some cuts in the executive power apparatus could have brought to the treasury around 2 trillion rubles, which could have gone to the development of science, health care, education, and agriculture.

Outlining his vision of the political prospects in Russia, Ruslan Khasbulatov spoke of "the need for a very strong and united government of national accord," which would not fight with its people or its parliament, but would act in accord with national interests. The parliamentary speaker also noted that such a government could put an end to conflicts flaring up on the outlying lands of Russia.

Touching upon the situation in the country in the international arena, Khasbulatov noted the appearance "in other countries of leaders who dream of dismembering the Russian Federation. They hate parliament for not allowing them to do that," the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia said. He stated that the unity of the country will be preserved. However, for this to happen, it is extremely important to instill in people the belief that the country can take a path of transformations which will lead to success.

Claims Executive Increases Tensions

PM0408080993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 93
p 2

[Vasiliy Andreyev report from the "In the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet" roundup: "They Stood Firm on the Spot Where the Metal Melted"]

[Text] Veterans of the Battle of Kursk were greeted in the Russian Supreme Soviet yesterday. The small number of those still living gathered in the award ceremonies hall. Supreme Soviet Chairman R. Khasbulatov and Vice President A. Rutskoy warmly congratulated the veterans on the anniversary of the Kursk encounter.

Addressing those assembled, R. Khasbulatov noted with bitterness that nowadays human memory is becoming a target of manipulation. Unless indiscriminate criticism of the country's Soviet period stops, new generations will simply be ignorant as to why people died on the battlefields 50 years ago. They will not take pride in the feat of those who stood firm on the spot where the metal [of the gun barrels] melted.

The Supreme Soviet chairman stressed anew that the country is not controlled by the executive, and that a process is under way to whip up tension. In his words, an unusually high number of troops are being maintained around Moscow, and officers are not being given leave. Despite this, R. Khasbulatov assured the veterans that the Supreme Soviet will not give way to panic, or yield to either an external or internal enemy.

At that point, 60 veterans were awarded financial aid of 100,000 rubles each, and 20 were awarded vacations at the Bulgarian resort of Varna. It should be noted that all money for this was allocated from the "Revival" Social Development Fund, and the joint stock aviation leasing company "ALAK" and "ALAK-TUR".

Council of Nationalities Chairman Eyes Constitution Drafts

PM0308112193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Jul 93 First Edition pp 1, 6

[Article by Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of Council of Nationalities: "Today We Are Not Prepared To Make Things Better. Let's Just Not Make Them Any Worse"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Russia is a particular cultural and historical world that has emerged as a result of the interaction of many cultures, traditions, and religions. And the Russian state is a Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, and even pagan state at one and the same time. We impart to our state the sacred meaning of a father-cum-master (even sometimes a tyrant). It will be extremely difficult to give this up. It may be largely for this reason that the reforms are failing to make progress. And friendship among the peoples was not a fabrication of the Soviet system—as certain people claim—but the spirit of the Eurasian brotherhood of peoples.

The logic of destruction that is being imposed on society reproduces conflicts and separatism. Whereas yesterday we were talking about the danger of the Russian Federation being dismembered by the possible separatism of republics and autonomous entities, today the representatives of the president, the government, and the parliament, along with a number of local bureaucrats, are propagandizing the idea of unifying the status of components of the federation and, by turning Vologda Oblast, the city of St. Petersburg, and other components into state formations, are thereby dismembering Russia and the Russian people themselves. The theoreticians of a "divisible Russia" have been involved in this as well. Against this backdrop, ideas of confederation—which run counter to Russia's history—are coming to the fore. The more that krais and oblasts try to move closer to republic status, the more the republics are distancing themselves from Russia. This must be recognized.

It is well known that, while the initial status of all components acceding to the Federation Treaty is preserved, the treaty itself levels out to a very great degree the rights of components and people in all spheres of social life. Having made the Federation Treaty an important part of the Constitution, we are striving for equal human rights, irrespective of which component's territory people live on.

The Federation Treaty is not a panacea, but it is being implemented in the republics more or less successfully. But the krais and oblasts are doing little work in this area—hence the disputes and dissatisfaction. The concept of the Federation Treaty opens up scope in all its options for all kinds of rights to be leveled out through the coordination and signing of specific agreements with federal organs of power.

Neither of the draft constitutions under discussion takes account of the principle of federalism as a comprehensive whole, merely recording certain aspects of it. Hence the imposition of contradictions through the unification of republics, krais, oblasts, and autonomous areas. Why does something again have to be done at someone else's expense? We should simply specifically resolve specific questions, if those questions arise.

No, there is no federation like Russia anywhere in the world. But what can we do? Break up the federation, redraw it, put people over our knee? We have tried all that before. The main threat to the federation is the policy of its unification. The principle of federalism presupposes many different versions of development. We need something else. Taking account of the realities, it is necessary to channel the process toward a normal, Russian interaction of ethnic groups, territories, and people without any diktat from politicians either at top or lower levels.

This mechanism is not included in the drafts, but since we are not prepared to improve matters today, let's at least not make things any worse by imposing abstract and, therefore, highly reactionary ideas. On the whole,

neither draft stabilizes or improves federal relations in comparison with the existing Constitution.

So why make an unnecessary fuss? Because of revolutionary enthusiasm? We would ask that this sphere be liberated from revolutionary breakthroughs. We should not demand for the umpteenth time that Russia abandon its former mentality for the sake of encouraging it to adopt a mentality of vulgar Westernism and Europeanism.

For Russia, with its experience of interethnic collaboration, this would be unacceptable and would generate discontent and a series of unending conflicts. I am writing this by no means because I like all aspects of the current state of affairs, nor because I support a communist nationalities policy. I want us to inherit what was best about it, rather than to engage in new experiments on the peoples.

But to this end, all of society—and, above all, the intelligentsia—needs to overcome the diktat both of ethnocentrism and of Eurocentrism that is being imposed on Russia.

All the peoples know the truth of the saying "Whoever controls the past controls the present. And whoever controls the present controls the future." So let us arrange Russia not to satisfy the latest political groupings, but on the basis of the vital needs of its original peoples, the historical realities of the Russian Federation, and, finally, the democratic guidelines of modern Russian statehood.

Regional Affairs

Further on Assassination of Polyanichko

North Ossetian President Cited

*MK0308104093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1*

[Yuriy Zaynashev, Dmitriy Kholodov report: "Assassins Galloped Off on Horseback. How Viktor Polyanichko Was Killed"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] ... One month ago, at a government meeting devoted to the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, the ministers of security, internal affairs, and defense unanimously asked Viktor Chernomyrdin to appoint Viktor Polyanichko, whom the chief of government knew from their joint Komsomol service in Orenburg, as new head in the state of emergency area (people knew Polyanichko from Afghanistan and Nagorno-Karabakh, however, as a leader who tends to count on the strength of arms). Viktor Chernomyrdin made Polyanichko deputy prime minister and sent him to the North Caucasus (decree No. 206 of 28 June). Evil-tongued people interpreted this as a partial removal of Sergey Shakhrai, chairman of the State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs, who has used peaceful

means to resolve interethnic strife. As Polyanichko got down to work, he often had telephone conversations with Sergey Shakhrai and other professionals from the State Federation and Nationalities Committee.

Ingush President Ruslan Aushev told us in a telephone interview that shortly before his death Polyanichko decided to consider the return of Ingush refugees to four villages in Prigorodny Rayon.

"The Ingush Congress, which was held on 31 July, decided to recall its representatives from the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional Conference until the return of refugees begins. A referendum on seceding from Russia has so far been put on hold. The agreement to start this process gradually from 1 August, reached at a meeting in the Kremlin with Yeltsin, Galazov, and Chernomyrdin, gave us hope. The assassination of Polyanichko is a response to these advances by forces that are not interested in stabilization."

The state of emergency area is teeming with soldiers, but political settlement turns out to be dependent on the acts of some bandits capable of organizing an assassination of a Russian deputy prime minister. [passage omitted]

Shooting Aimed 'To Wreck' Settlement

*PM0308121193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1*

[Oleg Odnokolenko report: "Tragedy in North Ossetia: Terrorists Use 7.62 Caliber Argument"]

[Excerpts] Last Sunday 56-year-old Viktor Polyanichko, head of the interim administration in the state of emergency area on the territory of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, died as a result of shots fired in an ambush outside the village of Tarskoye. His official Volga was literally riddled with machinegun fire. Major General Anatoliy Koretskiy, head of the Vladikavkaz Garrison and North Ossetian people's deputy, was in the vehicle with the head of the interim administration and was fatally wounded by the terrorists' bullets. Two enlisted men and two guard officers were wounded. An hour later one of them—Senior Lieutenant Viktor Kravchuk—died in the hospital. Russian and North Ossetian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] subunits were alerted and took urgent measures. [passage omitted]

It is quite appropriate now to make a few points. Over the last few years we have gotten accustomed to death, to seeing enlisted men, officers, and civilians die. A unique term has even appeared—"victims of conflicts." But when representatives of the authorities are killed in an ambush posted at the right time and in the right place, these are no longer merely "inevitable losses." The murder in this case is undoubtedly a means of attaining definite political goals.

Judge for yourselves. A meeting had just ended between Akhsarbek Galazov, chairman of the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet, and President Ruslan Aushev, and the

Russian Federation President and the head of the Russian Government, the ink of the signatures on the parliamentary appeal to the conflicting peoples had not had time to dry nor the mass media time to announce some stabilization in the region before machinegun fire was heard. There is no doubt that certain forces which derive benefit from the flames of conflict were trying to put an emphatic end to the talks with a 7.62 caliber gun in order to wreck the settlement process once and for all.

It is hard to imagine what the consequences of this provocation will be. Reports are already coming in that the tragedy has greatly exacerbated the situation and there was an exchange of fire early Monday morning on the outskirts of Vladikavkaz. Russian peacekeeping forces are trying to use all means to stabilize the situation.

In the last paragraph of this report I consider it essential to once again pay tribute to the memory of those who laid down their lives in an attempt to stop the interethnic tragedy from spreading. You know what efforts Maj. Gen. Anatoliy Koretskiy made to establish peace in the Ossetian-Ingush region. Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin, acting head of the interim administration, described Viktor Polyanichko as a "brave man and a strong politician." He stressed that Polyanichko's bravery was even manifested in the fact that he agreed to take up the post of head of the interim administration—a post which 20 men before him had declined. Senior Lt. Viktor Kravchuk had also done two tours of duty to the "hot spots." During this fatal trip he was acting as the interim administration head's bodyguard, and he performed that duty to the last.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman

LD0308131393 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1209 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] [Announcer] A briefing for Russian and foreign journalists was held today at the press center of the Russian Foreign Ministry. In his opening address, Grigoriy Karasin, director of the information and press department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, turned to the most disquieting issue of the day.

[Begin recording] [Karasin] Tragic developments dictate that I should begin today's briefing with a sad subject, i.e. the death at the hand of terrorists in North Ossetia of Viktor Petrovich Polyanichko, head of the interim administration in the state of emergency area and a deputy prime minister of Russia, together with Major General Koretskiy and Senior Lieutenant Kravchuk, who were accompanying him. The staff of the Russian diplomatic service express their deep condolences to the relatives of the killed. In this crime we can see another manifestation of an extremely dangerous trend towards the spread of terrorism, toward its penetration from the far and the near abroad into the territory of Russia itself. Faced with this real threat, the Russian Foreign Ministry believes that its task is to join efforts with other departments in a fight against this transnational evil of the

twentieth century, to protect the citizens of Russia from it to the best of our abilities. [end recording]

[Announcer] Asked by a Kommersant correspondent whether there will be any retributions for the killing of Viktor Polyanichko, Grigoriy Karasin said:

[Begin recording] [Karasin] In principle, the Russian Foreign Ministry does not comment on the events inside Russia. The reason I made this announcement was that the news of the killing of a government member shocked the entire Russian diplomatic corps. This is an extraordinary development, and naturally appropriate measures will be taken, as you know, in accordance with the president's decision, to prevent similar occurrences in the future. The most important thing is to establish the cause of the incident and to find those responsible for it. [end recording]

[Announcer] Other issues have also been covered at the briefing.

Reward Offered for Killers

LD0308145493 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1300 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Today in Vladikavkaz, the North Ossetian Security Council discussed the situation that has arisen following the killing of Viktor Polyanichko, head of the provisional administration in the state of emergency zone. A significant reward has been instituted for anybody who provides information that will help to find the killers.

Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin Issue Statement

LD0308171393 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1549 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The press service of the Russian president today circulated a statement by Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin following the tragic death of Viktor Polyanichko, head of the interim administration in the state of emergency area in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The document says that it is not accidental that the vicious crime was carried at a time when a breakthrough toward a settlement could have been achieved, as a result of efforts by the Russian president, the Supreme Soviet, and the government. The president and the head of the Russian Cabinet of Ministers have appealed to North Ossetian and Ingushetian leaders strictly to observe the Russian federation law and to embark on resolute actions aimed at eliminating bandit formations.

Further on Statement

LD0308175893 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1700 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Council of Ministers Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin have appealed to the leaders of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, calling on them to strictly and consistently observe the

laws of the Russian Federation and to display reason in this difficult, critical situation.

In their statement today, circulated in connection with the deaths of Viktor Polyanichko, head of the interim administration in the zone of the state of emergency on the territory of the North Ossetian Republic and Ingush Republic; Major General Koretskiy, commander of the garrison in the town of Vladikavkaz; and Senior Lieutenant Kravchuk, commander of the guards, the president and head of the Russian government stressed that all measures are being taken to find the criminals and bring them to justice.

Instructions have been given to the law enforcement bodies, troops of the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the Security Ministry of Russia, to close off all channels for weapons and guerrillas to reach the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and to begin resolute action to eliminate bandit groups, disarm criminal elements, and confiscate illegally held weapons in the conflict zone.

Yeltsin Gives Awards Posthumously

LD0408125093 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 4 Aug 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Valeriy Vinogradov] We have learnt today that Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on awarding posthumously Viktor Polyanichko, Major General Koretskiy, and Senior Lieutenant Kravchuk for showing courage and selflessness on duty. Junior Sergeant Kolesnichenko, Junior Lieutenant Kondratyev, and Private Skalozubov were awarded medals for bravery.

Chernomyrdin Pays Last Respects

LD0408123793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1140 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Aug—Russia paid its last respects today to Viktor Polyanichko, head of the interim administration in North Ossetia, and Major-General Anatoliy Koretskiy, commander of an army corps, who were killed in North Ossetia. A farewell ceremony was held in Moscow at the Central House of the Russian Army.

Russian Government Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian First Vice Premier Oleg Lobov, and Ingushetia President Ruslan Aushev came to pay their respects to the deceased men. The funeral of Viktor Polyanichko and Anatoliy Koretskiy was held at the Novodevichye cemetery.

Senior Lieutenant Viktor Kravchuk, a bodyguard who died in North Ossetia together with Viktor Polyanichko and Anatoliy Koretskiy, will be buried at his home town of Yekaterinburg in the Urals.

Yeltsin Visits Orel for Anniversary of Kursk Battle

Cited on Patriotism

LD0408092693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Interview with President Boris Yeltsin by correspondent Aleksandr Lutskiy in Moscow on 4 August; from the "Novosti" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Presenter] Before leaving by air this morning for Orel for the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Kursk battle, Boris Yeltsin gave an interview to our correspondent at the airport.

[Lutskiy] Boris Nikolayevich, First Channel of Ostankino, "Novosti" program. Boris Nikolayevich, during the Great Fatherland War patriotism played a decisive role in getting the country out of the military crisis. What role does patriotism play today for overcoming the present crisis of the Russian state?

[Yeltsin] I think that we pay insufficient attention to this patriotism in our present-day reality because, today, it is necessary to support Russia, to fight for Russia and for the rebirth of Russia, and to love Russia—and to be a genuine patriot of Russia.

[Lutskiy] Speaking of the present political situation in the country, the president emphasized that all the subjects of the Federation would consider the draft constitution in August so that the Constitutional Conference could resume its work as early as September. Boris Yeltsin told the journalists that he would be assembling the heads of republics within the Russian Federation and the chairmen of eight regional associations, krais, and oblasts in Petrozavodsk on 13-14 August. The president expressed confidence that the contradictions which had arisen during the discussion of the draft Basic Law would be resolved there. Boris Yeltsin also confirmed the intention to meet President Leonid Kravchuk in mid-August to clarify attitudes connected with the fate of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet.

[Presenter] On his arrival in Orel Boris Yeltsin reported that the main object of his visit there was to take part in the celebrations. Asked what was causing him the greatest anxiety at the moment, the Russian president said that he was troubled most of all at the moment by the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov is also taking part in the celebrations connected with the 50th anniversary of the Kursk battle. He, together with Aleksandr Rutskoy and Oleg Soskovets, are spending today in Belgorod.

Views Constitution Developments

LD0408073493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0632 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Lyudmila Aleksandrova, Oleg Velichko, and Yuriy Likhopek]

[Text] Orel, 4 Aug—"The celebrations are the main reason for my being here," Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin said to journalists today when he arrived at the Orel airport. The Russian Federation head of state has arrived here to take part in functions in honor of the 50th anniversary of the Kursk battle and of the liberation of Orel from fascist aggressors.

"Of course, I will also meet people and leaders of the oblast and the town, and I will hear them out. However, problems should not overshadow the brightest holiday for all our people, and of course, for the Orel Oblast," Yeltsin stressed.

Commenting on developments in the constitutional process at the request of an ITAR-TASS correspondent, the president pointed out that the constitutional draft is being actively discussed in August by oblasts, krays, and republics. "I believe these discussions will be finished in August, by and large, or maybe some will continue in September," he said. "It is in September, when the draft has been finalized and all suggestions taken into account, that we are planning to hold a final session of the constitutional conference, which will, in fact, initial the draft."

Answering questions concerning what causes him the greatest worry now, Yeltsin said: "It is the Supreme Soviet that worries me most."

The program of the president's visit to Orel includes visits to the institute of grain and bean cultures and the diorama museum, the laying of wreaths at the monument to the heroes-liberators of Orel, and participation in a ceremonial meeting of the town and oblast public, as well as meetings with the local authorities.

It is anticipated that Yeltsin will return to Moscow this evening.

Stabilization Will Be Reached by Years End

LD0408093593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0855 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Oleg Velichko and Aleksandr Likhopek]

[Text] Orel, 4 Aug—The reform will continue, Boris Yeltsin stated. It has already achieved some results. "We believe that stabilization will be reached at the end of the year, and then we will be on the up, nobody will stop us," he said to citizens who had gathered at the entrance to the Grain and Beans Research Institute. It is with the visit to this institute that the Russian Federation president, who arrived in Orel for celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Kursk battle, and of the liberation of the town from fascist invaders, has begun his visit.

Answering a question on "bringing order into the country" Boris Yeltsin stated: "We are getting to grips with it. We even had to sack a minister, Viktor Barannikov, because of this disorder."

The research center, created fairly recently, in 1962, already has a good name not only in the Russian Federation, but also in CIS countries. Over 90 new grades of beans and grain cultures have been obtained here, including unique grades of peas that do not exist anywhere else in the world. Boris Yeltsin was very keen on the institute's accomplishments in research and their introduction into practice.

'Political Quarrels' Obstacle to Reform

LD0408141493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1320 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova, Oleg Velichko and Yuriy Likhopek]

[Text] Orel, 4 Aug—Russian President Boris Yeltsin devoted a significant part of his speech at a ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, to the ruinous effects of the heightened struggle between the branches of power, and the latest decisions by the Supreme Soviet. We are marking the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk at a difficult, crucial time, Boris Yeltsin stated. "There are many problems that are clouding our festival. Let us be blunt: Life is not easy at the moment," the president continued. There are many reasons for this, he believes. "How much more successfully our reforms would proceed, how much more elementary order there would be, if it were not for the constant political quarrels and intrigues," he said.

Boris Yeltsin went on: It is a matter of great regret that in the last few weeks a new spiral in the senseless, exhausting political struggle has begun. It is artificially aggravating the already difficult problems of stabilizing the situation, and is maintaining the economic crisis.

After the April referendum, in which the view of the majority of the population in Russia on key issues was made known, this struggle has become openly provocative and anti-popular, Boris Yeltsin asserted. "I am convinced that everyone has had enough of this struggle between the branches of power. All the more so because at times it assumes really ludicrous and insulting forms," the president emphasized.

Boris Yeltsin said that in this situation he sees his main task in continuing the course toward transformation and reform. "I will do everything I can to minimize the destructive effect this struggle has on Russia," he said.

In the head of state's view, the huge potential for accord on the platform of transformation in Russia has hardly been used. This was exemplified by the Constitutional Conference. Boris Yeltsin expressed confidence that there are many more "sensible and wise people" in Russia than those who are "blinded by hate and hostility."

Boris Yeltsin said he was confident that healthy forces in society will be able to join their efforts and oppose the

destructive actions repeatedly taken lately. In his words, this concerns the economy first and foremost.

The president recalled that at the end of July the Supreme Soviet had taken decisions that, in his words, seriously destabilized the economic situation. The point at issue is a package of decisions whose implementation, Boris Yeltsin believes, leads to the halt and even the destruction of Russian privatization. "This is a blow to all areas of the Russian economy, including the state sector. This is a blow to every one of us," he stated.

The president expressed regret that the majority of deputies "did not want to see that total contempt for the interests of millions of people was being displayed for the sake of the interests of a group of politicians." He stated that attempts to curb privatization would continue to receive a firm and resolute rebuff.

Boris Yeltsin also dwelt on the budget for 1993 endorsed by the Supreme Soviet. Under this budget, expenditure considerably exceeds state revenue. The president believes that this decision provides a "fertile soil for further senseless clashes between the Supreme Soviet and the government."

Hostages Taken in Nadterechnyy Rayon of Chechnya

LD0308132193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1026 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Grozny, 3 Aug—The situation in Chechnya has heated up again. Alarming reports started coming into Grozny this morning from Nadterechnyy rayon [administrative center Znamenskoye], which does not recognize Dzhokhar Dudayev's authority.

According to deputy head of the Chechnya criminal police department Khamid Dzhamalkhanov, an operation has been under way since 0600 hours this morning around the settlement of Ken-Yurt, to free hostages which the inhabitants of Nadterechnyy rayon seized on Sunday. Members of the Chechnya's department for the protection of public order were among the hostages. At the same time, illegal armed formations operating in the rayon are being disarmed.

The mayor of Nadterechnyy rayon, Umar Avturkhanov, who does not submit to the President of Chechnya, told the ITAR-TASS correspondent by telephone that "movements of armored equipment have been seen on the Terek ridge, and shooting can be heard." Umar Avturkhanov said that "Salman Khasimikov, chairman of the republic's National Security Service, has already left for the rayon for talks with him. If government forces try to enter the rayon center of Znamenskoye, Umar Avturkhanov said, we will put up armed resistance."

The situation in Chechnya's capital outwardly remains calm.

Attempt To Reinforce Opposition Thwarted

LD0308131993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1228 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Grozny, 3 Aug (TASS)—The situation in Chechnya, where an armed clash took place this morning between government troops and formations from Nadterechnyy Rayon, which is boycotting the authorities, remains extremely tense. According to Salman Khasimikov, chairman of Chechnya's National Security Service, a number of people were wounded in cross-fire between Petropavlovskaya stanitsa [a Cossack village] and the settlement of Ken-Yurt, but he did not give the precise number of injured.

Salman Khasimikov is now holding talks with the mayor of Nadterechnyy Rayon, Umar Avturkhanov. According to Khasimikov, the Nadterechnyy side has already agreed to hand over three members of the department for the maintenance of public order, who were taken hostage 1 August. In a telephone conversation with an ITAR-TASS correspondent, Salman Khasimikov said that attempts to resolve the conflict by force could not be tolerated under any circumstances.

So far there is no official information about these events. At the present time President Dzhokhar Dudayev is meeting representatives of religious organizations and the republic's council of elders. Addressing the meeting, he praised the contribution made by those present to the development of Chechnya's independence and strongly criticized the opposition. "The pathetic attempts by the so-called opposition to hinder the molding of the Chechen state are doomed to failure," Dzhokhar Dudayev said.

According to unconfirmed reports, a section of the Nadterechnyy community in Grozny tried to go to the assistance of their fellows, but were stopped on the city outskirts.

Situation 'Sharply Deteriorated'

LD0308155993 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1530 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] We have just received information from Chechnya, where the situation has sharply deteriorated. Fighting is actually under way in Nadterechnyy district between government forces and armed insurgent units. According to incomplete figures, four people have been killed in the confrontation, in which both sides are using firearms and artillery. It has also emerged that all the inhabitants have risen up against attempts by the official Chechen forces to penetrate the territory of the district. This was reported by an official of the district internal affairs department, who wished to remain unidentified.

According to ITAR-TASS, the Chechen national security service and representatives of the Chechen elders are in

the conflict zone and are making every effort to prevent a further escalation of the confrontation.

Russian Involvement Alleged

LD0408101193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0922 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Excerpts] Grozny, 4 Aug—The shooting has stopped in the vicinity of the Chechen settlement of Ken-Yurt, where yesterday there were clashes between government forces and armed formations from the Upper Terek region, which does not recognize Dzhokhar Dudayev. There have been talks between the two sides this morning, attended by Salman Khasimikov, chairman of Chechnya's National Security Service, and Umar Avturkhanov, mayor of the Upper Terek region. Reports say that an agreement on an exchange of hostages has already been achieved. [passage omitted]

Government circles in Chechnya are alleging that Russian snipers, military specialists, and intelligence agents have been operating with the armed formations from Upper Terek region. Furthermore, leaders of Chechnya's border and customs service told Dzhokhar Dudayev today that Russian Army trucks, thought to be carrying arms, were spotted yesterday heading from the Stavropol region in the direction of Znamenskoye, the district center of Upper Terek region.

Umar Avturkhanov, the mayor of the rebellious Upper Terek region, categorically rejects Grozny's version of events. "We do not want to fight anybody, but we will stand up for ourselves," he told an ITAR-TASS correspondent over the telephone. Chechnya's Council of Elders has been meeting in Grozny this morning. It is discussing the best way of resolving the conflict between the Chechen authorities and leaders of Upper Terek region.

Shakhray's 3 Aug Ingushetia Activities Detailed

LD0308155093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1425 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Moscow, 3 Aug (TASS)—During the first half of the day Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray, who is in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone in connection with the tragic death of head of the temporary administration Viktor Polyanichko, visited Ingushetia where he met President Ruslan Aushev and members of the government of that republic. As reported by the press service of the Russian deputy prime minister, "in the course of their conversation they discussed the situation in the zone affected by the state of emergency and measures to ensure the construction and financing of the national economy of Ingushetia, and also questions of preparing for the session of the mixed commission on

the all-around solution of the problem of refugees and forced settlers on the territory of Ingushetia and North Ossetia."

In the afternoon, Sergey Shakhray continued work in Vladikavkaz. Consultations were held here with Akhsarbek Galazov, the chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet, and members of the North Ossetian Presidium and Government, which also discussed the stabilization of the situation in the conflict zone and preparations for a session of the joint commission.

The deputy prime minister's press service has reported that the interim administration of the state of emergency zone is to hold a session in Vladikavkaz at the end of the day and to work together with an investigation group and also to visit the place where Viktor Polyanichko died.

According to the press service of the Russian Federation deputy prime minister, the joint commission is to hold a session in Terek on 4 August.

Accident at Nuclear Energy Facility in Urals

LD0308083993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0818 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow, August 3 (TASS)—A conduit of waste solution depressurised at Plant No. 22 of Mayak Amalgamation, Chelyabinsk-40, the south Urals. The accident was discovered at 11:55 local time on Monday [2 August], ITAR-TASS learned today at the Agency for Information and Public Relations of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. By ten P.M. on August 2, the work to localise the contamination source and decontaminate the territory had been completed.

Experts report that waste solution with a volume of two cubic metres with a total radioactivity of about 300 millicurie escaped, polluting 100 square metres of the plant's territory. Nobody was affected. The personnel received the radiation dose within limit.

A special commission formed at the enterprise is investigating the causes of the accident.

Price Hike Threatens Maritime Defense Industry

LD0408081393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] The RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY reports. Defense enterprises are coming to a halt in Maritime Kray, after electricity rates have been raised in August. The kray's major artificial satellite tracking station in the village of (Gelenki) has joined the list of money losers. The "Dalpribor" association has been declared bankrupt. By the beginning of September, at least two other military-industrial enterprises may need to halt production due to insolvency.

International Affairs

Morozov on Nuclear Arms, Results of U.S. Visit

WS0308134393 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Report by Ihor Cherednychenko]

[Text] The program of the official visit to the United States has been fully carried out and the Ukrainian Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov is satisfied with the results of the visit.

[Begin Morozov recording] We felt a change in the attitude toward our state. There has been less pressure, more desire to understand the reasons that cause Ukraine's concern over its security. As a result of these changes, a memorandum on mutual understanding and cooperation was signed on 27 July by the U.S. defense secretary and the Ukrainian defense minister. The memorandum lays the foundation for relations in the sphere of military construction and takes our relations to a practical dimension. [end recording]

Some reporters were surprised that Ukraine has managed to sign a memorandum with the United States, while it still does not have a similar document with Russia. Kostyantyn Morozov stressed that Ukraine is making all efforts to sign a memorandum with Russia. Unfortunately, there still is no common stance of Russia and Ukraine on the issues of reducing nuclear arms, dividing the Black Sea Fleet, and a number of other issues. When asked whether the ratification of START I was discussed during the U. S. visit, Kostyantyn Morozov answered:

[Begin Morozov recording] We held negotiations at the State Department and members of the State Department were also present at other talks. The issue of ratification was indeed, discussed, but it was beyond my competence to give any forecasts on whether or not the treaty will be ratified by the Supreme Soviet. [end recording]

Has an agreement been reached on the issue of assisting Ukraine in nuclear arms reduction?

[Begin Morozov recording] We discussed the conditions under which direct assistance could be granted to Ukraine within the framework of allocations envisioned by the Nunn-Lugar law. You know—\$175 million. In my personal opinion, this sum cannot be regarded as the basis for a full scale implementation of a program of nuclear arms reduction. It can only be viewed as an encouraging monetary assistance in the first stage. [end recording]

I asked Kostyantyn Morozov about his [words indistinct] and his behavior in the United States when the Ukrainian defense minister took off his uniform, flew a U.S. warplane and landed precisely on the deck of an airplane carrier. Was this prompted by emotions or by a wish to prove his professionalism? In what uniform did

Kostyantyn Morozov feel more at home, that of the defense minister or of an airman?

[Begin Morozov recording] With regard to taking off the uniform, this was for a short time only. This was proposed to me because I used to be a pilot. I did not refuse. First, this is a unique occasion for any pilot, correct me if I am wrong. We could watch this wonderful kind of combat training—landing on a carrier—only in movies. I have had a chance to acquaint myself with the modern tactical fighter the F-18. I did not refuse, I was grateful for this chance and I do not want to conceal that I was extremely happy. [Words indistinct] whatever uniform I wear or take off I cannot fail to remember who I am now and what responsibility rests with me. [end recording]

Favors Defense Agreement With U.S., Russia

PM0408093193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Irina Pogodina report: "Ukrainian Defense Minister Pleased With Visit to United States"]

[Text] Kiev—At a press conference K. Morozov, head of Ukraine's military department, described the signing of a memorandum of cooperation in the defense sphere between the Ukrainian and U.S. defense ministries as the result of the fact that America is more understanding about the problems of safeguarding Ukraine's security, has removed its pressure on Kiev, and is prepared to share its experience in the organizational development of modern armed forces.

The memorandum opens up new opportunities for Ukraine to be integrated into world security systems and makes the United States its partner. It also, in the minister's opinion, creates favorable conditions for the United States to elaborate and implement real rather than paper security guarantees for Ukraine as the condition for its parliament's ratification of the START I Treaty.

Proof of that was the Ukrainian delegation's discussion at the State Department of the conditions for signing a "framework" agreement to obtain the promised \$175 million—not as the basis for a full-scale dismantling of all nuclear installations in Ukraine, but merely as start-up, incentive assistance.

Ukraine is not working on cracking the Russian nuclear codes nor on retargeting missiles and other action that undermines its neighbors' security, K. Morozov stated. The minister explained the fact that Ukraine has not yet signed with Russia a memorandum of cooperation in the defense sphere similar to the Ukrainian-U.S. memorandum by stating that there are a number of differences on the questions of strategic nuclear forces and the division of the Black Sea Fleet, but there is by no means any lack of desire on the part of Ukraine to cooperate with its great neighbor.

Kostyantyn Morozov stressed that, during his visit to the United States, the scenario of a deterioration of Ukraine's relations with Russia was not examined from a military standpoint, since the Security Council's decision and the participation on it of a U.S. permanent representative leaves hope that there can be a political solution to the problem. Moreover, the defense minister spoke in favor of the idea of concluding a kind of tripartite agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States on cooperation in the defense sphere.

Ambassador to Israel Issues Statement on Demjanjuk

LD0308192593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1645 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Kiev, 3 Aug (UKRINFORM-TASS)—UKRINFORM today received a statement from Ukraine's ambassador to Israel, Yuriy Shcherbak. It says:

"In connection with the course of events surrounding the J. Demjanjuk affair, I announce the following:

"After the verdict by the Israeli Supreme Court of 29 July and the order for his deportation, J. Demjanjuk received a private invitation from a lawyer in Kiev, Mr. Yuriy Ayvazyan, to spend one month in Ukraine. He lodged an application with the ambassador of Ukraine which states, in particular: 'As a Ukrainian, I request that I be granted the opportunity to temporarily visit my homeland, Ukraine, until such time that I can return to the United States.'

"This application has been granted. The relevant authorities in Ukraine have decided to admit J. Demjanjuk into the country. I stress that this does not mean the granting of asylum, nor "an invitation by Ukraine", but a temporary stay on a private invitation. This decision was reached in accordance with existing legislation of our state and also with account taken of international legal norms.

"At the same time, as a party to the Convention on Non-Applicability of the Statutory Limitation to War Crimes against Humanity (Ukraine ratified the Convention on 24 March 1969), Ukraine reaffirms its faith in the principles therein. State authorities reaffirm Ukraine's stance on the search for, and prosecution and punishment of Nazi criminals. Such crimes have no statutory limitation under Ukrainian legislation. The practice in Ukraine of investigating Nazi criminals and their accomplices, which began during the war and continues to this day, bears witness to our scrupulous and consistent pursuit of this issue.

"I can announce with all due authority that should J. Demjanjuk arrive in Ukraine and should there be sufficient grounds for them to do so, the relevant authorities of Ukraine will commence criminal proceedings against him and will take the necessary investigative steps.

"I regret some published articles in the Israeli media that have presented Ukraine's position regarding J. Demjanjuk in a distorted way and contain biased judgements of the role played by Ukrainians in the tragic events of World War II.

"With understanding of and compassion for the feelings of the Jewish people, who experienced a fearsome catastrophe and demand that Nazi criminals be punished, I wish to stress that Ukrainians were an insignificant group among the collaborators and accomplices of the German fascist occupiers and it is unacceptable that they be identified with the Ukrainian people.

"For those who have forgotten or have never had an opportunity to obtain objective information, I wish to point out again that during World War II, Ukraine, as the scene of bloody battles, suffered huge destruction and casualties amounting to seven million human lives. Ukraine, as one of the parties to the anti-Hitler coalition, made a worthy contribution to the cause of defeating fascist Germany. About 2.5 million Ukrainian citizens fought in the ranks of the Red Army, and 1.5 million in national volunteer forces [narodnoye opolcheniye]. About 250,000 Ukrainians were active in the resistance on occupied Ukrainian territory.

"I again stress the inadmissibility of using the J. Demjanjuk case to inflame anti-Ukrainian or anti-Jewish sentiments. I hope that the J. Demjanjuk case will not harm the development of friendly and mutually gainful relations between Ukraine and Israel."

Deputy Minister Comments on Foreign Policy Directions

LD0308191293 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1515 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Kiev, 3 Aug—The briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was devoted to discussing the basic directions of Ukraine's foreign policy. Mykola Makarevych, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, commented on the most important points from last week's sitting of the collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which examined this issue. "The approval of the Supreme Council of Ukraine of the basic directions of foreign policy is an important [word indistinct] in the foreign policy activity of our state." the first deputy minister stressed. Mr. Makarevych is convinced that on the one hand this document consolidates Ukraine's independence, and on the other hand it determines the principles, priorities, and aims of our country's foreign policy.

According to Mykola Makarevych's report, a system of measures for implementing the basic directions of Ukraine's foreign policy was elaborated at the sitting of the collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This includes resolving the issue of Ukraine's information structure abroad and resolving questions of financial provision for Ukraine's missions abroad, and so on. In particular, positive progress should take place on the

issue of training future diplomats, Mr. Makarevych noted. A diplomatic academy will soon be opened in Ukraine's capital.

Presidential Adviser on Dniester, 'Renewed Union'
WS0208141493 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1422 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] Odessa—Vil Romashchenko, senior adviser to the Ukrainian President's Office on territorial issues, stated in an interview given to a Tiraspol newspaper DNESTROVSKIY MERIDIAN that in the event of Moldova's annexation to Romania, the Dniester region population should have the right to decide their fate. Speaking about the possibility of the rebirth of the USSR, Romashchenko said: "We will inevitably unite and it will be a renewed union built on an equal basis." Vil Romashchenko is one of the Ukrainian Socialist Party leaders.

Kravchuk Welcomes Economic Conference in Kiev
LD3007201593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] On 30 July Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk sent a message of greetings to participants in the constituent conference of the international, nongovernmental organization Free Economy of Eastern Europe. It says:

I sincerely welcome the participants and organizers of the constituent conference of the international, nongovernmental organization Free Economy of Eastern Europe to Ukraine's capital, the city of Kiev. The main objective of its activities—to promote the building of a socially oriented economy in the countries of eastern Europe but not at the expense of developing private enterprise—deserves everyone's support.

Like the majority of countries in eastern Europe, Ukraine is following the difficult path of building a democratic and civilized society which is to be based on a free market economy in which every individual can realize his abilities in full measure. This amplifies your organization's importance as a unifying force which is to help the countries of this region to enter the all-European economic space as soon as possible.

I am sure that your organization will work on the principle of free expression of will by its participants, ensuring equal cooperation, abiding by the national interests of both the east European countries participating and other interested states, consolidating democratic institutions, and backing the processes of the formation of the law-governed states.

I wish the participants in the constituent conference fruitful work and creative inspiration in tackling issues involved with developing a steady system of international economic relations in industry, trade, financial and credit activities, and the soonest possible building of an open economy in the countries of eastern Europe.

[Signed] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk

Kuwait May Grant Low-Interest Credits for Oil Terminal

AU0308131693 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 31 Jul 93 p 1

[Unattributed report published under the rubric "Moment": Kuwait Is Ready To Assist in Building the Odessa Terminal"]

[Text] "Kuwait is interested in cooperating with Ukraine in the building of the Odessa Oil Terminal," stated Kuwait's ambassador for special missions, Faysal al-Ghays, who is currently in Ukraine on a working visit. The government of Kuwait, he said, is studying this question. In particular, the Kuwaiti Fund for Development may grant Ukraine credits for building the terminal at an interest that, according to the ambassador, is symbolic.

Nonpayment of Debt to UN May Result in Loss of Vote

LD0308225293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1930 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Borys Hudyma, head of the Foreign Ministry's International Organizations Directorate, reported at a briefing at the Ministry today that the Ukrainian delegation is preparing to participate in the work of the UN General Assembly, starting on 21 September. He also stressed that the nonpayment of its debt to the United Nations by 31 December 1993 may result in Ukraine being stripped of its UN vote.

To date, Ukraine's debt amounts to \$37 million, which is approximately 2 percent of the total UN budget. The Ukrainian Government has allocated several million dollars to settle the debt.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Chad

AU3007191893 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 29 Jul 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Serious Prospects for Chad"]

[Text] On 27 July, an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations was signed between Ukraine and the Republic of Chad.

Speaking at the festive ceremony that was held at the Chad Embassy in Moscow, the head of the Ukrainian delegation, Ukraine's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Volodymyr Kryzhanivsky pointed out that our state adheres to principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and builds relations with them proceeding from mutual advantage and equal partnership.

Ambassador of the Republic of Chad Al Khabo Mahamat Saleh said that his country is interested in

developing political, economic, and cultural relations with Ukraine and sees serious prospects of this.

National Affairs

Flood in Chernobyl Area Raises Radiation Concerns

WS0408104093 Kiev *VECHIRNIY KYIV* in Ukrainian 31 Jul 93 p 1

[Report by Valentyn Smaha: "High Waters"]

[Text] Pilot Yuriy Vladko starts the engine and the small Ka-26 helicopter lifts smoothly. Far below us, we see lead-colored waters of the Prypyat and the familiar silhouette of the "sarcophagus" in the distance.

Our group includes Valentyna Okipna, manager of Kiev Oblast Department of Environmental Protection; Anatoliy Semenchenko, manager of Kiev Oblast Water Resources Sector; DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA reporter Borys Perhamenshchuk; and the author of this article. We are flying to check on the Uzh River bed in the security zone around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant [AES].

Reports on the flood caused alarm among Kiev residents. The Uzh, which flows through the contaminated areas, runs into the Prypyat which feeds the Kiev water reservoir. One of Kiev's drinking water intakes is located there. First of all, we are interested in the Yanivskyy bridge and the Tsyanka Park. Judging by maps, this area is seriously contaminated by radiation. We must sound the alarm if this area were about to be flooded.

We are flying over powerline poles which look like broken matches, dark green woods, long sand strips of dams. We clearly see that the Prypyat is coping with excess water, albeit with difficulty. Thank God, the Tsyanka is dry. The so-called "polder," a special construction designed to channel excess water to areas separated by dams, has prevented disaster.

However, the narrow, meandering Uzh is now two to three kilometers wide. Signs of a disaster are more evident close to Poliske. There are floating stacks of hay; gulls look like white dots flying over pasture covered by water. In some places, even wire fences are under water.

A sewing factory and a canned goods factory have been flooded in Poliske. Orchards, gardens, and roads are also flooded. Water reaches the windows of four houses whose residents have been evacuated. The situation is tense because weather forecasts say that the rains and the floods will continue.

Nature has wrought tremendous damage on agriculture. Preliminary calculations show that neighboring Belarus has suffered damage in the amount of 300 billion rubles. Damage in Kiev Oblast is estimated at 10 billion karbovanetsi.

We discuss the main issue on our return: How to obtain exact data on radioactive contamination of the water, particularly at the mouth of the Uzh, from the experts of the Prypyat Scientific-Production Association [NVO]. Valentyna Okipna, who is experienced and highly principled, has brought an entire brigade of experts, who immediately take water samples at control points.

We should not forget, however, that monitoring is one of the basic duties of the Prypyat NVO. Despite the millions that were spent on its establishment, NVO experts are incapable of providing precise data. Moreover, they tried to lead us astray until we found out that they took samples of water near Cherevach as late as 28 July, and in Uzh's bottom land and near Poliske as late as 29 July. They have not analyzed the nuclide content of the samples.

We also heard a familiar phrase when a disaster occurred in the old times: "We do not give out any information to the press without permission from the Chernobyl Ministry or administration of the zone." The cursed regime of secrecy still exists. The dramatic aftermath of the accident, two fires at Chernobyl AES, and the recent law on the mass media have taught these officials nothing. Everyone has been trying to pass responsibility to "higher authorities."

Fortunately, Hennadiy Krasnozhan, NVO Prypyat Deputy Manager, does not fear responsibility and understands the importance of timely and unbiased information on the situation in the zone. He said: "Kiev residents can dial our automatic reply system at 8-293-5-28-05 for a report."

When we phoned from Hennadiy Krasnozhan's office, a pleasant female voice furnished us with rows of uncomprehensible figures on soil, water, and air conditions, along with a depressing commentary saying that contamination is "below the temporary norms of radiation approved by the Ukrainian Health Ministry." We knew that the NVO Prypyat had not conducted new water tests, therefore we asked for and received an explanation.

Anatoliy Mafran, state administration representative in the zone, displayed maps showing cesium, strontium, and other radioactive substance contamination. The left "dry" bank of the river Prypyat is "the dirtiest." With regard to Uzh's bottom land, only a small area has been flooded with strontium in the density of five Curies per square kilometer. This is a very low density; there are more contaminated places in Kiev itself.

Anatoliy Mafran flatly stated: "Such a flood would have been a catastrophe in 1987. The situation has greatly improved and I am sure that Kiev residents have no grounds for concern."

I would also like to believe that the flood will not affect the quality of water in the Dnieper. However, there are reasons for worry. Disregarding Valentyna Okipna's warnings, the NVO Prypyat has not managed to fill numerous wells, seven years after the accident. Everyone

understands that the flood will have a significant effect on the water table. How will the chaotically constructed tombs, the buried "red" forest, and the over-contaminated slag reservoir at the Yupiter plant survive under the current circumstances?

We have been assured that there is no direct threat to the quality of the Dnieper water. VECHIRNIY KYIV will soon have precise data from Valentyna Okipna.

We returned to Kiev late in the evening. The car was speeding along an empty highway passing weed-covered fields and half-ruined villages in the Chernobyl zone. The sun was hiding behind a huge rain cloud.

Kuchma, Officials View Flood Damage

AU0408123393 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in
Ukrainian 3 Aug 93 pp 1, 2

[Report by Leonid Samsonenko, URYADOVYY KURYER special correspondent: "The Flooding in Rivne Oblast Claimed Victims"]

[Text] One will hardly envy the premier these days. In addition to the political struggle for the redivision of power, the ongoing decline in production, the unwinding of the inflation spiral, and everyday worries for the fate of the harvest, the natural disaster in Rivne Oblast has also become a matter for his special concern. The unceasing rains have caused mass flooding of sown areas, hayfields, and pastures, as well as populated areas. For the period between 19 and 24 July alone—which was the highest point of the disaster—as much rain fell as would constitute a norm for one and one-half months. If we take the whole of July, it will be three monthly norms. As a result, 305,000 hectares of land were covered with water.

On 31 July, head of the Ukrainian government Leonid Kuchma visited Rivne Oblast. Immediately upon his arrival at Rivne Airport, he was briefed about the consequences of the natural disaster and measures for their elimination by deputy presidential representative in Rivne Oblast Viktor Kovalenko.

"The disaster was due to the fact that it continually rained throughout July, and then, for one week, there was a cyclone. Just during 19 and 20 July, water levels rose by almost one meter. As testified by meteorologists and old residents, there hasn't been such flooding since 1945. Moreover, there was hail, and the temperature decreased sharply (to between 8 and 10 degrees Centigrade), and the gusts of wind reached between 25 and 30 meters per second. The mass precipitation over a short period of time and the rushing of water from hills, from Khmelnytsky, Lvov, Volyn, and Zhytomyr Oblasts led to overflowing 'oblast' rivers Horyn, Sluch, and Styr, and to mass flooding. Water loosened the pylons of the electric communication network and the root system of trees, and the strong wind simply felled them. As a result, in many places, radio communication had to be used, as well as messengers. The oblast's northern areas with an

extensive system of hydrological structures, amelioration canals, and pumping stations that regulate the water supply could not withstand such a high water table. Floodgates and bridges were torn off by the water. The permanent way could be rescued with great difficulty.

"The situation was also aggravated by the following natural feature. The territory of the majority of the flooded areas—Bereznivskyy, Volodymyrsk, Kostopil, Rokytne, Dubrovyskyy, and Sarny—is underlain, very close to the surface, by a basalt deposit that prevents water from being absorbed into the soil.

"As soon as the water rose above the critical level, oblast and rayon emergency commissions were created. Their main tasks were these: To avoid human casualties and to rescue as much cattle as possible. The majority of people and animals could be evacuated. Unfortunately, about 600 cows, pigs, and sheep perished, because, in the conditions of such a rapid and extensive flood, there was simply nowhere to take them. Some cows generally managed to swim to dry land, but the animals in Polissya are used to this.

"There also are casualties among people. Two children and two adults perished. Some people drowned and some were killed by the broken high-voltage line, despite the fact that the population had been cautioned against it all the time on the radio and through the press."

It is clear that the extreme situation required extraordinary measures. According to Viktor Kovalenko, they were mainly directed at restoring lines of electric power supply and communication, as well as roads. Troops and civil defense units were ready to evacuate the population. This meant 145 populated areas! However, people managed to do this on their own. Special brigades were created for restoring the structures damaged by the elements.

A complex of measures was also prepared for restoring normal life of those affected by the disaster. In particular, this concerned the provision of the cattle with fodder, because practically everything was lost where there was water. The oblast, on its own, is supplying people with foodstuffs and basic commodities. However, the residents of Polissya will hardly be able to cope with the calamity on their own.

Leonid Kuchma could see for himself that what was said was true. He flew on a helicopter over the flooded rayons and visited, in particular, the collective farm "Mayak" in Dubrovyskyy Rayon, Stare Selo in Rokytne Rayon, and the state farm "Tuchynskyy" in Hoshchanskyy Rayon. The premier was deeply impressed by what he saw and heard.

He spoke about this at the conference that was specially convened in Rivne. It was attended by Minister of Finance Hryhoriy Pyatachenko, first deputy minister of the economy Valentyn Popov, chairmen of state committees for material resources and for oil and gas Anatoliy Minchenko and Mykhaylo Kovalko, Ukrainian

presidential representatives in Volyn, Zhytomyr, Lvov, and Khmelnytsky oblasts, and other high-ranking officials at oblast and republican levels.

"As it turned out, not only are the flooded areas the poorest in Ukraine, but also those that have been affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe. Where there is a disaster, there is also Chernobyl on top of it. A few days ago, measurements were made, and the result is quite distressing—200 microroentgen. The majority of families with many children live in these places—between 10 and 12 children each. The residents of these areas need urgent help, because their potatoes have been lost, the hay has been flooded, and all of their last year's reserves are also under water. They do not even have rubber boots to walk in now. That is why what can be done today must be done immediately and what may be done later must be planned. We will confirm this by a corresponding Cabinet of Ministers decree.

"If we list all the problems about which we have today heard from the people, one would like to cry together with them. The situation is difficult. However, we know what needs to be done. The long list that was submitted to us by the Rivne state administration will be fulfilled by all means. It is a matter of both financial and material resources, foodstuffs, fodder for animals, and seed. If one assesses the scale of the disaster in full measure, it is practically a catastrophe. However, the government must do everything in order to mitigate this enormous blow upon the people. One billion [monetary unit not specified] will not be sufficient here."

According to the Ukrainian presidential representative in Rivne Oblast, Roman Vasylyshyn, in order to normalize the situation and make it possible for the people to live through the winter and to keep the cattle, 346 billion karbovantsi is needed. Altogether 135.6 thousand hectares of wheat, sugar beetroot, potatoes, flax, and so on have been flooded, and there will be nothing to harvest there. Also about 7.5 thousand tonnes of hay are covered with water. Over 680 production and maintenance buildings are damaged and destroyed; in 146 populated areas, electric power supply and communication lines are not functioning. Ten bridges, 31 kilometers of highways, and 19 transformer stations have been destroyed. Besides, 26,000 hectares of private kitchen gardens have been flooded and 4,471 homes and public buildings have been damaged or destroyed by the elements.

The scope of the disaster is shocking. Will it be possible to avoid it and to save people in the future, in view of the fact that flooding is a traditional phenomenon in Polissya? As stressed by chairman of Ukraine's State Committee for Water Management Viktor Khoryev, the causes of such natural cataclysms also lie in the artificially created negative attitude toward amelioration. The president and the government issued directives to prepare a program for protecting from flooding mountain rivers and those rivers that tend to overflow onto surrounding territories. Such a program has already been

prepared. Its implementation will make it possible to protect populated areas from such a calamity. In Rivne Oblast, rivers could not hold all the water that fell into them with rain. The rivers burst their banks. The present emergency commission of the oblast resolved that by the end of the year a number of measures be fulfilled for protecting villages from flooding. However, in order to prevent the situation in which the stinger pays double, it is necessary to urgently allocate money for the protection of these rivers.

When asked whether the tragedy in Rivne Oblast may not recur in a few weeks when, according to forecasts, there will be rains again, Viktor Khoryev remarked: The oblast water supply management will fulfill, in the very near future, a complex of urgent measures that will make it possible to avoid the recurrence of the disaster.

Vice Prime Minister Volodymyr Demyanov has been authorized to coordinate work of the emergency commission for eliminating the consequences of the natural disaster. The URYADOVYY KURYER editorial board will inform our readers about the results of the commission's activity in greater detail in one of our issues.

Work Begins on River Near Chernobyl

LD0308211093 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1930 GMT
3 Aug 93

[Text] [no dateline as received]—In the 30 kilometer zone of alienation [surrounding the Chernobyl nuclear power plant], specialists from the "HolovRichFlot" [Main River Fleet] association's 5th Underwater and Water Engineering Work Expeditionary Detachment have started comprehensive work to reinforce the right bank of the River Prypyat, deepen the river bed, and strengthen the river bottom with rock. River bank reinforcements will lessen the outflow of radionuclides in the river, whereas the deepening of the riverbed will make possible the shipment of structural members to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant industrial platform [promyslovyi maydanchyk] when the construction of "Sarcophagus-2" is started.

Kravchuk Cancels 'Large-Scale Combat Exercise'

LD0308224193 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1930 GMT
3 Aug 93

[text] On 2 August, Leonid Kravchuk, commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, canceled a large-scale combat exercise of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the purpose of saving expenses.

Instead, a three-day command and staff exercise started under the command of Ukraine's first deputy defense minister, Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, in the Odessa military district in the morning of 3 August, exactly as provided for in a reserve plan. The aim of the exercise is to rehearse the mutual coordination of actions by the commanding bodies of army corps, mechanized

divisions, and brigades, on one hand, and air force, anti-aircraft defense, border troops, national guard, and navy units, on the other.

A demonstration military exercise involving field firing by separate units of the 28th Guards' Division under the command of Major General Valeriy Venher, will be held at the district's training center in Shirokiy-Lan on 6 August. The exercise will be conducted by Odessa Military District Commander Colonel General Vitaliy Radetsky.

Officials Agree to Krasnodon Miners' Demands

AU0308132093 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 31 Jul 93 p 2

[Liya Alekseyeva report: "Return to Work Postponed"]

[Text] It seemed that everything was agreed. Last Wednesday [28 July], negotiations at the Luhansk Oblast State Administration between authorized persons of the oblast leadership headed by first deputy presidential representative V. Ivanov and representatives of the Krasnodon strike committee lasted until late in the afternoon. The demands put forward by the miners in the course of the more than 50-day strike were discussed.

As a result of the stormy discussion, an agreement was signed on fulfilling all 15 demands put forward by the miners. In particular, the first demand recommended that the executive committee of the Krasnodon Town Council and the strike committee of the town conclude an agreement on the full resignation of this "cabinet" headed by O. Pashentsev. If this takes place, the strike will end and the miners will go to the mines for the first shift on 30 July.

It was also envisaged that the local Procurator's Office be investigated and the chief of the Krasnodon militia dismissed. Measures were specified to strengthen control over the activity of commercial structures, improve basic supplies for miners' settlements, provide public transport with everything it needs, and so on.

Strikers' representatives returned to Krasnodon with all that. However, the negotiations with members of the town executive committee on the first item of the agreement were not simple. The committee only decided to resign at the next session of the town council. Besides, the chairman of the town executive committee, O. Pashentsev, had, at that time, just been transferred from the emergency unit of the hospital to a regular room. What demands could be made on someone who is seriously ill? In short, the Krasnodon miners' expected return to work has been delayed.

'Democratic Center' Presents Proposals to Leadership

AU0408091393 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 31 Jul 93 p 6

[Rukh-Press statement: "There Is a 'Democratic Center'"]

[Text] The Rukh Secretariat held a conference of representatives of political and public organizations of right-wing centrist and centrist orientation. A declaration was signed on creating "The Democratic Center" political club. In the course of its activity, the question of a possible formation of a pre-election coalition will be clarified. The first to join the club were Rukh, the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Peasant Democratic Party, and the Union of Ukrainian Women. They adopted a joint statement.

Statement

The poorly considered actions of the supreme Ukrainian leadership, its propensity to make unjustified compromises and deals, especially in relations with our closest neighbors, the inappropriate policy with regard to the cadres, and the absence of an unequivocal policy on questions of vital importance for Ukraine have led to a situation in which a state that withdrew from the Union, while possessing powerful starting possibilities, has found itself in a difficult situation, which is worse than those prevailing in neighboring countries—parts of the former USSR.

We believe that every wasted day and every minute of inactivity, temporization, and the leaders' playing to the gallery of various forces whose intentions are not infrequently hostile, bring Ukraine closer to a national catastrophe.

We, representatives of political parties and public organizations of democratic orientation, realize what danger threatens our state and turn to the state leadership with the following proposals:

1. To build relations with republics of the former Soviet Union and with other states exclusively on the basis of mutually advantageous bilateral agreements without restricting our country's sovereign rights to join any unions or commonwealths.
2. The Ukrainian president, as the state's top official, must make public his attitude toward the Statement on Economic Integration that was signed by Ukraine's prime minister and express his attitude toward those members of government whose actions may lead to limiting the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state.

We believe that emergence from the severe crisis is possible with the help of alterations to the structure of state administration and to the procedure for its formation and through implementing fast market reforms, and not by way of losing independence.

Liberal Party Holds Briefing in Poltava

AU0308170293 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 31 Jul 93 p 3

["Excerpt" from a briefing by the Liberal Party of Ukraine in Poltava; date not given: "Questions in Poltava Were Straightforward"]

[Text] At a briefing in Poltava, the Liberals were asked many acute questions. We are quoting some of them, as well as answers by participants in the presentation—members of the leading council of the LPU [Liberal Party of Ukraine].

[Question] When miners go on strike, who supports whom: Do you support them or do they support you?

[LPU] Liberals are against strikes or rallies. This only interferes with work. Today, it is necessary to take decisive measures to carry out real reforms that would make life better not only for miners, but also for all those who work honestly.

[Question] Is your party the richest now?

[LPU] We do not count money in the treasuries of other organizations. We do not think that our party is the richest one. We do, however, have enough means to support the development of art in Donbass and organize a tour of the Ukrainian Drama Theater in Poltava and Sumy and the Donetsk Opera—in Italy. We will help in publishing newspapers and grant scholarships to capable students and postgraduates. We get material support from various commercial structures, but only within the framework of state legislation and within the framework of our statute.

[Question] What do you have in common with [Vladimir] Zhirinovskiy [chairman of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party]?

[LPU] Absolutely nothing. Nothing ever united us. Leaders of our party did not have any meetings or negotiations with him or his party. There is an opinion that this individual was advanced to the political arena in order to discredit the liberal movement.

Local Paper Stops Cooperating With Political Groups

AU0308170193 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 31 Jul 93 p 4

[Serhiy Pavlenko report: "The Editorial Board Has Become Nonaffiliated"]

[Text] Following the June statement by the oblast organization of the Ukrainian Republican Party on suspending cooperation with CHERNIHIVSKI VIDO-MOSTI, the latter's territorial board decided to become totally nonaffiliated: Its last party member, Mykola Samardak, who is a correspondent and chairman of the oblast organization of Ukraine's Democratic Party, has

now been dismissed from work. Rukh [Ukraine's People's Movement for Perestroyka], "Prosvita" [Enlightenment] Society, and other organizations, deprived of their right of expression in the organ of the town council, have sent their protest to the higher leadership of the town and oblast on the occasion of the "illegal dismissal."

Justice Ministry Explains Refusal To Register UNSO

AU0308135593 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 31 Jul 93 p 6

["Ukraine's Ministry of Justice Offers Explanation Regarding the Legitimacy of the Activity of Ukraine's People's Self-Defense"]

[Text] Answering citizens' questions on this subject, the Ministry of Justice states that in April 1992, it studied the application and founding documents submitted by UNSO [Ukraine's People's Self-Defense] for registering its statute. In resolving this question, attention was given to the fact that the given formation is paramilitary. The main goals of its activity are to organize the population for promoting Ukraine's defense on its territory in case of aggression, develop partisan struggle in the case of Ukraine's occupation, cooperate with the army, and supervise physical and theoretical training of the citizens for fulfilling the stated goals.

The creation of such a public association in a law-governed state is inadmissible. It is in contradiction with the requirements of Ukraine's Constitution (Article 49), Ukrainian laws "On Citizens' Associations," "On the Militia," and others. The current legislation envisages that the citizens have the right to unite in political parties and public associations. However, their goal must conform to social and personal interests: participation in forming state policy, protection of legitimate social, economic, and creative rights, and so on. The creation of militarized formations is forbidden by law. Such formations are not subject to legalization.

In view of the fact that the regulations of the UNSO statute did not conform to Ukraine's Constitution and legislation, on 15 May 1992, the Ministry of Justice refused to register it. Today, this association remains non-legalized (not officially recognized).

If there are signs of violations of law in the activity of UNSO, corresponding organs must react to them.

Commission Head Comments on Reforms

LD0308194793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Carrying out any reform is subjecting society to a surgical operation and the state's political and social situation depends on how qualitatively and promptly the former is implemented. This was stated today at a news conference in Kiev by Volodymyr Pylypchyuk, head of

the Ukrainian Supreme Council's Commission for Issues of Economic Reform and Management of the National Economy.

Unfortunately, our reforms have been drawn-out, he noted. Volodymyr Pylypchyuk said that the situation is critical but not catastrophic. Ukraine has opportunities, ways, methods, and forms to emerge from the (?crisis).

Crimean Tatars Express 'Radical Views' at Congress

AU0308151493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
31 Jul 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Radical Views Prevailed at the Kurultay"]

[Text] On the fourth day of the work of the second session of the Crimean Tatars' second Kurultay [congress], radical views prevailed. The discussion of the reports by Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov continued. It was asserted that the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian empire in 1783 had put an end to the normal development of the Crimean Tatars. "Until

1917, all misfortunes were blamed upon the tsarist regime, and until 1991—on communism," said Ilmy Umerov, deputy from Bakhchisaray Rayon. "However, it has already been two years that communists are not in power. Ukraine is a sovereign state, but the life of the Crimean Tatars has not changed." It was stressed that although Crimean Tatars account for less than 10 percent of the Crimean population, children of Crimean Tatars account for approximately 50 percent of all children in Crimean hospitals. Lately, great numbers of refugees from Tajikistan and Abkhazia have appeared in the Crimea, but there is not a single law or normative act on this occasion either on the side of the Crimea or Ukraine. People have again been left face to face with their problems. The deputies understand that Ukraine does not have the sufficient means to accommodate Crimean Tatars, but they do not understand why Ukraine does not recognize their right to self-determination and the elected representative organ of the Crimean Tatars—the Majlis. It was pointed out at the Kurultay that on 1 December 1991, the Crimean Tatars, as they voted for Ukrainian independence, also voted for the Ukrainian people's freedom and the rebirth on their own land.

Moldova

Sangheli Urges Parliament To Ratify CIS Agreements

LD0308144193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1208 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau, 3 Aug—Moldovan Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli today urged parliament to ratify the agreements on the republic's entry into the CIS. Delivering a report at the extraordinary session of parliament that opened in Chisinau today, he stressed that about 80 percent of Moldova's foreign economic ties were with the republics of the former Union, especially with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The confusion in economic relations with the East, from where Moldova obtains most of its raw materials and energy, has had a disastrous effect on virtually all sectors of the republic's economy.

Sangheli stressed that the government was aware of the difficult position of Moldova's citizens during the transition from an administrative to a market economy and was taking urgent measures to stabilize the situation. The aim of the key measures is to accelerate economic reforms, privatization, and the restructuring of the production and financial systems, to introduce a Moldovan

currency, to attract foreign investment, and to improve the social protection given to people.

The first steps along this road have already been taken, even if they are not yet very noticeable. The republic already has a diverse economy based on a variety of forms of ownership. However, the implementation of reforms is being complicated tangibly by the unsettled conflict in the Dniester region. Despite the Cabinet of Ministers' efforts, the situation in the economy remains difficult. National income in the first four months of this year fell by 20 percent.

The deputies who have assembled for the extraordinary session intend to tackle the current situation and to find a way to surmount the crisis. The session is expected to discuss the ratification of the agreements on Moldova's entry into the CIS signed by President Mircea Snegur.

Reconstruction, Development Bank Grants \$60 Million

LD0308121193 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1100 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The total amount of credits the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will grant Moldova in the near future will be \$60 million. This was announced at a meeting between Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli and a group of the bank's experts that spent three weeks analyzing the economic situation in Moldova. It is planned to invest these funds in the development of the power engineering complex, industry, agriculture, and health care.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Discusses Tajikistan With Adamishin

LD0308104293 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in
Kazakh 2300 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Summary] Last Saturday [31 July] President Nazarbayev received the Russian Federation president's special envoy and First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin who arrived to deliver a personal message from Boris Yeltsin. Nazarbayev highlighted his proposals on the problems at issue. He expressed his belief that all countries of the region should contribute to strengthening the Tajik borders. He supported Rakhmanov's appeal to the opposition and spoke in favor of the idea that the defense ministers and frontier guards commanders in chief of Russia and regional states should meet in Dushanbe and invite the opposition and Afghanistan's representatives to participate in this meeting. In his opinion the United Nations should send observers to the Tajik-Afghan border.

Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan will grant humanitarian aid, first of all in food, to Gorno-Badakhshan. The sides agreed that Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan should promote the dialogue between the conflicting sides to stop this conflict both in Tajikistan and on its border with Afghanistan. The probability of convening a conference of heads of interested states to discuss the situation in Tajikistan was underlined.

Nazarbayev and Adamishin gave a joint interview to the media. The Kazakh leader was of opinion that much depends on the setting up of a realistically operational economic alliance of the CIS countries with standing coordinative bodies, first of all, in the sphere of finances.

Nazarbayev Urges Stronger Fight Against Crime

LD0308190393 Almaty KAZTAG in Russian 1400
GMT 3 Aug 93

[Excerpts] [no dateline as received] An extended session of the board of the Republican Procurator General's Office has taken place. A report was delivered by Kazakh Procurator General Zharmakhan Tuyakbayev on the results of the work of Procuracy bodies during the first six months of the current year and the priority areas for procurator's supervision.

He noted that fighting crime and lawbreaking in Kazakhstan has become a state policy. Despite the fact that all the law-enforcement bodies are exerting every effort to combat crime, the results of their activities are hardly satisfying. Therefore the Security Council of the republic, which has deemed as unsatisfactory the organization of work in ensuring the principle of inevitability of punishment for crimes, has endorsed a program for priority measures in combatting crime and strengthening law and order for 1993-95. [passage omitted]

President Nursultan Nazarbayev addressed those attending the meeting. Society is living through a crime

crisis, he said, emphasizing this fact as of prime state importance. [passage omitted]

The head of state spoke about the need for developing in a transitional period a tougher system of punishment for crimes. He described as weakening procuratorial supervision the fact that only one in three of all thieves and robbers are prosecuted and only half of all crimes connected with robbery offenses are uncovered.

Nursultan Nazarbayev termed as one of the most important areas in strengthening the foundations of statehood a ruthless fight against crime together with exercise of state control over the implementation of laws. He stressed that life itself demands from Kazakhstan during its entry into the world economic community strict observance of the endorsed legislative acts and enactments aimed at creating the market system and the socially oriented economy, the mechanisms for privatization, financial, and credit policy, the bank system, and the development of entrepreneurship. [passage omitted]

Much depends on the Procuracy, Nursultan Nazarbayev went on to note, in strengthening political stability. We should adhere to principles with regard to those who infringe on the equal rights of all the citizens of the republic and stir up interethnic tension. Such adherence to principles is in itself important and an absolutely just cause, which does not contradict the principles of democracy and freedom.

Grain Harvest Expected To Be Smaller

PM0308104393 Moscow Russian Television Network in
Russian 1900 GMT 31 Jul 93

[By A. Svyazin and A. Kondrashov from Kazakhstan; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The mass harvest of grain has started in the southern oblasts of Kazakhstan. Owing to unfavorable weather conditions, this year's gross grain harvest is expected to be below last year's harvest. According to experts' forecasts it will total around 28 million tonnes.

Foreseeing difficulties ahead, the Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution "On Measures to Safeguard the Harvesting and Storage of Crops." As many city dwellers and students as possible are to be involved in this year's battle for the Kazakh harvest. Machine operators from CIS countries are to be hired on the basis of contracts that will enable them to purchase and export up to five tonnes of grain.

Wheat is to be purchased from all producers this year, irrespective of their form of ownership. The state is prepared to pay up to \$100 per tonne for soft varieties of wheat. Kazakhstan has still to fulfill intergovernmental agreements for the delivery of grain to CIS countries. Some 3 million tonnes are to be delivered to Russia alone.

Refugees, Families Expected From Iran

PM0308132193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "750 Kazakh Families Return to Their Historical Motherland from Iran"]

[Text] The tens of thousands of Kazakhs who have in recent years returned to their motherland from Mongolia will soon be joined by their Iranian fellow-tribesmen. These are mainly the children and grandchildren of refugees who left the republic in the years of the collectivization and Stalinist repressions.

The first 750 Kazakh families from Iran will arrive in South Kazakhstan Oblast. Algabasskiy, Suzakskiy, and Turkestanskiy Rayons are prepared to receive them. According to a report by the working commission for problems of resettlement in the historical motherland, which operates at the oblast administration, all questions connected with giving the repatriates plots of land, loans for construction, and other privileges they are entitled to receive under Kazakh law, have been resolved.

Tajikistan**Gorno-Badakhshan Authorities Discuss Aid With Rakhmanov**

LD0308133093 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 1000 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Today Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan Imamali Rakhmanov had a meeting with the representatives of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. The talk was mainly about the course of implementation of the decree of the government on ahead of time supply of food to the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. The head of the state briefly told those present about the social and political situation in the republic, the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, measures taken on opening the Sagirdasht highway, the supply of medicines and food for the inhabitants of the mountainous area, the earliest return of the refugees to their homes. Imamali Rakhmanov stressed that in spite of great efforts of the government still in the republic and outside it, there are forces that do not want peace and tranquility to be established in Tajikistan. Rakhmanov said all the leaders of the ministries and departments who do not want, (or hamper), the delivery of the medicines, food, and the other consignments to the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast cannot be called anything other than saboteurs. It was also reported that the working groups have been formed in the cities of Osh [in Kyrgyzstan] and Dushanbe to control the delivery of the consignments to Gorno-Badakhshan. Abdulmahadov, first deputy [chairman] of the oblast executive committee; leaders of several organizations and departments of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast; Koimdodov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the republic; and others took part in the meeting.

Call For Withdrawal of Government Troops

LD0408093793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0840 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 4 Aug—The authorities of Gorno-Badakhshan autonomy in Tajikistan are still insisting on the immediate withdrawal of the subunits of the republic's government forces from the region's territory and on the political settlement of the conflict situation, Garibsho Shabozov, chairman of the oblast soviet, stated in a telephone interview to an ITAR-TASS correspondent today. He thinks that the "further presence of government forces in Darvazskiy rayon of the Pamirs, no matter for what goals it is justified, can only aggravate the sociopolitical situation in the region and lead to the escalation of tension between the central government and the population of the Pamirs".

"In the area there are certain political groups with extremely radical views who are in favor of the Pamir seceding from the republic, the resignation of its current leadership, and are close in their convictions with the Islamic opposition, Garibsho Shabozov admitted. They do not enjoy the support, however, of the majority of mountain inhabitants." Concerning the accusations of the central powers of the alleged attempts to turn the Gorno-Badakhshan Oblast into a transit point for the fighters of the opposition and Afghan Mojahedin crossing from Afghanistan into the Pamir areas, he said that recently Russian border guards stationed there reached agreement on the participation of the Pamir young people in the joint protection of the most vulnerable sections of the border.

"One of the reasons of the sociopolitical tension in the region—the head of the oblast believes—is the truly calamitous socioeconomic situation of the residents of the Pamir, which is being skillfully exploited by the leaders of local opposition groupings, people are on the verge of famine. The many thousand of refugees remaining here are making the situation even worse." With satisfaction he noted yesterday's assurance by the head of the country, Imamali Rakhmanov, which he gave at a meeting with the Pamir delegation that the central government will take decisive measures to deliver food and other vital goods to the Pamir, and will be promoting the return of the refugees to the areas of their permanent residence. Other problems of the oblast were also met with understanding, Shabozov said.

As the ITAR-TASS correspondent found out from well-informed sources, yesterday during the day and this morning exchanges of fire continued between the government subunits stationed in the Darvaz village of Sagirdasht and the so-called Pamir self-defense detachments who have set up a covering force near the Khaburabat pass. The source did not mention the number of casualties, but there are injured on both sides.

Troops Continue Offensive Against Rebels

LD0408094393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0910 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 4 Aug—Subunits of Tajikistan's Defense Ministry are continuing an offensive to destroy an anti-government group in Tavildaryinskiy Rayon at the foothills of Pamir. This group consists of, by various estimates, between 1,000 and 1,500 militants equipped with modern weapons, even rocket launchers. The offensive is being deployed successfully, the ministry stated today to the ITAR-TASS correspondent. The sources refused to comment on reports in different foreign media stating that government troops were using helicopters. All they said was: "The military have in their possession rather effective devices for destroying the opposition group."

According to one military expert, "the Army decided to act after the leaders of the guerrillas refused outright to lay down their arms, stop destabilizing the sociopolitical situation in the region, and lift the blockade of the Dushanbe-Khorog road." This road is only one by which Gorno-Badakhshan has been traditionally supplied with food and other vitally important goods from Dushanbe.

Both sides are sustaining losses. According to unconfirmed figures, seven Tajik Government soldiers have been killed during the last 48 hours, and several wounded. Dozens of fighters in the Tavildarinskiy grouping have been killed but, judging by their resolute behavior, they do not for the moment intend to put out the "white flag".

Forces Prepare for Opposition Attack on Border

PM0308142393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 93

[By Alisher Khodzhayev and Boris Aramov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Khodzhayev] The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border continues to be exacerbated. And although there was no fighting during the past two days, military preparations continue on the opposite bank.

According to Tajik Foreign Ministry information, armed gangs of the Tajik opposition continue massing in four rayons simultaneously—Ishkashimskiy and Kalai-Khumbskiy in the Pamirs, as well as Pyandzhskiy and Shuroabadskiy. Field commanders close to Ahmad Shah Masud, one of the Afghan military leaders, are rendering assistance to the opposition forces by delivering the latest types of weapons and munitions directly to the border.

Russian border guard troops, subunits of the Tajik Ministry of Defense, and the collective forces of the Commonwealth are taking emergency measures on the Tajik bank in preparation of rebuffing an attack.

Russian Forces Prevent Border Violation

LD0408082493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0742 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Aug—Russian border guards have prevented another attempt to violate the border at one of the sections controlled by the Pyandzh Border Guard Detachment. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told today by the Russian border troops press service, that on Tuesday [3 August] evening a group of armed people had attempted to cross from Afghanistan to Tajikistan on a raft across the River Pyandzh. After making warning signals, the Russian servicemen were forced to open fire. The intruders turned back.

The same source reports that reinforcements are arriving at Russian border posts, and that active work is being done on field fortification of the border.

Russians Meet Afghan Commanders

LD0308213493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2000 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By Aleksandr Goryachev; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Judging by reports being received, apart from the border problems, relations inside the Republic of Tajikistan have again worsened. Thus, the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border remains alarming but is completely under the control of Russian border troops and subunits of the 201st motorized infantry division and battalions from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

In the first three days of August, four armed opposition groupings which had sought to break through the border have been eliminated.

The command of the Russian border troops is making attempts to tackle the problem by other means, too. A number of meetings have been held with Afghan field commanders who have given the assurance that they will take all measures to prevent armed groupings crossing from Afghanistan into Tajikistan.

Apart from this, the border troops have achieved mutual understanding with the leadership of Gorno-Badakhshan on strengthening the protection of the borders in the given direction using groupings from the oblast.

Now, about the situation in Gorno-Badakhshan itself: The official version of Dushanbe is this: no combat actions are being conducted on the territory of the autonomous oblast. All that is taking place is an operation to eliminate fighters of the Tajik opposition who, by their actions, are preventing vehicle columns from carrying food, medicines, and economic freight for Badakhshan on the Khabu-Rabot pass and the Dushanbe-Khorog highway.

Uzbek Battalion To Arrive

LD0308125893 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 1000 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Today the head of the state Imamali Rakhmanov had a telephone conversation with Islam Karimov, president of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Islam Karimov informed him that a battalion has been sent from Uzbekistan to the Republic of Tajikistan to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border.

Human Rights Violations Detailed

MK0308115093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 3

[Khabib Nazrulloev report under "Tajikistan" rubric: "Things Are Not Quiet in the Upper Echelons. At the Bottom, Extrajudicial Practices, Arrests, and Disappearances Continue"]

[Text] In Dushanbe and its suburbs there have been increased instances of extrajudicial executions of opposition supporters, disappearances, and arrests of dissenters. Observers are linking this to the aggravated situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and the defeats suffered by government troops in combat operations areas inside the country.

On 30 July, at the moment when Anatoliy Adamishin, the Russian Federation president's special envoy, was giving a message from Boris Yeltsin to Tajik head Imamali Rakhmanov stating gross violations of human rights and freedoms in Tajikistan, in the center of the city, in front of the Supreme Soviet building, Saidsho Shoyev, deputy of the Tajik Supreme Soviet, and his brother Siyarsho Shoyev were arrested. A military jeep took away them in an unknown direction. Until the latest session of the Tajik Supreme Soviet the Shoyevs had been in Moscow, invited to Dushanbe by Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullodzhonov to take part in the session. Neither is anything known about the fate of another seven people's deputies whose security the prime minister has personally guaranteed.

Leninabad Oblast executive committee personnel resigned en masse last week. A closed emergency oblast council session accepted this unprecedented resignation and charged oblast executive committee chairman Abdudzhali Khomidov with selecting a new staff for the executive committee.

Under one theory, the resignation of the oblast executive committee is a protest against the oppression of the Kulyab clan, termination of subventions to the oblast, and the republic leadership's unwillingness to sit down at the negotiating table with the opposition. It is believed in Khodzhen that if civil war starts again, it would inevitably affect the country's northern parts as well.

The content of a collective statement by the 65 officers of the oblast executive committee is being kept secret, and this theory by local observers seems to be more than likely.

This event has aggravated tensions in relations between Kulyab and the Khodzhen leaders even more. In the corridors of power the prime minister is often charged openly with being involved with the opposition leaders. This was also evident during the latest Tajik TV program about the former coalition government, in which Abdullodzhonov was a member.

Disarray in the upper echelons of power is resulting at the grass-roots level in a second exodus of Khodzhen residents from Dushanbe and Uzbeks from Tajikistan, which is also stimulated by a quiet panic that has seized the capital in connection with developments on the border. Acts of retribution on the part of opposition members, who are taking refuge in Dushanbe suburbs, have also increased. On 1 August, 14 bodies of former Tajik People's Front combatants were found near the Varzhob sovkhos.

Council of Ministers Discuss Economic Development

LD0308173493 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 1200 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Excerpts] A regular sitting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan took place today in Dushanbe. Our correspondent reports:

[Unidentified correspondent] There was one question on the agenda of the regular sitting of the Council of Ministers of the republic, the results of economic development of the republic during the first six months of the current year and future tasks in the second half of the year. The sitting of the Council of Ministers was opened by Abdumalik Abdullodzhonov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic. Then Minister of Finance and Economy Ismail Davlatov made a report about the economic situation of the republic in the first six months of the current year. [passage omitted]

Shavkat Umarov, minister of industry; Habibullo Tabarov, minister of agriculture and land reform; and Kayum Kalandarov, chairman of the light industry concern, spoke about the achievements and difficulties of their branches.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Imamali Rakhmanov took part in the work of the regular sitting of the Council of Ministers.

Turkmenistan**Niyazov, Russia's Adamishin Discuss Tajik Situation**

LD0308122093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1100 GMT 3 Aug 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyumila Glazovskaya]

[Text] Ashgabat, 3 Aug (TASS)—Turkmenistan will adhere firmly to the principle of positive neutrality and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and will take no part in settling the Tajik-Afghan conflict other than by methods of political settlement, which it is ready to join in. Such was the main result of the meeting held in Ashgabat between President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan and the Russian president's envoy Anatoliy Adamishin, first deputy minister of foreign affairs.

In an interview to journalists just after the negotiations ended, the head of the Russian Federation delegation emphasized that Turkmenistan's position, despite some specific aspects of it, should be appraised first and foremost "from the point of view of multilateral approaches" reflecting the entire spectrum of such a complex and contradictory problem as the issue of a Tajik-Afghan settlement.

The acuteness of the conflict is heightened by the fact that "it is more Tajik-Tajik in nature," because a struggle is being waged between the legitimate government of Tajikistan and the opposition, which is using armed methods in this struggle and resorting to the help of Afghan mojahedin.

The ITAR-TASS correspondent learned that in the lengthy one-to-one conversation between Saparmurad Niyazov and Anatoliy Adamishin, the latter was obliged to subscribe to the president's irrefutable arguments in favor of Turkmenistan's military nonintervention in settling the conflict.

The envoy of the Russian president pointed out to journalists that Turkmenistan has the right to take the stance it has taken. At the same time Anatoliy Adamishin cited Turkmenistan's desire to do its utmost to facilitate a political settlement of the conflict. Anatoliy Adamishin has described as positive the approach

of Turkmenistan, which it "has faithfully and consistently maintained in issues of bilateral cooperation with Russia."

Immediately after the talks with Anatoliy Adamishin, Saparmurad Niyazov had a meeting with representatives of the military departments of the two states at which the sides discussed details of military cooperation in the future. A preliminary accord was reached that the national air defense forces of Turkmenistan would be formed jointly with Russia. A decision is also to be taken in the near future on the status of Russian officers serving in Turkmenistan. According to Ashgabat, the final decision on these and other issues will be taken during Boris Yeltsin's visit to Turkmenistan in October this year.

Agree to Joint Air Defense Forces

LD0308153993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1256 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Glazovskaya]

[Text] Ashgabat, 3 Aug— After talks ended today with Anatoliy Adamishin, Russian Federation first deputy foreign minister and Russia's representative, President Saparmurad Niyazov held a meeting with representatives of the military departments of Russia and Turkmenistan, during which some questions of further military cooperation between the two states were discussed in detail. A preliminary agreement was reached to the effect that Turkmenistan's national air defense forces will be set up jointly with Russia. The question connected with the status of Russian officers serving in Turkmenistan will also be resolved soon.

It is thought in Ashgabat that these and other documents will be finalized during the visit to Turkmenistan by Boris Yeltsin in October, Durdymukhammed Kurbanov, the Turkmen president's press secretary told journalists.

Armenia

Foreign Ministry Upholds UN Call for Karabakh Talks

LD0408111993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1020 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan, 4 Aug—The Armenian Foreign Ministry believes that without contradicting the logic of the Minsk process, the Azerbaijani-Karabakh dialogue is the most efficient means for the conflicting sides to achieve mutual trust. Its statement regarding UN Security Council Resolution 853 has been made public here.

The resolution is an important step towards eliminating obstacles to stopping the war in the Karabakh conflict zone, it says. Armenia welcomes the encouragement of direct contacts between the conflicting sides, which is expressed in the resolution, and actual support for the developing dialogue between Baku and Stepanakert.

The Armenian Foreign Ministry shares the Security Council's deep concern over the latest escalation of military actions in the region, the document notes. A lack of trust between the confronting sides and the effect of the domestic political situation in Baku on the military situation are given among the reasons for the escalation. The Armenian Foreign Ministry described as important the condemnation of attacks on civilians and shelling of settlements. They are convinced that this relates to the Azerbaijani actions against Kapanskiy and Vardeniskiy Rayons of Armenia and Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Yerevan is convinced that the CSCE Minsk process with the UN support is the best level of authority to settle the Karabakh problem. The Armenian Foreign Ministry has welcomed the UN Security Council's appeal to lift the blockade and open up the roads for the delivery of humanitarian cargoes. Armenia has called upon all the sides to follow its example and declare all communications passing through its territory open.

Karabakh Hopes For Successful Negotiations

NC0308205693 Yerevan SNARK in English 1556 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Stepanakert, August 4 (SNARK)—The Karabakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers that the development of military actions by Azerbaijani side is the result of the UN Security Council's Resolution 853 which is accused only Armenians in Karabakh. Masis Mailyan, the official from the Foreign Ministry, said to SNARK, that is why there is a decreasing from Azerbaijani side in the contacts with official representatives of Karabakh. Recently the agreement on meeting of the heads of Karabakh and Azerbaijan has been achieved. Meanwhile, though Azerbaijani side makes some artificial barriers, the Karabakh powers do everything to finish

successfully the direct dialog, begun between Stepanakert and Baku. Masis Mailyan expressed the hope that the process of bilateral negotiations has to lead to the peaceful settlement of Karabakh- Azerbaijan conflict.

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Tajikistan

LD0308130493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1138 GMT 3 Aug 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan, 3 Aug (TASS)—The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed "great alarm and concern" in connection with Tajik-Afghan border events, which led, as the document notes, to numerous casualties among servicemen and civilians and which resulted in serious deterioration of the military and political situation in the region.

The statement of the Armenian Foreign Ministry circulated here today assesses the events as "an act aimed at destabilizing the situation in Tajikistan and disrupting the establishment of accord and peace." Yerevan believes that the act of aggression was carried out with regard to the sovereign state—a member of the CIS and the UNO, which has friendly ties with Armenia.

The foreign policy department confirmed the republic's readiness to provide the necessary assistance to Tajikistan, having drawn the attention of the CIS member-states to the need of collective efforts aimed at the speediest political settlement of the conflict. Armenia is doing this as a member of the treaty on collective security of the CIS, proceeding from its commitments to carry out peacekeeping actions in Tajikistan within the Commonwealth and the Minsk agreements of 22 January, the statement of the republican Foreign Ministry notes.

Foreign Ministry Statement on UN Resolution on Kuwait, Iraq

NC0308200193 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1534 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The Armenian Foreign Ministry issued a statement today on behalf of the Armenian Government in which it welcomed the UN Security Council Resolution 833 and expressed full support for the decisions of the UN commission demarcating the border between Iraq and Kuwait.

In highly assessing the resolution, the Armenian Foreign Ministry specifically highlighted the fact that the resolution, in taking account of the sovereignty rights of the Kuwaiti people and its aspirations, emerges as an example of a comprehensive and just approach toward fulfilling UN principles and tenets.

The statement calls on the Iraqi Government to express its readiness to fulfill the UN resolutions.

Premier Meets Greek Envoy on Assistance to Armenia

NC0308211793 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1534 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan received and held an hour-long meeting today with the Ambassador of Greece to Armenia Leonidhas Khristanthopoulos.

The prime minister thanked the ambassador for his country's support for the oil and gas prospecting in Armenia, for ensuring the transportation of Armenia-bound humanitarian assistance by the Greek planes, and for providing fuel for 16 flights which will transport the aid provided to Armenia by the American Red Cross.

The prime minister noted that Greece has a leading and special place in Armenia's foreign policy.

At the ambassador's request, the prime minister briefed him on Armenia's socioeconomic situation, economic programs, and the work being done for the reutilization of the Armenian nuclear power plant.

Matters pertaining to economic and political cooperation were discussed, and it was agreed to speed up the organization of Athens-Yerevan-Tehran permanent air flights.

The ambassador said that there is no need to comment on the mutual sympathy existing between the two peoples, and noted that he sees no obstacles on the way to developing and deepening Armenian-Greek ties. We must help Armenia so that it can recover and gain strength, noted Khristanthopoulos.

Azerbaijan

Baku Welcomes UNSC Resolution 853 Condemning Armenia

PM0308121393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Sokhbet Mamedov report: "UN Security Council Has Condemned Occupation of Azerbaijani Territories"]

[Text] Baku—Baku has welcomed the news that the UN Security Council, "expressing serious concern over the worsening relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan," has unanimously adopted Resolution 853 which condemns "the seizure of the Agdam region and all other recently occupied regions of Azerbaijan."

An emergency session of the Security Council was convened on the insistent demand of Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet Chairman Geydar Aliyev, who is exercising the powers of president of Azerbaijan. In his letter to UN Security Council Chairman David Hannay (Britain) and UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, Geydar Aliyev noted "the dramatic situation that has developed in

Azerbaijan as a result of the continuation and escalation of Armenian aggression" and announced that, since the start of hostilities, the opposing side "has seized over 17 percent of Azerbaijani territory. The entire mountainous part of Karabakh; Lachinskiy and Kelbadzharskiy Rayons; and villages in Kazakhskiy, Fizulinskiy, Zangelanskiy, and Agdamskiy Rayons have been occupied." "In all," G. Aliyev noted, "503 inhabited localities have been seized, and the total number of refugees and migrants amounts to 567,000 people." Having described the seizure of the city of Agdam by Armenian armed forces as "a devastating blow to the fledgling peace process," the head of the Azerbaijani state demanded immediate UN Security Council intervention and the adoption of "urgent measures to restrain the aggressor and stop the bloodshed."

This letter, according to D. Hannay, "was attentively examined by the Council, particularly in light of the report submitted by CSCE mediator Mario Raffaelli." Initial reaction in Azerbaijan to UN Security Council Resolution No. 853 has been positive. Although it does not say so openly, this resolution intimates for the first time that Azerbaijan is the aggrieved party and therefore, in condemning this act, the Security Council has demanded the prompt cessation of all hostilities and the immediate, full, and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces involved in the conflict from the Agdam region and all other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan." [opening quotes not published] At the same time "the Council has deliberately urged the government of the Republic of Armenia to continue to exert its influence with a view to ensuring compliance by Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the provisions of Resolution 822 (1993) and the present resolution, and the adoption by this side of the proposals of the CSCE Minsk group." This once again confirms that the Armenian community in the mountainous part of Karabakh is to blame for wrecking the schedule for settling the conflict in the region. The Council is therefore "urging the states to refrain from supplying any weapons and equipment that could lead to the escalation of the conflict or the continuing occupation of territory."

Gasan Gasanov, Azerbaijan's permanent representative at the United Nations, assessing the present Security Council decision as a major achievement for Azerbaijani diplomacy, expressed his satisfaction with the objective position of the representatives of all the Security Council member states.

Elchibey's Representatives To Meet Turkish Premier

NC0308171093 Baku TURAN in English 1421 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Baku, August 3, (TURAN)—Today meeting between Prime-Minister of Turkey Tansu Ciller and Former Secretary of State of Azerbaijan Ali Kerimov, former assistant of presidents staff for international

affairs Asim Mollazadeh is due to take place in Ankara. Asim Mollazadeh in his phone talk with TURAN's correspondent told, that Turkish publicity and official circles intended to support legal Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey further more. To Mollazadeh words, today the chairman of the largest opposition party of Turkey "Ana Vatan" [Motherland Party] Mesut Yilmaz will receive representatives of Elchibey.

Asim Mollazadeh also told, August 4 he and Ali Kerimov were to leave for Washington on official invitation of the US Department of State.

Both these members of the President Abulfaz Elchibey's staff left for Turkey after the removal of Azerbaijani president from his post in the middle of June this year. From that time his close supporters go on their struggle for returning of Elchibey to Baku outside Azerbaijan.

Supreme Court Chairman Relieved of Post

LD0308154093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1330 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] A decision by the National Assembly was made public in Baku today. It relieves Tair Kerimli, the chairman of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan, of his post on the basis of his personal application.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Order on Commission for Abkhazia

LD0308193393 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Now we will acquaint you with the order of the head of state on organizational measures for peacefully settling the Abkhaz conflict.

In order to resolve peacefully the current conflict on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and to carry out the obligations for the 27 July cease-fire agreement, the following persons from the Georgian side are to be appointed to the joint commission for settling the situation in Abkhazia:

1. Zhiuli Shartava, chairman of the commission, personal and plenipotentiary representative of the head of state in Abkhazia, chairman of the Defense Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

2. Aleksandre Kavsadze, deputy chairman of the commission, personal and plenipotentiary representative of the head of state of Georgia, chairman of the Committee for Human Rights and Interethnic Relations.

3. Avtandil Tskitishvili, deputy chairman of the commission, chief of general staff of the armed forces of the Republic of Georgia, and first deputy defense minister.

Members of the commission:

1. Geno Adamia, commander of the 23d Brigade of the 2d Army Corps.

2. Giga Burduli, deputy foreign minister of the Republic of Georgia.

3. Jemal Gorgiashvili, deputy minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Georgia.

4. Giorgi Vashakidze, deputy defense minister of the Republic of Georgia.

5. Valeri Vashakidze, chairman of the Georgian republic's Committee for Accommodating Refugees.

6. Remi Vashakidze, head of the Railway Transport Department of the Republic of Georgia.

7. David Zubitashvili, head of the Oil and Petroleum Department of the Republic of Georgia.

8. Pridon Injia, minister of communications of the Republic of Georgia.

9. Kote Kemularia, Minister of Justice of the Republic of Georgia.

10. Gogi Keshelava, head of intelligence and information service of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

11. Viktor Lortkipanidze, deputy of the Republic of Georgia from the Autonomous Republic of Ajara.

12. Irakli Machavariani, deputy head of the staff of the head of state of Georgia.

13. Lorik Marshania, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

14. Irakli Menagharishvili, minister of health of the Republic of Georgia.

15. Guram Mirianashvili, minister of architecture and construction of the Republic of Georgia.

16. Mirian Murjikneli, deputy finance minister of the Republic of Georgia.

17. Ramaz Sichinava, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

18. Nino Uznadze, head of the service for coordinating humanitarian aid of the staff of the head of state.

19. Zaur Uchadze, major general, commander of the 2d Army Corps.

20. Nugzar Pipia, first vice president of the National Bank of the Republic of Georgia.

21. Irakli Kadagishvili, director of the customs office of Georgia.

22. Nodar Tskitishvili, chairman of the Red Cross Central Committee of the Republic of Georgia.

23. Levan Sharashenidze, deputy defense minister of the Republic of Georgia.

24. Tengiz Sharmanashvili, deputy chairman of the Committee for Human Rights and Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Georgia.

25. Londer Tsaava, chief state advisor of the staff of the head of state.

26. Zurab Chankvetadze, head of the Air Transport Department of the Republic of Georgia.

A commission is to be established by defining the status of the autonomous republic within the territory of Georgia, disconnecting the functions between the central and autonomous leadership bodies, forming the key regulations on the local leadership bodies, and by perfecting other political and legal issues, and in order to secure a comprehensive settlement of the Abkhaz conflict.

Suggestions about resolving the above-mentioned issues in practice or conceptually are to be systematically brought to the attention of the head of state.

Aleksandre Kavsadze, personal and plenipotentiary envoy of the head of state, is to prepare suggestions about the composition of the above-mentioned commission within two days.

Aleksandre Kavsadze, personal and plenipotentiary envoy of the head of state, is to present for approval the composition of the group of information for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia within two days.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Georgia is to provide the commissions and groups for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia with financial and technical help.

Zhiuli Shartava, personal and plenipotentiary envoy of the head of state in Abkhazia, and chairman of the Defense Council and of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia is to secure in an organized manner the activities of the above-mentioned commissions and groups on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

[Signed] Eduard Shevardnadze

Shevardnadze Bans Execution of POW's Without Trial

LD0408101993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0933 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi, 4 Aug—Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze has instructed the republic's Defense Ministry to create a POW's detention camp at one of the military units, and provide it with all necessary foodstuffs, clothing, and other staples. The instruction contains a separate clause to the effect that "Attempts on

lives of the prisoners, their humiliation and shooting without trial are strictly prohibited."

Commanders of military formations have been instructed to establish identities of the wounded, sick, dead, and captured enemy servicemen within 24 hours, and to forward the compiled information to the Georgian Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Interethnic Relations. On the instruction of Eduard Shevardnadze, this committee and the Defense Ministry must conduct negotiations on the exchange of POW's.

The enemy side will be given the checked lists, documents, personal effects, and money found on the bodies of those killed. The bodies will be also handed over, whenever possible, or buried.

Eduard Shevardnadze had earlier issued an instruction "On the development of the mechanism of defense of rights of prisoners captured in military operations, and on the procedure of the burial of bodies of enemy servicemen, killed or dead as a result of wounds, and on handing them over to the opposing side." This document was drawn up in line with the requirements of the additional protocol "On protection of victims of international military conflicts" of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949.

Georgian Army Press Chief on Conflict Zone Situation

LD0408083993 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0700 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Interview with Gocha Ablutia, head of the Armed Forces Press Center, by an unidentified correspondent in Sukhumi—live]

[Text] [Ablutia] It was relatively calm in the conflict zone last night. However, Georgian positions near the village of Mania came under sporadic fire. It should be noted that near the village of Mania, the opposing side has been conducting engineer works and reinforcing its positions for several days. As I said, there were sporadic attacks on our positions. Two Georgian fighters were killed during such attacks yesterday.

[Correspondent] What is the situation this morning?

[Ablutia] It has been calm this morning. Another handover of the bodies of Georgian soldiers who were killed near Shroma and Akhalsheni is planned for today. It is expected that observers will be present there. There are also other plans.

[Correspondent] What can you say about the work of the Tripartite Commission?

[Ablutia] The commissions have just been set up. Of course, there are some hitches and a certain degree of confusion, because some do not know the positions, but in general, we are positive about it. We cannot blame any

commission for being unfair. They are filled with objective people. If we do everything to guarantee a good technical level competence, it seems that these commissions will do a lot of good.

Roundup of Latest Developments in Senaki, Ajaria

PM0308145593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[V. Mezentsev report under the "Reporting Details" rubric: "Putsch Attempt in Senaki"]

[Excerpts] Batumi—Armed formations of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's supporters led by Loti Kobalia have occupied the city of Senaki in Mengrelia and set about mobilizing the population. According to Kobalia's version, mobilization is being carried out to supplement the ranks of Sukhumi's defenders. However, according to information from official sources, Kobalia plans in conjunction with Kitovani to cut western Georgia off from Tbilisi and to launch an armed attack against Shevardnadze's government.

The idea of overthrowing the head of state has brought together two irreconcilable enemies—Kobalia and Kitovani. Incidentally, Loti (who is also known as Vakhtang) to this day calls himself chief of the Georgian National Guard Main Administration. [passage omitted]

In conversation with Loti Kobalia a week ago, I asked about his vision of his homeland's future state structure. Loti categorically refuted the idea of a confederation, and with a soldier's bluntness he declared that he advocates "a united Georgia without Shevardnadze."

"Soon, all forces of Western Georgia will unite against him," Kobalia declared. "We will attain peace only once we have rid ourselves of the tyrant and restored Gamsakhurdia's government."

The arrival of armed opposition formations in Senaki prompted Eduard Shevardnadze to telephone the Ajar leader. In Aslan Abashidze's words, Shevardnadze planned to deploy government troops in Senaki. Responsibility for carrying out the operation fell to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. First Deputy Minister Igor Geogadze headed for Senaki with armored vehicles.

Georgian Internal Affairs Minister Teimuraz Khachishvili came to Batumi. So far, he is declining to comment on the incident in Senaki. However, his trip to Ajaria is being linked with that very event. As for Abashidze's position, it is quite well known. It seems that, having declined Shevardnadze's flattering proposals to head the government in Tbilisi, the Ajar leader also refused Kobalia's and Kitovani's embraces. Last Sunday, the Ajar Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted an appeal to the head of the Georgian state and parliament. It states, among other things, that Georgia should return to the ruble zone immediately, sign the trilateral treaty, halt the fratricidal war in Abkhazia, and offer the Russian Army dignified conditions for its stay in Georgia...

According to the command of the Russian Group of Forces in the Transcaucasus, today it is only via the efforts of Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov, assuming the role of mediator, that the Abkhaz troops have been kept in check and prevented from attacking Sukhumi.

So far, the Ajar leader has succeeded in cooling the ardor of the new-wave putschists. At Shevardnadze's request, Aslan Abashidze held talks with Loti Kobalia and the city administration in Senaki as a result of which an agreement to withdraw armed formations and armored vehicles from the city was reached. However, local observers are of the opinion that Georgia is unlikely to avoid a fresh round of confrontation.

Even in peaceful Ajaria the situation is quite alarming. In the last few weeks alone, 500 kg of explosives, gunpowder, a large quantity of automatic weapons, various kinds of pistol, grenades, flare pistols, portable radios, and edged weapons have been confiscated in Batumi. Abashidze declared in a conversation with me that he is convinced that a "fifth column" is operating in the city.

Last night, armored vehicles and a group of submachine-gunners stood guard near the Ajaria Supreme Soviet building. And armored vehicles belonging to this autonomy's special internal troops subunit were positioned at the airport, near the Internal Affairs Ministry building, and other facilities.

Political Situation in Kutaisi 'Rather Tense'

LD0308141793 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Despite the seeming calmness, the political situation has been rather tense in Kutaisi lately, which is partly due to a complex criminal situation. It can, on the one hand, make people's patience overflow and, on the other hand, can facilitate the stepping up of actions by the former president's supporters. The former deputies visiting Kutaisi are trying to benefit from the situation that has arisen in Kutaisi and to use the mutual hardship to satisfy their political ambitions.

Prime Minister Outlines Economic Strategy

AU0408091493 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 23 Jul 93 p 1, 3

[Speech delivered by Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua at the session of the Georgian parliament in Tbilisi on 22 July: "The Economic Policy of the Georgian Government: Strategy and Tactics"]

[Text] 1. The aim of the government's economic policy is the prosperity of each individual citizen in Georgia, Georgia's economic revival, the development of a genuine feeling of economic patriotism, and ensuring complete individual, including economic, freedom. To achieve this aim, it is recognized that, instead of a

dependent colonial economic system, one has to create an independent economic system that will be able to provide the country's population with a civilized standard of living.

Georgia's national independent economic system signifies a single Georgian market, a single economic area, and an autonomous financial and credit system through the introduction of a market base.

The Government's economic policy is built on the market model, the basis of which is private ownership, the right to ownership in general, and private entrepreneurship. At the same time, the development of foreign trade and the attraction of foreign investments acquire particular significance.

Economic tactics are formed according to how one can implement a way of emerging from economic anarchy, putting a halt to the economic crisis, and stabilizing the situation.

2. In order to implement an economic policy, the Georgian Government is trying, on the one hand, to intensify economic reform and to overcome the economic crisis and, on the other hand, to implement the systematic restructuring of the economic system through the active involvement and assistance of the state.

The main directions of economic reform are outlined for a medium-term period in the Cabinet of Ministers decrees No. 149 of 24 February 1993 and No. 443 of 4 June 1993: "The Medium-Term Program for Macroeconomic Stabilization and Systematic Changes in the Republic of Georgia" and "On Measures To Ensure the Implementation of the Medium-Term Program for Macroeconomic Stabilization and Systematic Changes in the Republic of Georgia." There can be no alternative point of view regarding the achievement of the economic thinking in this program. It has to be emphasized that any document on the implementation of the Government's economic policy does not come from the legislative authorities.

With regard to the progress of economic reform, it has to be said that, today, through the efforts of the Government, it has moved from the realm of talking about reforms and discussing conceptual questions to a basis for real implementation and concrete action. Therefore, it is not accidental that the aforementioned program has only recently attracted attention as it concerned concrete interests.

With the aim of fully putting into action a mechanism for the state regulation of economic processes, Decree No. 264 (30 March 1993) "On the Delivery of Products and Goods for the State Needs of the Republic of Georgia" and Decree No. 265 (31 March 1993) "On a Single Set of Rules for Establishing Restrictions on and Licensing the Export and Import of Goods (Works, Services) on the Territory of the Republic of Georgia" have been adopted.

The whole privatization program and, in particular, the Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 288 of 14 April 1993 "On Organizational Measures To Restructure State Enterprises and State Enterprise Associations as Joint Stock Companies" envisage a radical change of the economic system.

The Cabinet of Ministers is dissatisfied with the pace of reform. The Government has been unable to raise the aggregation [agregirebis] level of the stabilization program to the [level of] the sector economy, has not elaborated purposive programs, has been unable to establish the higher spheres and needs with regard to the utilization of investments, and so forth. However, it should be explained that there has also been a short period of time for these activities; nevertheless, important steps have been taken in this direction. Georgia was the first of the post-communist countries to overcome the "plan phobia" and with Decree No. 358 of 10 May 1993 "On Indicative Planning for the Economic and Social Development of the Republic of Georgia" extended its work in order to transfer to this system from 1994. It is only by means of the optimal combination of state and market regulating forces that it is possible to advance toward civilization.

3. The extreme social situation that prevails in the social environment is the primary factor among those independent of the Government that is hindering economic reform and transformation. The war, the economic crisis, nihilism in the legal sphere, the ecological and moral crisis, and so forth are restricting the full potential for economic reform.

A full-fledged legal base for transforming the economy, one brought into the system [as published], has not been created. The primary condition for conducting economic reform and ensuring any program is, of course, political and ideological stabilization but, at the same time, in order to restructure the economic system, the appropriate legal infrastructure has to be created. Economic reform should be guaranteed by legal reform. The biggest task is to open the way to business initiative, create a specific environment, develop market forces, and convince investors to do business in Georgia. In conditions of a legal infrastructure formed on the basis of the administrative-command system, it is not possible to implement a speedy transformation and obtain quick results. What is under discussion? In order to create a legal base for a market economy, it is necessary to adopt nine large packages of legislative acts. These are: 1. Legislation on property, leasing, mortgage, intellectual property, and privatization; 2. Laws on foreign investments and concessions and on international civil procedures (including foreign judicial and arbitral decisions) and international private law; 3. Laws on entrepreneurial activities, trade partnerships, cooperatives, and bankruptcy; 4. Antimonopolistic legislation and legislation on competition. 5. Legislation on marketing, franchising, trade representation, and different types of *mosashualebebi* [meaning not known]; 6. Legislation on banks and banking activity, securities, stock

exchanges, and insurance and exchange control; 7. Legislation on land, natural resources, and environmental protection; 8. Legislation on commercial disputes, judicial reform, the resolution of commercial disputes and access to legal services; 9. Customs legislation and legislation on taxes and tariffs.

In addition to this, in order to include Georgia in world relations, it is necessary to have: 1. Legislation on foreign investment; 2. International private law; 3. Legislation on commercial partnerships; 4. Legislation on securities and stock exchanges; 5. Legislation on transport; 6. Customs legislation; 7. Legislation on judicial reform.

What has been done in this direction? More than 10 legislative acts were adopted under the previous parliament, more than 50 decrees under the provisional Government and State Council, while 40 have been adopted by the present parliament. Why? Not because parliament does not have the authority (this view is being expressed but we are not simplifying the question) but because the acute nature of political questions has not given parliament the means to do so. Will the creation of a legal base alone be sufficient to conduct economic reform? Of course not, unless there is peace in Abkhazia and civic accord in the country.

4. Economic development is also being hindered by the fact that it has not been possible to form an optimal cheap and efficient structure for managing the economy.

The failure of the monetary and credit policy has been particularly great. The banking system is unable to cope with the reforms. Furthermore, the credit policy that is being conducted by the republican bank, and the credit policy that is determined by the Government's economic program are mutually exclusive. Without resolving this question, it is impossible not only to implement reforms but also to preserve the country's economic viability. This is not an easy question. In addition, the monetary and credit policy is the cornerstone of economic policy. Parliament cannot remain neutral in this question or fulfill the role of a mediator. There does not exist three sides—the bank, the Government, and parliament. There exists two political directions in the economy. Parliament should determine which it supports and do so unequivocally. To be dependent upon the bank does not mean having to sign documents that bring undesirable results for the country.

5. Georgia's economic difficulties are, first and foremost, political difficulties. Different political forces are viewing economic reform as a means of making political capital and not from the standpoint of economic pragmatism. After all, in what country does the question of currency and national currency become a subject for debate on television? When an allusion made by an official has an enormous influence on the dollar and the ruble themselves, it is easy to imagine the influence it will have on our half-currency.

Politics has sway over the Georgian economy not only through politicians; the Georgian economic crisis itself is

a result of political development. Political development has caused the rupture of economic ties and a crisis. Georgia, which, as yet, does not have its own monetary and credit policy, has found itself unprotected in the face of the world market.

6. Georgia's economic situation is complicated by the fact that we import such important resources as wheat and energy resources and also because the bulk of its production capacities were built on the basis of raw materials from the former Soviet Union. In order to import, we need correspondingly to export; prices for Georgian exported goods have increased 100 times less than those for goods imported by Georgia, in particular energy resources.

In order to make what I have said more clear, I will speak about just gasoline, diesel fuel, and furnace fuel oil. In order to satisfy normal demands, Georgia needs 1,265,000 tonnes of gasoline, 1,000,000 tonnes of diesel fuel, and 3,000,000 tonnes of fuel oil or 700 million dollars; and up to 800 million dollars in total for petroleum products. In order to satisfy minimum demands on the aforementioned three types of fuel (gasoline—660,000 tonnes, diesel fuel—600,000 tonnes, and fuel oil—2,000,000 tonnes), it needs 420 million dollars and, in all, 470 million dollars. To this we can add natural gas and liquid gas of which, in normal conditions, we need 650 million cubic meters and 30,000 tonnes and, as a minimum, 415 million cubic meters and 15,000 tonnes. In terms of money, this amounts to 685 million dollars during normal consumption and 430 million dollars during minimum consumption, that is to say, just for energy resources, we need 1,475 million [dollars] during normal consumption and 900 million dollars in order to satisfy minimum needs. Georgia cannot ensure such consumption at this stage. The specific character of the inter-branch economy is such that any branch consumes energy and particularly those types that subsequently determine Georgia's export potential. The Georgian Government is fully engaged each day in the struggle to resolve these questions. Naturally, it is difficult for us to believe that Georgia can resolve these problems with its internal resources. Foreign investment is needed although, in the future, of course, Georgia has to find alternatives and substitutes. This is happening. Savings programs and those for utilizing energy resources and Georgian coal are being elaborated in Georgia. Strategic aims and tactical steps require understanding each day. More precisely, it is necessary to become better acquainted with this matter.

7. Tactical adjustments in economic planning are being made every day. It is well known that Georgia is unable not to give a national emphasis to economic life. Work is being carried out daily to mobilize the economy for the military conflict. It is not possible to anticipate what the budget will be for the war economy. It is impossible to calculate these expenses in advance.

8. Naturally, all the aforementioned factors are important in determining the main line of the Government's

economic policy. In global terms, one can present two scenarios for the development of the economy: The economy in conditions of military conflicts and in the event of the establishment of peace. These two variants have dozens of different possible combinations. One, if we introduce our own currency and, two, if we do not introduce it; if we conclude an economic treaty with Russia and if we do not do so. Therefore, given such precarious factors, it is natural there will be complications. One can say that a strategy for modelling the Georgian economy at the micro-level is being determined in the economy [as published]. The current Georgian Government's wish and course for transferring to a market economy is irreversible. However, it is extremely complicated to elaborate economic tactics on account of the highly unstable economic situation. In spite of this, it is necessary to implement economic strategy in individual branches. It has to be said that, due to inexperience and, at times, mentality, branch programs are not being drawn up. Here, we should probably make use of technical assistance on a broad scale. Steps have already been taken in this direction; the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations has elaborated independent projects.

The following programs, for example, should be brought up to a level that corresponds with international standards: an investment program for forming the Kolkheti independent economic zone; large investment programs for transport communications passing through Georgia (automobile, rail, air, sea, ferry, and the transportation of liquid loads by pipeline); an investment program for the development of the Republic of Georgia fuel and energy complex; a further investment program for the Republic of Georgia industrial complex; investment programs for the development of the rational utilization of Republic of Georgia natural resources and environmental protection, Georgian agriculture and the processing industry, the Georgian construction industry and building materials industry, the improvement of the Georgian telecommunications systems, and the development of the Republic of Georgia infrastructure. A separate program is needed to attract foreign investment.

Such separate programs should be drawn up everywhere even though they have great importance in branch projects.

The most dangerous aspect is our not being able to coordinate these programs. Their implementation requires not only the creation of a legal basis but also taking into account our legal traditions. The legislative acts adopted in Georgia should correspond to Georgia's requirements and priorities. It is precisely with this aim that it is being decided to implement indicative planning.

Within this plan, as a budgetary requirement, regional programs will be elaborated. These will be programs determining the development of autonomies and individual regions.

We are participating in international programs as well. If it is not possible to build inside the country, it is necessary to export the construction service in order to utilize potential to the maximum and as an alternative to letting capital escape out of the country. With this aim, Georgia's constructors are eyeing the markets in Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Turkmenistan.

9. Where is the Government's "Achilles' heel?" It is neither concepts and programs nor competence. It is the creation of a concrete and fixed work program, which is objectively impossible due to existing conditions in the country. The Government's permanent time problem is hindering this. It is not possible to provide information on activities. The mechanism of regional management has not been improved. Furthermore, a vacuum has been created. Sometimes, as a result of emotional decisions, the country's business is being spoiled. For example, parliament revoked the provisional statute on local self-administration adopted by the Government and did not ratify a new one. Is this permissible? Is it possible for local self-administration, to all intents and purposes the country, to be left without regulating documents? What is needed is a positive opposition to the Government and not a defiant position. This divides the members of the Government themselves and creates a nervous atmosphere in their work. The competence of the members of the present Cabinet of Ministers cannot, on the whole, be called into question. At the same time, each is conscious of the significance of the subjective factor in his work and his personal responsibility and, therefore, continues his activities, otherwise it is possible we would have got other results. Our way of thinking hinders matters here. The current situation cannot be attributed only to the existence or non-existence of members of the Government. Of course, the subjective factor is of importance but we cannot simplify our reality as this will hinder a way out of the situation. In general, we have to overcome the non-reformist mood in economic thinking at all levels. The implementation of an economic policy is the joint concern of all levels of Government. It seems to me that we are making a fetish of economic reform. Economic transformation is a decisive but, nevertheless, only a single part of that systematic restructuring that is being implemented in post-communist countries, a systematic restructuring that signifies the restructuring of the Soviet administrative-bureaucratic directive planned economy. The supremacy of the law in this restructuring is the determining factor.

10. Discussion of the economic course cannot be transferred to the plane of the implementation or non-implementation of economic reforms in the country. Today, not only in Georgia but also in the world, it is difficult to find positions for post-communist states that are strategically different from that proposed by the Georgian Government. It is true there exists the attempt to revive "neosocialist" ideology but there is probably no foundation for this in Georgia. Quite recently, it was possible to discuss the pace of economic reforms; today, however, this discussion likewise has no foundation.

Whether reform should proceed by stages or in leaps and bounds is today an obsolete question. Reform has already become a reality and demands answers to other types of questions: How will the reform of state enterprises proceed? Who will receive a dividend on behalf of the state? When will holding companies be formed? And so forth.

11. State property is being privatized for the first time through the reform of state enterprises and their transformation into joint-stock companies. There will be no commercial interests for foreign state corporations. They will merge to form holding companies. Not one state administrative body will interfere in economic activities. They will fulfill a supervisory function. The state will enter the economy as an ordinary subject. The present level of the private sector will not be sufficient to compete with the state sector. Therefore, the state will implement a program of comprehensive support for entrepreneurship. If it were not for the time factor, such a program would have been adopted. Furthermore, a fund for aiding small business will be created into which the Government will also put budgetary expenditure in order to create a competitive environment. Privatization is not an end in itself but represents a way of correcting the economic imbalance. The already formed powerful state sector in Georgia will probably remain for quite a long time but under different conditions and different rules of the game.

12. The continuation of the war, the rise in unemployment, the non-establishment of economic ties, the economic decline, weather, and other factors and their long-term effect and intensity could possibly necessitate the introduction of changes to the tactics underlying the economic policy but this will not be able to change and the Georgian Government will not change the strategy behind the economic policy.

Gamsakhurdia Supporters Hold Rally in Poti

LD0308151093 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Deputies of the former Supreme Soviet have tried to destabilize the situation in Poti. They managed to hold unauthorized rallies in the town on 31 July; however, the local population did not support them in this. The Poti mayor's office and law enforcement bodies took all measures to preserve stability. Approaches to the town are now controlled. It is calm. The port, flour mill, and other strategic sites are working properly.

Gamsakhurdia Urges Soldiers To Disobey Shevardnadze

AU0408121093 Tbilisi IBERIA-SPEKTRI in Georgian 28 Jul-3 Aug 93 p 1

[Address by the Persecuted President (Zviad Gamsakhurdia) to All Georgian Fighters Located in Abkhazia" delivered on 20 July; place not given]

[Text] It has become more and more clear of late that E. Shevardnadze's "diplomatic maneuvering" around the Abkhazian problem is aimed at capitulating to the Abkhazian separatists and the Russian imperial forces; preparations are being made for a so-called Tskhinvali variant, the introduction of "peaceful forces" into the conflict zone, and the surrender of Sukhumi, which is being persistently demanded by the Russian and Abkhazian side. E. Shevardnadze is vaguely speaking about some kind of "demilitarization" of Abkhazia and the removal of all soldiers from the conflict zone, which is unrealistic and can only be used by the enemy in order to gain a decisive strategic advantage.

At an earlier meeting between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze, it was planned to remove heavy equipment and artillery from Sukhumi, which means the surrender of Sukhumi. The plan for a so-called tripartite treaty proposed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister B. Pastukhov bears witness to this. The withdrawal of the Georgian Army from Sukhumi signifies the removal of the Georgian population as 90 percent of the armed forces are made up of the local population. The surrender of Sukhumi will be followed by the surrender of the whole of Abkhazia and all this signifies the genocide and deportation of the Georgian population.

I call upon all Georgian fighters and commanders located on Abkhazian territory and the population of all Georgia not to obey the orders of E. Shevardnadze and his communist regime; not to surrender a single handful of Abkhazian soil—ancient Georgian soil; not to surrender to the enemy positions that have already been won; to restore Georgia's territorial integrity!; to remember that the border of the state of the Republic of Georgia stretches to the River Psou!

God and justice is with us! We will be victorious!

[Signed] Zviad Gamsakhurdia, president of the Republic of Georgia

[Dated] 20 July 1993

South Ossetians Insist on Talks With Russia

PM0408093793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Vitaliy Denisov report: "Shaky Equilibrium in South Ossetia May Be Disrupted"]

[Text] No talks between the Russian Federation and Georgia on the problems of South Ossetia will bear fruit without plenipotentiary representatives of the autonomous republic taking part in them. That is the opinion of the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet Presidium.

People in Georgia are seriously concerned by South Ossetian leaders' recent statements with their blatantly separatist tones. Georgian parliamentary deputies are

already saying that the situation in this region may deteriorate at any moment and escape the peacekeeping forces' control.

South Ossetian Official on Peace in Region

PM0408103393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 30 Jul 93 p 2

[Report on interview with Oleg Teziyev, chairman of the South Ossetian Council of Ministers, by Alan Kasayev; place and date not given: "Standard of Security. No Shooting in South Ossetia for a Year Now"]

[Text] The other day Russian Government Vice Premier Sergey Shakhrai reported that the concept of a peacekeeping policy in the Caucasus must be based on a comprehensive approach toward the region's problems: A conflict cannot be settled if another one is continuing to fester. It is no secret that the "South Ossetian factor" is still one of the factors determining the situation in the region, which is why Russians are closely following what is happening in Tskhinvali. Exactly a year has passed since peacekeeping subunits of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian servicemen entered the conflict area and there is rarely any shooting there now, but calm has still not returned to this long-suffering land. Why? At the request of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's correspondent, Oleg Teziyev, chairman of the South Ossetian Council of Ministers, comments on the situation that has developed in the republic:

The past year has revealed both the indisputably positive aspects of and the rather substantial flaws in the Dagomys settlement. The main and undoubtedly most valuable positive result was the ending of the mass extermination of the peaceful population by official and unofficial Georgian armed formations, which made it possible to return a significant proportion of refugees to their own homes and begin a gradual return to the standards of a peaceful and relatively safe life in the region. At the same time the absence in the year-old treaty of clear provisions concerning the revival of South Ossetia's socioeconomic organism, long-term guarantees of its security, and—what is especially important—real ways of and deadlines for solving the problem of political and legal status is a potentially destabilizing factor which to a considerable extent devalues the positive results achieved.

The past year brought neither a decrease in the level of mutual distrust and alienation between the region's Ossetian and Georgian populations, nor a reduction in the polarity of the political aims of official Tskhinval and Tbilisi. The virtual economic and transport blockade of

South Ossetia by Georgia, statements by representatives of the Tbilisi leadership about the impermissibility of recognizing the actual fact of South Ossetia's existence as a special territorial unit, periodic demands for the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces and the restoration of the Georgian administration's authority here—naturally backed up with the appropriate force, and the continuing policy of suppressing ethnic minorities in Abkhazia and other Georgian regions convince South Ossetians that peaceful coexistence with Georgia within the framework of a united or even federative state is impossible in the foreseeable future and that a certain level of readiness to repel possible aggression must be maintained. The situation is made worse by the uncertainty of Russia's position on the question of South Ossetia's future status, the lack of Moscow's official confirmation that peacekeeping forces will not be withdrawn until the conflict has been completely settled, and behind-the-scenes work on the draft Russian-Georgian treaty, which lacks any guarantee of the former Georgian autonomous entities' rights. But on the other hand the introduction of border-zone regulations and procedures on the border between North and South Ossetia is envisaged. All this is an additional argument for Tskhinval to rely primarily on its own forces to defend its sovereignty, and prompts it to seek new channels for acquiring weapons and new allies.

At present the option least acceptable to the vast majority of South Ossetia's population for solving the political status problem is the conclusion of a confederative treaty with Georgia with reliable international (Russian) guarantees. At the same time it is obvious that South Ossetia will sign such a treaty only with Abkhazia, and should the latter acquire a higher level of autonomy this is precisely the level South Ossetia will aim for.

Any form of legal mutual relations between South Ossetia and Georgia which presupposes Tbilisi control of any significant aspects of South Ossetia's political, economic, and cultural life—an autonomous entity or a constitutional or even probably a treaty-based federation—will in no circumstances now be accepted by the living generation of South Ossetians, while attempts to force such mutual relations will inevitably cause armed opposition, which is being made much easier by the existence of a considerable quantity of weapons in both the Republic of South Ossetia's official military formations and the population's hands, as well as by reliable guarantees of support from well-known circles in North Caucasus, primarily North Ossetia, and Russia. However, events could develop according to this scenario even without a substantial impetus from outside, merely because of the accumulated critical mass of political, economic, and social problems in the unrecognized, blockaded republic which has been left to its fate.

Estonia

Laar Refuses To Confirm Defense Minister's Resignation

LD0408093893 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0900 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Excerpt] The mass media has reported today that Defense Minister Hain Rebas has handed in his letter of resignation. We have no confirmation of this report but the defense minister's secretary informed Estonian radio that Hain Rebas would not be taking part in the "Week-day" [Argipäev] program, as he had promised previously. Our Tartu correspondent Urmas Paet asked Prime Minister Mart Laar to comment on this unconfirmed news.

[Begin recording] [Paet] Mr. Prime Minister, excuse me, please. One question from Estonian Radio's [word indistinct] news: Is it true that Defense Minister Hain Rebas has signed his letter of resignation?

[Laar] I cannot comment on that at present.

[Paet] So you say he has not signed it?

[Laar] I am not saying anything. [end recording]

Prime Minister Mart Laar added that he has not seen a letter from Defense Minister Hain Rebas. [passage omitted]

Laar on Criminal Case Against Light Infantry Company

WS0308124693 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1834 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, Aug 2—Prime Minister Mart Laar back from his leave of absence on Monday [2 August] said Estonia's defence police had started a criminal case in connection with events in the rebellious Laanemaa light infantry company that was ordered to disband, the government press office told ETA. The company had not surrendered its arms to the government as ordered last Tuesday.

Monday morning, the defence police at gunpoint stopped a car the deputy commander of the light infantry company, Jaak Mosin, and deputy chairman of the parliamentary defence committee, Peeter Lorents, were using.

Lorents interpreted the incident as an attack against his parliamentary immunity and an attempt to aggravate the crisis over the company.

He called on a special session of the Estonian parliament, the Riigikogu, to be convened to find a non-violent solution to the conflict.

The defence police said deputy commander Jaak Mosin was also suspected to have incited unrest in the Kuperjanov battalion last summer.

The company commander Asso Kommer told ETA the company considered the arrest of Mosin as a provocative act and that he had difficulties in withholding his men from freeing their deputy commander by force.

Last night, two officers belonging to another army unit were detected and detained in the company vicinity. The two officers from Kalevi battalion, located at Jagala, North Estonia, were released after half-an-hour detention. Asso Kommer denied rumours that any hostages had been taken by the company.

The statement by the Defence Minister, issued on Sunday morning, stresses that every leader had to answer for his subordinates and not to set them on their own-invented foes, using patriotic bathos. He notes that he and the commander-in-chief of the Defence Forces had been made into such foes at Pullapaa. The minister called on the company leaders to lay down their arms and surrender themselves to justice.

Rebas visited the company at its Pullapaa base on Sunday, answering the soldiers' questions and explaining the views expressed in his statement.

The Laanemaa light infantry company, which last week declared its separation from the national defence forces and formation of a new national army unit, was ordered to disband by the government last Tuesday. Defence Minister Hain Rebas broke off his leave to enforce the decision.

The leaders of the company argue they have nothing against the government nor any political demands, they only object to the present order of military service which is still in many areas not regulated by the law. The company commander Asso Kommer, however, has said that the men would not let themselves to be disbanded by force.

Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste who acted as Prime Minister at the start of the conflict has expressed the government's intention to avoid any violence.

Talks were held over the company's fate at its main base at Pullapaa, West Estonia. Two members of the Riigikogu, Enn Tarto and Peeter Lorents, are continually staying at Pullapaa.

On Friday, the government ruled the company leaders Asso Kommer, Jaak Mosin, Lembit Tons and Juhan Kodar had to leave the unit as soon as the new company leadership appointed by the government arrived to take over the command, and to appeal to the court for any legal issues to be settled. They were obliged not to contact the unit's personnel before the court verdict.

The company's behaviour was also condemned in an official statement by the voluntary Defence League leadership on Friday.

Infantry Retracts Resolution on Withdrawal From Forces

WS0308143693 Tallinn BNS in English 1314 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Pullapaa, Estonia, Aug 03, BNS—The Estonian Volunteer Infantry Company based at Pullapaa sent a letter to the government Monday [2 August] to retract its resolution on withdrawing from the Estonian defense forces.

BNS brings below the full text of the letter:

"Herewith we declare that the Laanemaa Volunteer Infantry Company has never opposed the constitutional government of the Republic of Estonia or the Constitution, and retracts the July 25, 1993, statement by the Laanemaa Volunteer Infantry company's personnel, citizens of the Republic of Estonia, about our withdrawal from under the command of the Estonian defense forces. We presume on our part that the government suspends its decision on dissolving and disarming the infantry company.

"In this connection we consider it essential that legislative work on the acts regulating the activity of the defense forces be intensified. The general staff of the Estonian defense forces needs reforming and staffing with officers loyal to the Republic of Estonia.

"We also insist that Major Mosin be freed since his detention does not conform to legislation of the Republic of Estonia."

The letter to the government was drawn up by the company's chief, Asso Kommer, and signed by the personnel who also signed the company's declaration on splitting from the defense forces.

Kommer told BNS that the situation in the company and around the Pullapaa base Monday night and Tuesday morning was peaceful. He said most of the police patrols on the roads leading to Pullapaa have been withdrawn, and only "single policemen" have been seen moving about.

Kommer said that not a single government or defense forces' general staff representative visited the infantry company either Monday or Tuesday morning.

The government plans to discuss the Pullapaa crisis at its session Tuesday.

Admiral Gromov Signs Pact Handing Over Safety Equipment

LD0308144593 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1300 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Admiral Feliks Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Navy, and Andi Meister, Estonian roads and communications minister, signed an agreement in Tallinn today handing over the Russian hydrography service located in Estonia to Estonia. Minister Juri Luik

[without portfolio, in charge of talks with Russia] said to ETA [Estonian Telegraph Agency] that some details of the agreement had been clarified during their meeting and that, according to the agreement, by 15 September all the hydrography equipment previously administered by Russia but located in Estonia will be handed over. Luik said that, during his meeting with Admiral Gromov, the withdrawal of the Russian Navy from Estonia had been talked about, with practical issues like deadlines, building houses, transportation, and other issues under discussion. Admiral Gromov left Tallinn today.

To Visit 4 Aug

WS0308124293 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1835 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, August 2—The commander-in-chief of the Russian navy, Admiral Feliks Gromov, is expected to visit Estonia on Wednesday [4 August] to sign an agreement on hydrography service and hold talks on Russian navy pullout from Estonia, well-informed sources informed ETA.

The commander of the Russian navy's Baltic fleet, admiral Vladimir Yegorov, arrived in Tallinn on Monday to prepare the visit.

Hydrography service that used to be the responsibility of the former Soviet navy has been a source of controversy between Estonia and Russia as Russia has been taking its equipment to Russia instead of handing them over to Estonia thus endangering maritime traffic in Estonian waters.

Views Handover of Paldiski

LD0308173393 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1600 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The Russian Navy intends to hand over the major part of the town of Paldiski to Estonia once they receive guarantees from the Estonian side on the townspeople's rights. This is what Admiral Feliks Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Navy, stated today on his visit to Tallinn. According to Gromov, steps on both sides are required for a handover agreement on the structures unconnected with the Russian submarine staff's training center. At the same time the commander in chief added that it is not easy to resolve the issue of Paldiski as a whole, as the town was built for a specific purpose. The handover of the whole town will be on the agenda once the technical issues to do with the nuclear reactors have been resolved.

Luik Cited on Prospects for Stabilization

PM0308130593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 2

[Sergey Knyazkov report: "Estonia Seeks Solution to Social Crisis"]

[Text] "Political dialogue between the Russian and Estonian communities would help stabilize the situation in the republic," Juri Luik, Estonian delegation head at the talks with Russia, told RIA's correspondent.

According to him, the Estonian Government is pinning great hopes on the "new free elections" to local organs of power to be held this fall, but as a result of which, I would point out, noncitizens of Estonia cannot be elected to local organs of power. However, in Luik's opinion, the work of the government commission to extricate Narva's industrial enterprises from crisis is of no small importance in stabilizing the situation in the republic.

Yeltsin Aide Blames Estonia for Narva Tensions

PM0408090993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 93
p 2

[Lembit Annus report: "The Term 'Noncitizen' Was Devised in Estonia"]

[Text] Narva—The need for a four-day visit to the Estonian Republic by a Russian Federation delegation was brought about by increased tension in connection with the referendums held in Narva and Sillamae, Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Deputy Abdulakh Mikitayev, delegation head and chairman of the Commission for Citizenship Questions under the Russian president, stated at a press conference in Narva.

According to A. Mikitayev, in questions of citizenship the Estonian side allows national legislation to take precedence over international norms and agreements, and applies the principle retroactivity [obratnoye deystviye]. This may lead to future complications. He asserted that the term "noncitizen" was devised by Estonian parliamentarians themselves. International law does not recognize it.

He stressed: "We can in no way admit that the referendums in Narva and Sillamae were initiated by the Russian side.

"These acts were 90-percent prompted by the actions of the Estonian authorities themselves, and by the improper approach to resolving citizenship questions. Russia had nothing to do with this. At the same time, we reminded the Estonian leaders that international agreements should take precedence.

"Russia will never turn its back on ethnic Russians," A. Mikitayev concluded. "But nor will it exert economic pressure on Estonia. We will act only through political and diplomatic methods."

Citizens League Leader Predicts Fatherland To Lose Election

WS0308124993 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1850 GMT 2 Aug 93

[From 31 July PUHAPAEVALEHT, p 6]

[Text] Monday, August 2—Leader of the Estonian Citizens League (EKL) Juri Toomepuu held a news conference on the local elections. He expressed his firm conviction that the ruling "Fatherland" coalition will lose and invited the independent candidates to join the EKL lists. The EKL will publish again the programmes of the "Fatherland" to demonstrate its failure to keep its promises, he added. The EKL has 25 local cells currently, but the League intends to increase the number to 30 so as to cover the entire country. Toomepuu was also optimistic about the gathering of signatures in order to amend the constitution, the citizenship law and the elections law.

RAHVA HAAL To Be Sold, Privatized

WS0308130793 Tallinn BNS BALTIC BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 1016 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Text] Estonia's second largest newspaper, RAHVA HAAL, will be sold off, as part of the privatization program in the country, for not less than 3.3 mln kroons. This figure was reported to be the best offer received for the newspaper by the State Property Department by the beginning of July.

According to information available, there were only three offers. The first was made by the RH Joint Stock Company set up by the newspaper's employees. The second was connected with the well-known businessman Andres Bergman. The third came from a group of private individuals closely linked with the ruling Pro-Patria Party.

Those who offered less have until August 4 to change their offer and conditions.

Rahva Haal is Tallinn's major newspaper and the nation's second largest. It sells over 50,000 copies per day in a format of 8-12 pages, 6 days per week.

Ulmanis Receives Outgoing British Ambassador

WS0308130693 Tallinn BNS in English 1833 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Text] RIGA, Aug 02, BNS—British Ambassador Richard Christopher Samuel paid a farewell visit to Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis Monday [2 August].

Samuel voiced his country's strong support in Latvia's bid for a speedy withdrawal of Russian troops. Great Britain does not bind the withdrawal with the problems of ethnic minorities in Latvia, he said.

Samuel said he hoped that all the problems, including that of citizenship, would be resolved democratically and in keeping with the internationally accepted norms.

Latvia

New Cabinet Discusses Pensions, Talks With Russia

LD0308184793 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1700 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The first sitting of the new Cabinet of Ministers ended half an hour ago. It was opened by President Guntis Ulmanis, who wished success to the new government. On the question of differentiating pensions, it was decided at the session to set up a special commission which, in the course of a month, must prepare for the Saeima a draft for increasing pensions and benefits.

A delegation was appointed for the talks with Russia, and it will be led in future by Martins Virsis. Agriculture Minister Janis Kinna reported that by 1 September the government will have settled accounts for the grain purchased from farmers last fall.

The reorganization of ministries was also discussed. Among other things, the Ministries of Forestry and of Culture are to retain the status of juridical persons, included respectively within the Ministries of Agriculture and of Education, Science, and Culture. During the discussion of this question, Minister of State Raimonds Pauls (?left) the cabinet session, dissatisfied with the originally proposed elimination of the Ministry of Culture.

Sets Up Five Committees

LD0208181993 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1700 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Cabinet has set up five committees. They are: the Defense Committee, the Economic and Finance Committee, the Committee on Social and Education Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Committee on the State and Rights.

Gorbunovs Requests International Observers at Russia Talks

LD3007222093 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1700 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] In talks with the French and British ambassadors, Anatoliy Gorbunovs emphasized that Latvia will maintain its request with international organizations to send observers to the Latvian- Russian bilateral talks, so that the question of the withdrawal of troops will be inspected as the minority issue is.

During the talks, there was also the discussion of further possibilities for interparliamentary cooperation, as well as the exchange of experiences by parliamentary officials. For the British ambassador, this was a farewell visit.

Saeima Deputy Resigns for Health Reasons

LD0208164793 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1500 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Text] Because of a health condition which requires long treatment and stay outside Latvia, Visvaldis Varnesis Klive, representing the Latvian Union of Peasants, has resigned his mandate of a Saeima deputy. For the past three years, Professor Klive has actively worked at the Theology Department of the Latvian University, which has resumed its work.

The mandate of a Saeima deputy now goes to Martins Kalnins, an engineer from the United States, who is the next one on the list of candidates from the Latvian Union of Peasants.

New Defense Minister Views Tasks on Taking Office

LD0308190093 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1700 GMT 3 Aug 93

[text] The prime minister believes that the main task of the Defense Ministry is to ensure and strengthen Latvia's independence and the nation's security. For his part, in his address to Ministry officials, [Defense Minister] Pavlovskis, emphasized that the defense of Latvia is the sacred duty of its citizens, and at present the Latvian people have been given a unique opportunity to go down in world history having their own national and state identity.

Prime Minister on Budget Difficulties, Pensions

LD0308230393 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
2000 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Excerpt] How did the first session of the new cabinet of ministers, which was held today, propose to resolve the issue the protesting pensioners. This was reported by Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs.

[Begin Birkavs recording] The first thing we noted at the session of the Cabinet of Ministers was the big budget deficit, which amounts to 55 million lats. The first question is where to get the money to cover this deficit at all. We will be introducing a certain system, and straight away, in a few days, the bills will be ready, on a unified sales tax rate, or more exactly, an increased sales tax rate, and on a share tax, on gasoline, on diesel fuel, on separate categories of light cars, as well as what we envisaged in the program. While increasing indirect taxation, at the same time we will try to reduce income tax too, quite considerably. So, the money acquired as a result will be directed at pensioners and those badly off. For pensioners, 6 million lats will give an opportunity to increase pensions on average by 16.7 percent. Six million in (?necessary) material assistance to the badly off: so the first thing we want to achieve is to differentiate pensions, giving bigger ones to some, but not giving smaller ones to anyone. As for further possible sources of funds: We will mobilize to the maximum the state revenue service, the

special service that is formed so that taxes will come through inescapable channels, so that everyone will pay—of course that will be (?achieved)—and we will reduce the number of ministries. At the ministries themselves there must be a rationalization of work. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Prime Minister Receives Russian Ambassador

WS0408084693 Riga LETA in English 1100 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Riga, August 3 (LETA)—Monday [2 August], Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs received Russian Ambassador in Latvia Aleksandr Rannich. The ambassador handed over the letter of congratulation to the head of the Latvian government from the Russian Federation Prime Minister Victor Chernomirdin in connection with the appointment to a high post. The letter expressed confidence that Russian and Latvian interests correspond the development of the two countries relations as good-neighbourly in the spirit of cooperation with the strict observance of the international law, human rights, norms and principles.

During the talk Mr. Birkavs noted the fact that on the first governmental meeting, apparently, the new delegation will be appointed for the negotiations with Russia. This will allow to renew the dialogue between the two countries, taking into special consideration the issue of the Russian troops withdrawal. Mr. Rannich expressed his satisfaction with the complete decision to pass over the Parfenov's case, the black berets officer, which till now has brought tension into the relations of both states, to the Russian authorities. In his view the Supreme Council of Russia according to the 1920 peace agreement will not elaborate any decision that would exacerbate the situation.

New Conservative Alliance Formed

LD3107155093 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 2000 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] On 30 July, the Union of 18 November and the Tevzeme [Fatherland] Latvian National Union concluded an agreement on political cooperation in a unified national conservative political organization, the Union for the Fatherland and Freedom [Apvieniba Tevzemei un Brivibai]. The practical basis for this cooperation is the experience of political cooperation gained during the pre-election campaign.

The Union has announced that its activity will be based on the pre-election program of the electoral alliance 'For the Fatherland and Freedom' as well as programs of the two constituent organizations. A coordinating council of the Union is being formed, consisting of deputies from the faction 'For the Fatherland and Freedom', as well as three representatives of each of the constituent organizations. On Friday, the first sitting of the Coordinating Council took place, at which Janis Straume was elected chairman, and his deputy Janis Jakobsons.

Lithuania

Brazauskas Urged Not To Sign Treaty on Troop Withdrawal

LD0308222993 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The Lithuanian state delegation for the negotiations with Russia proposes that President Algirdas Brazauskas postpone his intended meeting with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow and that he definitely does not sign the draft treaty proposed by Russia.

At present the Russian Army is being withdrawn from Lithuania in accordance with a previously coordinated schedule. Less than a month remains to 1 September, the deadline of the withdrawal. Russian hopes that this Thursday, during the planned meeting between Brazauskas and Boris Yeltsin, a bilateral treaty on the withdrawal of the Army is signed.

Virgilijus Bulovas, the head of the Lithuanian state delegation for the negotiations with Russia, speaking to journalists today, announced that the draft of that treaty, submitted and unilaterally initialled by Russia, was totally unacceptable to Lithuania because according to the treaty Russia is obliged to compensate Lithuania for damage inflicted only from January 1992, not from the beginning of the occupation, that is, from 1940, as is demanded by Lithuania. Damages calculated by Lithuania amount to 146 billion U.S. dollars.

The Lithuanian negotiating team has prepared an alternative version of the treaty where the sides state their intention to continue negotiations on the compensation of damages. It is stated further that the withdrawal of the Army is not the affair of the treaty but an obligation of Russia as the inheritor of the Soviet Union's duties.

The Lithuanian state negotiating delegation, according to Bulovas, is prepared to go to Moscow at any time and continue negotiations with the Russians, but the president is recommended not to sign the proposed treaty.

Brazauskas must announce tomorrow morning whether or not he is going to Moscow to meet with Yeltsin.

Brazauskas Cancels 5 Aug Visit to Moscow

LD0408102493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1001 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Vilnius August 4—Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas has cancelled his visit to Moscow on Thursday, ITAR-TASS learned from sources close to the president. The reason for the move was not immediately known.

Brazauskas was expected to meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Thursday to sign an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from his country, the Lithuanian president's press office said.

Leader of the Lithuanian state delegation to negotiations with Russia is due to fly to Moscow on Wednesday.

Russian Officials Barred From Signing Agreements

PM0308130893 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Excerpt] Virgilijus Bulovas, member of the Lithuanian Seimas and head of the Lithuanian state negotiations delegation has told ELTA that by initialling the draft treaty on troop withdrawals, Russia had acted incorrectly. The paragraphs dealing with compensation for damage to Lithuania remain unacceptable. According to Virgilijus Bulovas, Lithuania wants it recorded in the treaty that Russia recognizes the damage made to Lithuania by the Soviet armed forces and that the compensation for it should be the subject for further interstate negotiations.

According to unofficial sources the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has warned all departments in Russia that no economic or other agreements should yet be signed with Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Official Says Russian Troop Withdrawal on Schedule

LD0308145093 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The Baltic News Service agency reported that there were apparently no specific indications that would suggest that the pullout of the Russian troops had been suspended. This was reported to a BNS correspondent by Stasys Knezys, chief of staff and the authorized representative of the Lithuanian Government regarding matters related to the withdrawal of Russian troops.

According to Knezys, the pullout of troops is proceeding according to schedule, and no notice about the suspension of the troop withdrawal has been received from the Russian servicemen. Knezys also reported that he had a telephone conversation with representatives from the prompt action group at the Russian Defense Ministry on the withdrawal of the troops from Lithuania. No other subject except how to make the final stage of the pullout of the troops more efficient was touched upon, Chief of Staff Knezys maintained.

About 3,000 Russian servicemen still remain in Lithuania. A year ago, in September of last year, this number was 22,000. According to Knezys, the troops are being withdrawn completely from all the remaining units.

Army 'Games' Coincide With Russian Exercises

PM0308124793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Sergey Knyazkov report: "Exercises in the Baltic. Involving Two Armies at Once"]

[Text] As you know, August is the last month that Russian Army units and subunits are stationed on Lithuanian territory. The date of the banquet which the Lithuanian leadership intends to hold in the former Defense Ministry building in Kaunas, which for many years housed the staff of a Soviet—later Russian—airborne assault division, to celebrate their pullout, is even known... Meanwhile the first Lithuanian Army operational "games" code-named... "Barrier-93" were held in the Baltic Sea. Typically, they were held simultaneously with exercises conducted by Russian Baltic Fleet forces in neighboring Kaliningrad Oblast.

The fact that the two countries' military groupings carried out an exercise at the same time is nonetheless presumably a coincidence.

Landsbergis on Negotiations With Russia

WS0408071793 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1617 GMT 2 Aug 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 299]

[Text] Vilnius, July 31 (ELTA)—The leader of the Seimas opposition Vytautas Landsbergis has referred to the last week declaration of the head of Russian team at negotiations with Lithuania Victor Isayev as to the song from the old repertoire. V. Isayev considers the position of Lithuania at negotiations as non-active. In V. Landsbergis words, similar declarations claiming that negotiations are being delayed "undue to Russia's fault" have been made before but all propaganda against Lithuania had failed. Vytautas Landsbergis suggests that Lithuanian government and Foreign Ministry, as it was done before, should [keep] a "White Diary" which would note the process of negotiations and would indicate who is to blame for cleavages. The leader of the opposition has noticed that this diary published in Lithuanian, Russian and English languages has served as an effective propaganda weapon against Russia's attacks on Lithuania. In his comments on the Germany's refusal to pay compensations for the damage caused to Lithuanian people during the years of Nazi occupation by motivating that all reparations have been paid to the former USSR immediately after the war, Vytautas Landsbergis noticed that compensation had been paid to the "wrong way". This question must be settled in the Russian-German or perhaps trilateral negotiations. Vytautas Landsbergis expressed his worry about the information provided by the Seimas Foreign Committee Chairman Kazys Bobelis. It indicates the intensified migration of Russian population to the region of Kaliningrad. If the German migration into this regions also begins, then this area could become a potential spot for the national conflicts between the immigrating Germans and already settled Russians. Vytautas Landsbergis thinks that this justifies the presence of the Russian army in this region for there could be no other reason for the "Iron Fist" in the center of Europe.

Foreign Minister's Comments on Moscow Visit Reported

WS0408105993 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1923 GMT 3 Aug 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 300a]

[Text] Vilnius, Aug. 3, ELTA—Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys' urgent visit to Moscow last Thursday, details of which had not yet been made public by the foreign ministry, caused numerous discussions among politicians as well as in press, "Lietuvos Rytas" writes. Mr. Gylys repeatedly asserted that talks in Moscow centered around the Russian army pullout as well as around pending Lithuanian president's visit to Moscow. Whether the president will go to Moscow will depend on how the negotiating sides will manage to agree on controversial articles in agreement on compensation of damage done to Lithuania, according to Mr. Gylys. According to "Lietuvos Rytas", Lithuanian president Algirdas Brazauskas received a letter from Russian president Boris Yeltsin shortly after Mr. Gylys' visit in which invitation had been extended to visit Moscow on August 5 with the view to sign an agreement on the Russian army pullout. Copies of the letter have been passed to Lithuanian premier and foreign minister. Speaking on radio on Monday, Lithuanian prime minister pointed to a possible Mr. Brazauskas' meeting with Mr. Yeltsin this

week and to a signing of agreement on free trade with Russia on Thursday. Meanwhile, the president's aids have not provided any concrete details concerning the Russian president's letter and scheduled talks. Mr. Isakov, who leads the Russian negotiating team repeatedly assured "Lietuvos Rytas" of the presidents' meeting due this week, most probably on August 5. According to Mr. Isakov, Russia has agreed to compensate Lithuania for damage done covering the period since the foreign army on Lithuania's territory had been officially given status of the Russian army (former USSR army was officially renamed into Russian army in January, 1992). "Tiesa" and "Respublika" dailies also contain articles on the scheduled meeting between Lithuanian and Russian presidents.

Government Issues Decree on Foreign Currency

WS0408110193 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1923 GMT 3 Aug 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 300a]

[Text] Vilnius, Aug. 3 (ELTA)—Under a decree by bank of Lithuania and by government, settling accounts in foreign currency was banned from August 1. Trading outlets and services are to receive and pay cash only in litas. The decree is published in "Tiesa".